# The strength of Turing determinacy within second order arithmetic 

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#### Abstract

We investigate the reverse mathematical strength of Turing determinacy up to $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$, which is itself not provable in second order arithmetic.


1. Introduction. Reverse mathematics endeavors to calibrate the complexity of mathematical theorems by determining precisely which system $P$ of axioms is needed to prove a given theorem $\Theta$. This is done in one direction in the usual way showing that $P \vdash \Theta$. The other direction is a "reversal" that shows that relative to some weak base theory, $\Theta \vdash P$. Here one works in the setting of second order arithmetic, i.e. the usual first order language and structure $\langle M,+, \times,<, 0,1\rangle$ supplemented by distinct variables $X, Y, Z$ that range over a collection $S$ of subsets of the domain $M$ of the first order part and the membership relation $\in$ between elements of $M$ and $S$. Most of countable or even separable classical mathematics can be developed in this setting based on very elementary axioms about the first order part of the model $\mathcal{M}$, an induction principle for sets and various set existence axioms. At the bottom one has the weak system of axioms called $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$ that correspond to recursive constructions. One typically then adds additional comprehension (i.e. existence) axioms to get other systems $P$. Many of these systems are given by $\Gamma$ comprehension $\left(\Gamma-C A_{0}\right)$ which is gotten from $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$ by adding on the axiom that all sets defined by formulas in some class $\Gamma$ exist. So one gets $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ for $\Gamma$ the class of arithmetic formulas and $\Pi_{n}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ for $\Gamma$ the class of all $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ formulas. (In each case the formulas may contain set parameters.) Full second order arithmetic, $\mathbf{Z}_{2}$, is the union of all the

[^0]$\Pi_{n}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$. The standard text here is Simpson [2009] to which we refer the reader for general background.

The present paper is concerned with the analysis of various principles connected with axioms of determinacy. This subject has played an important role historically as an inspiration for increasingly strong axioms (as measured by consistency strength) both in reverse mathematics and set theory. We have given a brief overview of this history in $\S 1$ of Montalbán and Shore [2012] (henceforth denoted by MS [2012]) and refer the reader to that paper for more historical details and other background for both reverse mathematics and determinacy. Here we give some basic definitions and cite a few results.

Definition 1.1 (Games and determinacy). Our games are played by two players I and II on $\{0,1\}$ [or $\omega$ ]. They alternate playing an element of $\{0,1\}$ [or $\omega$ ], with I playing first, to produce a play of the game, which is a sequence $f \in 2^{\omega}\left[\omega^{\omega}\right]$. A game $G_{A}$ is specified by a subset $A$ of $2^{\omega}\left[\omega^{\omega}\right]$. We say that I wins a play $f$ of the game $G_{A}$ specified by $A$ if $f \in A$. Otherwise II wins that play.

Definition 1.2. A strategy for I [II] is a function $s$ from strings $\sigma$ in $2^{<\omega}\left[\omega^{<\omega}\right]$ of even [odd] length into $\{0,1\}[\omega]$. It is a winning strategy if any play $f$ following it (i.e. $f(n)=s(f\lceil n)$ for every even [odd] $n$ ) is a win for I [II]. We say that the game $G_{A}$ is determined if there is a winning strategy for I or II in this game. If $\Gamma$ is a class of sets $A$, then we say that $\Gamma$ is determined if $G_{A}$ is determined for every $A \in \Gamma$. We denote the assertion that $\Gamma$ is determined by $\Gamma$ determinacy or $\Gamma$-DET.

The classical reverse mathematical results are (essentially Steel [1976], see also Simpson [2009, V.8]) that $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$-DET is equivalent to ATR $_{0}$, a system asserting the existence of transfinite iterations of arithmetic comprehension that lies strictly between $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ and $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$; and (Tanaka [1990]) that $\Pi_{1}^{1-}$ $\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ is equivalent to determinacy for conjunctions of $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ and $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$ sets. Results on $\Pi_{2}^{0}, \Delta_{3}^{0}$ and $\Pi_{3}^{0}$ determinacy (Tanaka [1991], MedSalem and Tanaka [2007] and Welch [2011]) are significantly stronger, with the last provable in $\Pi_{3}^{1}$ $\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ but not $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$. Friedman [1971], in what was really the first foray into reverse mathematics, proved that $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-DET is not provable in full second order arithmetic, and Martin [1974a], [n.d.] improved this to $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-DET.

