A+ CATEGORY SCIENTIFIC UNIT

Open topics in fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility

Volume 71 / 2006

Milan Mareš Banach Center Publications 71 (2006), 213-225 MSC: Primary 91A12; Secondary 03E72. DOI: 10.4064/bc71-0-17

Abstract

Vagueness is one of the phenomena which cannot be separated from the real bargaining and cooperative situations. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the recent state-of-art of the modelling of vagueness in coalitional games with transferable utility. It may be recognized in two components of these games, namely, in vague structure of coalitions where each player may simultaneously participate in several of them, and in vague expectations of coalitional pay-offs. Both these cases are described in the paper and approaches to including them into the game model are analyzed. An attempt to unify both cases into one uniform model is discussed as well.

Authors

  • Milan MarešInstitute of Information Theory and Automation
    Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
    P.O. Box 18
    182 08 Praha 8
    Czech Republic
    e-mail

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