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Bilateral sequential bargaining with perfect information and different protocols

Tom 71 / 2006

Robert Golański Banach Center Publications 71 (2006), 147-161 MSC: Primary 91A05, 91A10. DOI: 10.4064/bc71-0-12

Streszczenie

Most research done in the bargaining literature concentrates on the situations in which players get to be proposers alternately, with the first player being the proposer in the first period, the second player being the proposer in the second period, and so on until the cycle ends and the order of proposers is repeated. However, allowing for only this kind of order is a rather simplifying assumption. This paper looks at the situation in which we allow for much more general kind of protocols. We characterize the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for two players with different discount factors, give a closed-form solution for the equilibrium payoff and finally analyze the properties of the bargaining power of the players as the function of such elements as their discount factors or their relative position and frequency of being proposers within each bargaining cycle.

Autorzy

  • Robert GolańskiDepartment of Mathematical Economy
    Warsaw School of Economics
    Al. Niepodleg/lości 162
    02-554 Warszawa
    Poland
    e-mail

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