In MS [2012] we delineated the limits of determinacy provable in $Z_{2}$ as encompassing each level of the finite difference hierarchy on $\Pi_{3}^{0}$ sets. Indeed each level $n$ of the this hierarchy is provable from $\Pi_{n+2}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ but not at any lower level of the comprehension axiom hierarchy. (So the union of the hierarchy (which is far below $\Delta_{4}^{0}$ ) is not provable in $Z_{2}$.) Then, in Montalbán and Shore [2014] (hereafter MS [2014]) we analyzed the consistency strength of all these statements, getting a much clearer picture. In the present paper
we analyze, to the extent we can, the reverse mathematical strength of a variation on determinacy where one is thinking of the underlying space as the Turing degrees in place of $2^{\omega}$ or $\omega^{\omega}$.

Definition 1.3. An $A \subseteq 2^{\omega}\left[\omega^{\omega}\right]$ is Turing invariant or degree closed if $\left(\forall f \in 2^{\omega}\left[\omega^{\omega}\right]\right)\left(\forall g \in 2^{\omega}\left[\omega^{\omega}\right]\right)\left(f \equiv_{T} g \rightarrow(f \in A \leftrightarrow g \in A)\right)$. We denote by $\Gamma$ Turing determinacy or $\Gamma$-TD the assertion that every degree closed $A \in \Gamma$ is determined.

REMARK 1.4. For any reasonable $\Gamma$ including each of the $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ classes, it is clear that $\Gamma$-DET is equivalent (in $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$ ) to $\breve{\Gamma}$-DET where $\breve{\Gamma}=\{\bar{A} \mid A \in \Gamma\}$. So we can use these two assertions interchangeably, and similarly for $\Gamma$-TD. We also note that while it is easy to code sets as functions recursively (and so determinacy or Turing determinacy for classes in $\omega^{\omega}$ imply the corresponding result for $2^{\omega}$ ) the converse is not obvious at the very lowest level. However, for any of the arithmetic classes at or above $\Delta_{3}^{0}$, it does not matter for determinacy or Turing determinacy if we work in $2^{\omega}$ or $\omega^{\omega}$, as we can code functions in $\omega^{\omega}$ by sets in $2^{\omega}$ as long as we include the $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ condition that the sets are infinite. So once we are at that level, we work in whichever setting is more convenient.

It is a classical theorem of Martin that a degree closed set $A$ is determined if and only if it contains a cone, i.e. a set of Turing degrees of the form $\{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x} \geq \mathbf{z}\}$ for some degree $\mathbf{z}$ called the base of the cone, or is disjoint from a cone. (In the first case, I has a winning strategy; in the second, II.) In the realm of set theory, this induces a $0-1$ valued measure on sets of degrees (with measure 1 corresponding to containing a cone). This result is the basis for many interesting set-theoretic investigations. The question of the relationship between determinacy axioms and Turing determinacy axioms is an interesting one in the set-theoretic setting. Perhaps the most striking early result is that for $\Gamma=\Sigma_{1}^{1}$ the two notions coincide and are equivalent with the axiom asserting the existence of $x^{\#}$ for every $x \in \omega^{\omega}$ (Martin [1970] and Harrington [1978]). At the level of determinacy for all sets, later work by Woodin showed that full determinacy and Turing determinacy are not only equiconsistent but are equivalent (over DC) in $L(\mathbb{R})$. (See Koellner and Woodin [2010], and other articles in the same handbook, for this and much more on the role of TD in set theory.) The main results for Turing determinacy at lower levels of the arithmetic hierarchy show some differences from full determinacy at the same levels. There are a few classical ones given in Harrington and Kechris [1975] primarily from the recursion-theoretic or ZFC points of view, and Martin [1974, n.d.] from the viewpoint of working in ZFC without the power set axiom and replacement only for $\Sigma_{1}$ formulas.

