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Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players

Tom 71 / 2006

Sjur Didrik Flåm, Andrzej Wieczorek Banach Center Publications 71 (2006), 115-123 MSC: C70. DOI: 10.4064/bc71-0-9

Streszczenie

The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.

Autorzy

  • Sjur Didrik FlåmDepartment of Economics
    University of Bergen
    Hermann Foss gt. 6
    5007 Bergen
    Norway
    e-mail
  • Andrzej WieczorekInstitute of Computer Science
    Polish Academy of Sciences
    Ordona 21
    01-237 Warszawa
    Poland
    e-mail

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