

# The number of countable generic models for finite forcing

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Abstract. We give a characterization of forcing-complete theories and of types which are realized in generic models. Then, we use these results to prove a sufficient condition for the existence of 2% denumerable generic models.

We prove the following theorem:

THEOREM. Suppose that  $T^{\dagger}$  is a complete forcing-companion of a denumerable language, and suppose that  $T^{\dagger}$  has no prime-model. Then  $T^{\dagger}$  has  $2^{\aleph_0}$  denumerable generic models.

0. Notations. L is a denumerable first-order language with equality and  $T^f$  is the forcing-companion of a theory T in (see [1]). We denote by  $B_n$  ( $n \in \omega$ ) the partial boolean algebras for  $T^f$ . For simplicity, we identify a formula with its equivalence class modulo  $T^f$ . In the sequel,  $T^f$  is assumed to be complete without a finite model. We denote by  $B = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} B_n$  the boolean algebra for  $T^f$ . M is said to be a prime-model for  $T^f$  if M is elementarily embeddable in any other model of  $T^f$ .  $B_n$  is said to be atomic if for every  $\varphi \neq 0$ , there exists a  $\varphi$  atom of  $B_n$  such that  $\varphi \leqslant \varphi$ . A type is a proper filter of B. We denote by  $\bigwedge_{i \in I} a_i$  the greatest lower bound (if it exists) of a family. The concept of the least upper bound is defined similarly. For notions and results concerning finite forcing in model theory, the reader is referred to [1], [7]. Other notions will be introduced when necessary.

## 1. Properties.

LEMMA 1. Suppose T is a theory of L. M completes T if and only if for every formula  $\varphi(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})$  of L and any n-tuple  $\langle a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1} \rangle$  of |M| (domain of M), if  $M \models \varphi(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1})$ , there exists an existential formula  $\psi(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})$  such that:

(a)  $\psi \leqslant \varphi$  (for T),

b)  $M \models \psi(a_0, ..., a_{n-1}).$ 

Proof. M completes T if and only if  $T \cup D(M)$  (D(M)): diagram of M) is a complete set of sentences for the language L(M). A simple application of the theorem of compacity gives the result.

In [3], A. Macintyre uses this characterization to prove that T-generic structures are axiomatizable by a sentence of  $L_{\omega_1\omega}$ . In the sequel, we denote by  $\Sigma_{\varphi} = \{ \neg | \psi / \psi \text{ an existential formula such that } \psi \leqslant \varphi \} \cup \{\varphi\}$ .

Lemma 2. M completes T if and only if M omits  $\Sigma_{\varphi}$  for every formula  $\varphi$  of L.

Proof. If  $M \models \varphi(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1})$ , then there exists an existential formula  $\psi$  such that  $\psi \leqslant \varphi$  and  $M \models \psi(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1})$ . So,  $M \not\models \neg \psi(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1})$  and  $\varSigma_{\varphi}$  is omitted in M. Conversely, if  $M \models \varphi(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1})$ , since  $\varSigma_{\varphi}$  is omitted in M, there exists a  $\neg \psi \in \varSigma_{\varphi}$  such that  $M \not\models \neg \psi(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1})$ . In consequence,  $M \models \psi(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1})$  with  $\psi$  existential  $\leqslant \varphi$ ; so M completes T (Lemma 1).

PROPOSITION 1. A complete theory T of L is equal to its forcing-companion  $T^f$  if and only if, for every formula  $\varphi, \varphi = \bigvee \{\psi | \psi \text{ is an existential formula such that } \psi \leqslant \varphi \}.$ 

Proof. Suppose T is equal to  $T^f$ ; so, by [1] T has a model which completes T. From Lemma 2,  $\Sigma_{\varphi}$  is omitted in M for every formula  $\varphi$ . Since T is complete, this is equivalent to saying that  $\bigwedge \Sigma_{\varphi} = 0$ . But  $\bigwedge \Sigma_{\varphi} = 0$  is equivalent to the fact that:  $\bigwedge \{ \neg \psi / \psi \text{ is an existential formula such that } \psi \leqslant \varphi \} = \neg \varphi$ , which is also equivalent to  $\bigvee \{ \psi / \psi \text{ existential } \leqslant \varphi \} = \varphi$ . Conversely, suppose that  $\varphi = \bigvee \{ \psi / \psi \text{ existential } \leqslant \varphi \}$ ; then  $\bigwedge \Sigma_{\varphi} = 0$ . This property being true for every formula  $\varphi$  of L and L being denumerable, the use of the omitting types theorem proves that there exists a denumerable model M of T which omits every  $\Sigma_{\varphi}$ . Lemma 2 proves that M completes T; so, by [1],  $T = T^f$ .