Their results either directly give, or can be refined to give, ones in reverse mathematics. In this paper we present them from the viewpoint of reverse
mathematics and fill in some of the gaps. We begin with determining how much Turing determinacy is provable in weak systems. The base theory $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$ proves $\Pi_{2}^{0}$-TD (Corollary 2.5 . The next step is, of course, $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD.

The standard tool in analyzing the $\Delta_{n+1}^{0}$ levels is the finite level version of a classical theorem appearing in Kuratowski [1966]. It gives a representation of $\Delta_{n+1}^{0}$ subsets of $2^{\omega}$ in terms of the transfinite difference hierarchy on $\Pi_{n}^{0}$ or $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ sets. One can then use determinacy at the lower level to bootstrap up to $\Delta_{n+1}^{0}$. There are various formulations and we state a couple of variants. That this theorem can be proven for $n \in \omega$ in $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ with some extra recursiontheoretic conclusions is due to MedSalem and Tanaka [2007]. Our notation is slightly different from theirs. It follows more closely that used by Martin [1974, 1974a, 1974b, n.d.]. We also incorporate a few normalizations of the sequences that appear in different presentations.

Theorem 1.5 (Kuratowski; Martin; MedSalem and Tanaka for ACA $_{0}$ ). For any $Z \in 2^{\omega}$, a set $A \subseteq 2^{\omega}$ is $\Delta_{n+1}^{Z}$ if and only if there is an ordinal $\alpha$ recursive in $Z$ and a sequence of uniformly $\Pi_{n}^{Z}$ sets $A_{\xi}$ for $\xi \leq \alpha$ which are decreasing $\left(A_{\eta} \supseteq A_{\xi}\right.$ for $\eta<\xi$ ), continuous (for limit ordinals $\lambda, A_{\lambda}=$ $\left.\bigcap\left\{A_{\eta} \mid \eta<\lambda\right\}\right)$ with $A_{0}=2^{\omega}$ and $A_{\alpha}=\emptyset$ such that $(\forall X)(X \in A \Leftrightarrow$ $\mu \beta\left(X \notin A_{\beta}\right)$ is odd). Dually (by taking complements) $A \in \Delta_{n+1}^{Z}$ if and only if there is an ordinal $\alpha$ recursive in $Z$ and a sequence of uniformly $\Sigma_{n}^{Z}$ sets $A_{\xi}$ for $\xi \leq \alpha$ which are increasing $\left(A_{\eta} \subseteq A_{\xi}\right.$ for $\eta<\xi$ ), continuous (for limit ordinals $\left.\lambda, A_{\lambda}=\bigcup\left\{A_{\eta} \mid \eta<\lambda\right\}\right)$ with $A_{0}=\emptyset$ and $A_{\alpha}=2^{\omega}$ such that $(\forall X)\left(X \in A \Leftrightarrow \mu \beta\left(X \in A_{\beta}\right)\right.$ is even $)$.

REMARK 1.6. If a $\Delta_{n}^{0}$ set $A$ is degree invariant and $n \geq 3$ then, in the above $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ representation, we may take the $A_{\xi}$ to be degree invariant as well. The first point here is that $\leq_{T}$ is a $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ relation, and so if $A$ is $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ then so is its Turing closure $\hat{A}=\left\{f \mid(\exists e)\left(\Phi_{e}^{f} \in A \&(\exists i)\left(\Phi_{i}^{\Phi_{e}^{f}}=f\right)\right)\right\}$. The second point is that $\hat{A}$ still gives a representation of $A$ : If $\xi$ is the first with $X$ in the degree closed version $\hat{A}_{\xi}$ of $A_{\xi}$, then some $Y \equiv_{T} X$ is in $A_{\xi}$ and not in any $A_{\eta} \subseteq \hat{A}_{\eta}$, and so in $A$.

Theorem 1.5 allows us to prove $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD at the expense of moving from $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$ to $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ (Corollary 2.7). We point out that there can be no reversals from any Turing determinacy assumption to any system stronger than $R C A_{0}$. The key fact here is that the standard model of $R C A_{0}$ with just the recursive sets (or the sets recursive in any $X$ ) is obviously a model of $\Gamma$-TD for any $\Gamma$. Thus we can hope for implications from any $\Gamma$-TD only over stronger systems. In this case we can, however, prove that $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD is not provable in $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$ (Proposition 2.8 ). This supplies a natural principle that lies strictly between $R C A_{0}$ and $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ but does not imply the existence of a nonrecursive set.

We next move on to $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-TD. Combining the implication from $A T R_{0}$ to $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$-DET (Steel [1976] in RCA ${ }_{0}$ ) and from $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$-DET to $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-TD (Harrington and Kechris [1975]) we see that ATR ${ }_{0} \vdash \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-TD. In this case, we prove a reversal over $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ (Theorem 3.7). This supplies an example of a natural theory strictly weaker than $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ (and indeed does not even imply the existence of a nonrecursive set) but which joins $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ up to it. In particular, $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$-DET is equivalent to $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-TD over $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$.

Using the representation of Theorem 1.5, we can now hope to prove $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD in $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$. We do so in Theorem 3.3 but we need an additional induction axiom.

Definition 1.7. For $S$ a class of formulas, $S$ transfinite induction, $S$-TI, is the scheme of axioms stating that for every well-ordering $\alpha$ (formally coded as a set $X$ of ordered pairs $\langle\beta, \gamma\rangle$ prescribing its ordering relation $<_{X}$ on its domain which is also a subset of $\omega$ ) and every formula $\varphi \in S$,

$$
(\forall \gamma)\left[\left(\left(\forall \beta<_{X} \gamma\right) \varphi(\beta)\right) \rightarrow \varphi(\gamma)\right] \rightarrow\left(\forall \beta<_{X} \alpha\right) \varphi(\beta) .
$$

The version that we need to prove $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD over $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ in Theorem 3.3 is $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{Tl}_{0}$. Over $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ this axiom scheme is equivalent to the dependent choice axiom for $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$ formulas (Simpson [2009, VIII.5.12]) and so provable in $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ but not in ATR $_{0}$.

As our last stop inside $Z_{2}$, we analyze $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD and $\Delta_{5}^{0}$-TD based on results of Harrington and Kechris [1975], Martin [1974] and Welch [2011] to show that $\Pi_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ proves both. We can have no meaningful reversal even over relatively strong systems. Even full Borel determinacy can prove neither $\Delta_{2}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ (even with TI for all formulas) nor $\Pi_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ even over $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ and TI for all formulas (MS [2012, Corollaries 6.2 and 6.6]). Still, using methods and results of MS [2012], [2014] working, however, with $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD in place of $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-DET, we prove that not much less than $\Pi_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ will suffice. Indeed, $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD proves the existence of a $\Sigma_{2}$ admissible ordinal (Lemma 4.7), and so in terms of consistency strength, $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{4}^{0}-\mathrm{TD}$ is much stronger than $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ (Corollary 4.8).

Finally, we use these methods to derive Martin's result that $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD implies the existence of $\beta_{0}$ (the least ordinal $\alpha$ such that $L_{\alpha} \vDash Z_{2}$ ) in $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ (Lemma 4.4). Thus $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD implies the consistency of $\mathrm{Z}_{2}$ (and more), and so takes us well beyond the reach of full second order arithmetic (Corollary 4.6).

We close this section with some notational conventions.
Notation 1.8. We use $\omega$ to denote the set of natural numbers. Members of $2^{\omega}$ are generally called sets, and symbols such as $X, Y, Z$ are used to denote them. Members of $\omega^{\omega}$ are often called reals, and we use symbols such
as $f, g, h$ to denote them. (Of course a real may be a set when its range is contained in $\{0,1\}$.) The (Turing) degrees of these sets and functions are, as usual, denoted by the corresponding small boldface roman letter. So for example $f \in \mathbf{f}$ and $X \in \mathbf{x}$. The $e$ th partial recursive function and r.e. set relative to $f$ are denoted by $\Phi_{e}^{f}$ and $W_{e}^{f}$, respectively.