COROLLARY. A complete theory T is equal to  $T^{l}$  if and only if, for every  $\varphi \neq 0$ , there exists an existential formula  $\varphi$  such that:  $\varphi \neq 0$  and  $\varphi \leqslant \varphi$ .

Proof. The condition is necessary by Proposition 1. The sufficiency is similar to the proof that, in an atomic boolean algebra, every element a is the least upper bound of the atoms less or equal to a [6].

Remarks. 1. In particular, if T is atomic and if atoms are existential formulas, the corollary proves that T = T'. This is the case, for instance, of complete arithmetic Th(N).

2. The complete theories which are forcing-companions have a characterization which is similar to those of atomic theories [8].

Let p be an ultrafilter of  $B_n$ . p is said to be existential if for every  $\varphi \in p$  there exists an existential  $\psi \in B_n$  such that  $\psi \in p$  and  $\psi \leqslant \varphi$ . We write  $\vec{x} = (x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$  in the sequel. p is said to be sur-existential if, for every formula  $\varphi(\vec{x}, y_0, \dots, y_m)$  of B such that  $\exists y_0 \dots y_m \varphi \in p$ , there exists an existential formula  $\psi(\vec{x}, y_0, \dots, y_m)$  such that  $\psi \leqslant \varphi$  and  $\exists y_0 \dots y_m \psi \in p$ .

Lemma 3. p is sur-existential if and only if p is the type of an n-uple  $\langle a_0, ..., a_{n-1} \rangle$  of elements of a denumerable generic structure.

Proof. From Lemma 1 it is clear that if p is the type of  $\langle a_0, ..., a_{n-1} \rangle$ of a generic structure, p is sur-existential. Conversely, suppose that p is sur-existential and consider the language  $L' = L(c_0, ..., c_{n-1})$  obtained by adding to L n new individuals  $c_0, \ldots, c_{n-1}$ . Let  $p(\vec{c})$  be the set of sentences of L' obtained from p by replacing  $x_0, ..., x_{n-1}$  by  $c_0, ..., c_{n-1}$  respectively.  $p(\vec{c})$  is complete in L'. Let  $\delta(\vec{c}, y_0, ..., y_m)$  be a formula of L' whose free variables are among  $y_0, ..., y_m$  ( $\delta$  does not necessarily use every constant  $(c_0, \ldots, c_{n-1})$ , and suppose that  $\delta$  is consistant with  $p(\vec{c})$ , i.e.  $\Xi y_0 \ldots y_m \delta$  $\epsilon p(\vec{c})$ . The formula  $\delta(\vec{x}, y_0, ..., y_m)$  of L obtained by replacing  $\vec{c}$  by  $\vec{x}$  is consistent with  $T^{\dagger}$ ; so, by the corollary, there exists an existential formula  $\psi(\vec{x}, y_0, ..., y_m)$  such that:  $\psi \leq \delta$  and  $\exists y_0 ... y_m \psi \in p$ . The formula  $\psi(\vec{c}, y_0, ..., y_m)$  of L' is existential and satisfies  $p(\vec{c}) \vdash \psi(\vec{c}, y_0, ..., y_m)$  $\rightarrow \delta(\vec{c}, y_0, ..., y_m)$ . Since the formula  $\psi(\vec{c}, y_0, ..., y_m)$  is consistent with  $p(\vec{c})$ , it follows from the corollary that  $p(\vec{c}) = p(\vec{c})^{t}$ . So, let M' be a denumerable  $p(\vec{c})$ -generic structure and let M be the L-reduct of M'; M' exists, see [1]. Let  $N' \supset M'$  be such that  $N' \models p(\vec{c})$ ; then N' > M'. If we consider the L-reduct M of M', we have:  $M \models T^f$  and  $M \models p(\vec{a}_c)$ , where  $\vec{a}_c$  is the assignment of  $\vec{c}$  in M. Suppose that  $N \models T^f$  and  $N \supset M$ . N realizes the existential formulas of  $p(\vec{x})$  in  $\vec{a}_c$ . Since  $p(\vec{x})$  is existential, we have  $N \models p(\vec{a}_c)$ . So, the structure  $N' = (N, \vec{a}_c)$  is an extention of M' and is also a model of  $p(\vec{c})$ . Since M' completes  $p(\vec{c})$ , we have M'  $\ll N'$ . Consequently, the L-reducts M and N of M' and N' satisfy M < N. The structure M is T'-generic and it realizes  $p(\vec{x})$ .