Notation 1.9. Subsets of both $2^{\omega}$ and $\omega^{\omega}$ are generally denoted by symbols such as $A, B, C$. We use symbols such as $\sigma, \tau$ to denote strings in either $2^{<\omega}$ or $\omega^{<\omega}$ and rely on the context to determine which is intended. The length of $\sigma$ is denoted by $|\sigma|$ and its initial segment of length $n \leq|\sigma|$ is denoted by $\sigma \upharpoonright n$. We use standard concatenation and pairing functions, conventions and notations such as $\sigma^{\wedge} \tau, \sigma^{\wedge} f,\langle\sigma, \tau\rangle,\langle\sigma, f\rangle,\langle\sigma, X\rangle,\langle f, g\rangle$, $\langle u, v, w\rangle=\langle u,\langle v, w\rangle\rangle$ in the usual way. The precise formulations do not matter as long as they are done recursively.

We assume a basic familiarity with recursive ordinals and the hyperarithmetic hierarchy and at times their formal development in ATR $_{0}$ as in Simpson [2009, VII]. Note also that we generally prove theorems in their lightface version and leave relativization to the reader, unless some desired uniformity is brought out by carrying along the set parameter.
2. The trivial levels. In this section we prove $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ and $\Delta_{3}^{0}$ Turing determinacy. Only the first proof is carried out in $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$. It is helpful to introduce a weaker but more easily definable notion of closure than under $\equiv_{T}$.

Definition 2.1. Given $k \in \omega$ and $f \in \omega^{\omega}$ we define $k \times f \in \omega^{\omega}$ by $(k \times f)(k n)=f(n)$ and $(k \times f)(m)=0$ for $m$ not a multiple of $k$. We say an $A$ contained in $\omega^{\omega}$ or $2^{\omega}$ is sufficiently closed if $(\forall f \in A)(\forall \sigma)(\forall k)\left(\sigma^{\wedge}(k \times f) \in A\right)$. Here and elsewhere, $\sigma$ is in $\omega^{<\omega}$ or $2^{<\omega}$ as appropriate. The smallest sufficiently closed set containing $f$ is the sufficient closure of $f$. Let $E$ be the set of even strings, i.e. those whose nonzero values occur only at even numbers such as all initial segments of $2 \times f$ for any $f$.

Remark 2.2. Note that, for all $m, n, f$, we have $m \times(n \times f)=m n \times f$. It is then easy to see that, for every $f$ in $\omega^{\omega}$ or $2^{\omega},\left\{\sigma^{\wedge}(k \times f) \mid k \in \omega\right.$ and $\sigma$ a string $\}$ is the sufficient closure of $\{f\}$.

Also, for any $A \subseteq 2^{\omega}$, the set $\hat{A}=\left\{X \mid(\forall \sigma, k)\left(\sigma^{\wedge}(k \times X) \in A\right)\right\}$ is sufficiently closed. The advantage of using sufficient closure instead of Turing closure is that if $A$ is $\Pi_{2}^{0}$, then so is $\hat{A}$.

Lemma 2.3. $\left(\mathrm{RCA}_{0}\right)$ For every $Z \in \omega^{\omega}$, every $\Pi_{2}^{Z}$ set $A \subseteq \omega^{\omega}\left[2^{\omega}\right]$ which is sufficiently closed is either empty or contains an element of every Turing degree above $Z$.

Proof. Let $A \neq \emptyset$ be such a set. There is then an r.e. operator $W$ (given by some $\left.W_{e}\right)$ such that $f \in A \Leftrightarrow f \in W^{Z \oplus f}$ is infinite. Let

$$
X=\left\{\sigma \mid W^{Z \oplus \sigma}-W^{Z \oplus \sigma^{-}} \neq \emptyset\right\}
$$

(where $W^{Z \oplus \sigma}$ only runs for $|\sigma|$ many steps and $\sigma^{-}=\sigma \upharpoonright|\sigma|-1$ ). So, we see that $f \in A$ if and only if $f\left\lceil n \in X\right.$ for infinitely many $n$. Note that $X \leq_{T} Z$. Say $f \in A$; then for every $\sigma$, we have $\sigma^{\wedge}(2 \times f) \in A$. Thus for every $\sigma$ there is a $\tau \in E$ (e.g. some initial segment of $2 \times f$ ) such that $\sigma^{\wedge} \tau \in X$.

Now, given any infinite $Y \in 2^{\omega}$ with $Z \leq_{T} Y$, we build an $h \in A$ with $h \equiv_{T} Y$. We construct $h$ as the union of finite initial segments $\emptyset=\sigma_{0} \subseteq$ $\sigma_{1} \subseteq \cdots$, all of even length. We just need to make sure that $h$ meets $X$ infinitely often and is of the same Turing degree as $Y$. Suppose we have $\sigma_{s}$. Let $\tau_{s}$ be the first $\tau \in E$ found in a standard search recursive in $Z$ such that $\sigma_{s}{ }^{\wedge} \tau \in X$. Let $k_{s}$ be least such that $\left|\sigma_{s}{ }^{\wedge} \tau_{s}{ }^{\wedge} 0^{k_{s}}\right|=2\left\langle x, y_{s}\right\rangle+1$ for $y_{s}$ the $s$ th element of $Y$ and some $x$. Now set $\sigma_{s+1}=\sigma_{s}{ }^{\wedge} \tau_{s}{ }^{\wedge} 0^{k_{s}}{ }^{\wedge} 1$. Clearly $h \leq_{T} Y$ (by construction as $Z \leq_{T} Y$ ), $h \in A$ and $Y \leq_{T} h$ (its members can be read off in order from the list of odd numbers $m$ such that $h(m)=1$ ) as required.

As degree invariant sets are obviously sufficiently closed, we have the following corollaries.

Corollary 2.4. For every $Z \in 2^{\omega}$, every nonempty degree invariant $\Pi_{2}^{Z}$ set $A \subseteq \omega^{\omega}\left[2^{\omega}\right]$ contains all $f \geq_{T} Z$.

Corollary 2.5. $\mathrm{RCA}_{0} \vdash \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{2}^{0}$-TD.
Lemma 2.6. $\left(\mathrm{ACA}_{0}\right)$ For every $Z \in 2^{\omega}$, every nonempty, degree invariant $\Delta_{3}^{Z}$ subset $A$ of $2^{\omega}$ contains all $X \geq_{T} Z$.

Proof. Let $A$ be a $\Delta_{3}^{Z}$ degree invariant subset of $2^{\omega}$. By Theorem 1.5 , there is a decreasing, continuous sequence $\left\{A_{\xi} \mid \xi \leq \alpha\right\}$ of uniformly $\Pi_{2}^{Z}$ subsets of $2^{\omega}$ with $A_{\alpha}=\emptyset$ such that

$$
X \in A \Leftrightarrow \mu \xi\left(X \notin A_{\xi}\right) \text { is odd. }
$$

Now, let $\hat{A}_{\xi}=\left\{X:(\forall \sigma, k)\left(\sigma^{\wedge}(k \times X) \in A_{\xi}\right)\right\}$. The $\hat{A}_{\xi}$ are clearly $\Pi_{2}^{Z}$ and, by Remark 2.2, sufficiently closed and so dense. By Lemma 2.3, each $\hat{A}_{\xi}$ is either $\emptyset$ or contains a member $Y$ of every degree above that of $Z$. As $A_{\alpha}=\emptyset=\hat{A}_{\alpha}$, there is, by $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$, a least $\xi$ such that $\hat{A}_{\xi}=\emptyset$. (By Lemma 2.3. $\hat{A}_{\xi}$ being empty is equivalent to $\neg(\exists X)\left(X \equiv_{T} Z \& X \in A\right)$.) Note that as the $A_{\xi}$ are continuous, so are the $\hat{A}_{\xi}$ : Consider any limit ordinal $\lambda$. If $X \in \hat{A}_{\lambda}$, then its sufficient closure is contained in $A_{\lambda}$ and so in every $A_{\xi}$ for $\xi<\lambda$ and thus in $\bigcap\left\{\hat{A}_{\xi} \mid \xi<\lambda\right\}$. On the other hand, if $X \in \hat{A}_{\xi}$ for every $\xi<\lambda$, then its sufficient closure is contained in each $\hat{A}_{\xi} \subseteq A_{\xi}$ and so in $A_{\lambda}$ and in $\hat{A}_{\lambda}$. Thus $\xi$ cannot be a limit ordinal by the Baire category theorem.
(The $\hat{A}_{\xi}$ are dense $\Pi_{2}^{Z}$ and so themselves intersections of open, and hence dense open, sets.)