Remarks. The notion of a sur-existential ultrafilter p is adequate for the types of generic models. The notion of an existential ultrafilter is, a priori, weaker; but we have no example of an existential ultrafilter which is not sur-existential. We could try to get such an example for  $\operatorname{Th}(N)$  since there exists only one generic structure which is the standard model N. The following result (oral communication by A. Macintyre) proves that it is impossible.

There exists no non-principal existential ultrafilter for Th(N).

The reason is that there exists a formula  $\theta(x)$  consistent with  $\operatorname{Th}(N)$  such that, for every existential formula  $\psi_1(x)$  and  $\psi_2(x)$  satisfying  $N \models \mathbb{H}_{\infty} x \psi_1(x)$  and  $N \models \mathbb{H}_{\infty} x \psi_2(x)$  ( $\mathbb{H}_{\infty}$  is the quantifier "there is an

infinity of ..."), we have  $\operatorname{Th}(N) \neq \psi_1(x) \to \theta(x)$  and  $\operatorname{Th}(N) \neq \psi_2(x) \to \neg \theta(x)$ . For every ultrafilter  $p, \ \theta \in p$  or  $\neg \theta \in p$ . Suppose p is non-principal. In the first case, if  $\psi(x)$  is an existential of p we have  $N \models \Pi_{\infty} x \psi(x)$ , and so  $\operatorname{Th}(N) \not\models \psi(x) \to \theta(x)$ . The second case is identical. Note that  $\theta(x)$  defines an immune and co-immune set.

Now, we remember that T' has no prime-model; so there is an  $n \ge 1$  such that  $B_n$  is a non-atomic boolean algebra. We denote by  $S_n$  the Stone space of  $B_n$  and by S the Stone space of B.  $\sigma_n$  is the function of Stone defined by

$$\sigma_n \colon \delta(\vec{x}) \mapsto \{p/p \in S_n \text{ and } \delta \in p\}$$
.

Suppose  $\theta(\vec{x}, y_0, ..., y_m)$  is a formula of B. By Proposition 1 we know that  $\theta = \bigvee \{\psi | \psi \text{ is an existential formula of } B \text{ such that } \psi \leqslant \theta\}$ . In fact, we can restrict the family of elements of the second member to the set of  $\psi$  whose free variables are among  $x_0, ..., x_{n-1}, y_0, ..., y_m$ :

$$\theta(\vec{x}, y_0, ..., y_m) = \bigvee \{ \psi(\vec{x}, y_0, ..., y_m) / ... \}$$
.

So, in the sequel we suppose this. We note  $\theta(\vec{x},\vec{y}) = \bigvee \{\psi(\vec{x},\vec{y})/\ldots\}$  It is also easy to prove that  $\exists \vec{y} \theta(\vec{x},\vec{y}) = \bigvee \{\exists \vec{y} \psi(\vec{x},\vec{y})/\psi(\vec{x},\vec{y})\}$  is an existential formula  $\leqslant \theta(\vec{x},\vec{y})\}$ . With each formula  $\delta(\vec{x})$  of  $B_n$  we associate the set  $E_\delta = \{\psi(\vec{x})/\psi(\vec{x}) \in B_n$  and  $\psi(\vec{x}) \leqslant \delta(\vec{x})\}$ , and withe each formula  $\theta(\vec{x},\vec{y})$  of B we associate the set  $E_\delta' = \{\exists \vec{y} \psi(\vec{x},\vec{y})/\psi(\vec{x},\vec{y})\}$  which is an existential formula of  $B \leqslant \theta(\vec{x},\vec{y})\}$ . We have  $\bigvee E_\delta = \delta(\vec{x})$  for each  $\delta \in B_n$ , and  $\bigvee E_\delta' = \exists \vec{y} \theta(\vec{x},\vec{y})$  for each  $\theta \in B$ . We get a denumerable set of least upper bounds and we want to preserve them. We recall that an ultrafilter U of a boolean algebra A is said to preserve the least upper bound  $a = \bigvee_{i \in I} a_i \notin U$ ; otherwise there exists an  $i \in I$  such that  $a_i \in U$ . In the sequel we use the following fondamental result (see, for instance, [5]):

LEMMA 4. Let  $a = \bigvee_{i \in I} a_i$ . The set  $\{p | p \in S(A) \text{ and } p \text{ preserve } a\}$  is a dense open set in the Stone space S(A) of A.

COROLLARY. The set of ultrafilters which preserve a denumerable family of least upper bounds of A is a dense subset of S(A).

Let  $\varphi$  be an incompletable formula of  $B_n$ ; we have the following properties:

**Lemma 5. 1)** The space  $\sigma_n(\phi)$  has no isolated point. In fact,  $\sigma_n(\phi)$  is homeomorphic to the Cantor space  $2^{\omega}$ .

2) The set V of  $p \in S_n$  which preserve both the families  $\bigvee E_\delta$ , for every  $\delta \in B_n$ , and the families  $\bigvee E'_\theta$ , for every  $\theta \in B$ , is a denumerable intersection of dense open sets of  $\sigma_n(\varphi)$ .



3) V is not meager in  $\sigma_n(\varphi)$ .

- 4) V is uncountable.
- $5) \operatorname{Card}(V) = 2^{\aleph_0}.$
- 6) Each element p of V is sur-existential.

Proof. 1) and 2) result from Lemma 4 and its corollary. 3) is a property of Baire spaces (see [2]). 4) follows from 3) and 1) for if V were denumerable, it would be a countable union of nowhere dense sets since the space  $\sigma_n(\varphi)$  has no isolated point, and so V would be meager. 5) V is in fact a borelien set since it is a countable intersection of dense open sets. Since V is uncountable,  $\operatorname{Card}(V) = 2^{\aleph_0}$ . 6) We can easily verify that each p is sur-existential; this follows from the definition of V and from the definition of sur-existential ultrafilters.

In order to prove the theorem, we remark that each countable generic structure realizes only a denumerable set of sur-existentials. Since, by Lemma 3, each sur-existential is realized in a denumerable generic model, there are  $2^{\aleph_0}$  such models.

2. Applications. By using recursivity and specific properties of groups and division rings, A. Macintyre has proved that there exist  $2^{\aleph_0}$  denumerable generic groups and  $2^{\aleph_0}$  denumerable generic division rings (see [3] and [4]). Here, using the above theorem and an omitting types theorem for generic structures (see [3]), we also get this result.

THEOREM (A. Macintyre). 1) There exist  $2^{\aleph_0}$  denumerable generic groups.

2) There exist  $2^{\aleph_0}$  denumerable generic division rings.

Proof. It is implicit in [3] (oral communication of A. Macintyre) that there exists no prime-generic model for  $T^f$  the forcing-companion of the theory of groups (M is a prime-generic model for  $T^f$  if M is elementarily embeddable in all other generics). Suppose  $T^f$  has a prime-model  $M_0$ ; it is easy to see that  $M_0$  is generic. In particular,  $M_0$  is prime-generic: a contradiction. The theorem we have proved shows that  $T^f$  has  $2^{\aleph_0}$  denumerable generic models. These models are the generic models for the theory of groups. The same thing is true for division rings.

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