We now claim that $A$ is either $\emptyset$ or contains every $Y \geq_{T} Z$ depending on the parity of $\xi$ (or if it is $\alpha$ ). To see this, consider any degree $\mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{z}$. By the leastness of $\xi$ and Lemma 2.3, there is a $Y \in \hat{A}_{\xi-1}$ of degree $\mathbf{y}$. Of course, $Y \notin \hat{A}_{\xi}=\emptyset$ and so, by definition, there are $\sigma$ and $k$ such that $\sigma^{\wedge}(k \times Y) \notin A_{\xi}$. On the other hand, since $\hat{A}_{\xi-1}$ is sufficiently closed, $\sigma^{\wedge}(k \times Y) \in \hat{A}_{\xi-1}$. Thus the membership of $\sigma^{\wedge}(k \times Y)$ (and so of $\left.Y \equiv_{T} \sigma^{\wedge}(k \times Y)\right)$ in $A$ is determined by the parity of $\xi$ as required.

## Corollary 2.7. $\mathrm{ACA}_{0} \vdash \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{3}^{0}$-TD.

Note that by Remark 1.4 the corollary holds in $\omega^{\omega}$ as well as $2^{\omega}$. From now on we will be concerned with Turing determinacy at levels above $\Delta_{3}^{0}$ and so work in whichever setting is more convenient.

We conclude this section by showing that $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD is not provable in $R C A_{0}$. If we are looking for a standard model of $R C A_{0}$ in which $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD fails, we have serious restrictions on the method of attack. Suppose the formulas (with parameter $Z$ ) defining a $\Delta_{3}^{0}$ set $A$ of reals determining a game in a standard model $\mathcal{M}$ actually define a $\Delta_{3}^{0}$ set of reals in the universe, or even in any extension of the sets of $\mathcal{M}$ to a model of $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$. In this case, Theorem 1.5 provides a representation of $A$ in the extension and Lemma 2.6 applies. Its conclusions, however, are clearly absolute downwards to $\mathcal{M}$ and so the given game is determined in $\mathcal{M}$. Thus the only hope of finding a standard model counterexample is to consider formulas which define a $\Delta_{3}^{0}$ set in $\mathcal{M}$ but not in any extension to a model of $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$.

## Proposition 2.8. RCA $\mathrm{R}_{0} \nvdash \Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD.

Proof. Consider an initial segment of the degrees below $0^{\prime}$ of order type $\omega$ given by representatives $X_{n}$ which are uniformly $\Delta_{2}^{0}$ (Lerman [1983, XII.5.1], Epstein [1981]). Our model $\mathcal{M}$ of $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$ consists of all sets recursive in some $X_{n}$. Our $\Delta_{3}^{0}$ degree invariant class is given by two $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ formulas $\varphi$ and $\psi$. The first says that there is an $n$ such that $X \equiv_{T} X_{2 n}$, and the second that there is an $n$ such that $X \equiv_{T} X_{2 n+1}$. These sets are clearly complementary in $\mathcal{M}$. To see that they are $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$, write out the definitions, for example, $\varphi(X) \Leftrightarrow(\exists n)\left\{(\exists e)\left(\Phi_{e}^{X}\right.\right.$ is total \& $(\forall m)\left(\Phi_{e}^{X}(m)=\right.$ $\left.\left.X_{2 n}(m)\right) \&(\exists i)\left(\Phi_{i}^{\Phi_{e}^{X}}=X\right)\right\}$, and remember that the $X_{n}$ are uniformly $\Delta_{2}^{0}$. Thus $\varphi$ and $\psi$ define a $\Delta_{3}^{0}$ set of reals in $\mathcal{M}$ while both sets are clearly unbounded in the Turing degrees of $\mathcal{M}$. Thus $\mathcal{M} \nvdash \Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD as required.
3. $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ and $\Delta_{4}^{0}$ sets. In this section we show that $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-TD is equivalent to $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ over $A C A_{0}$, and that $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{4}^{0}$-TD is provable from $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}+\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{TI}_{0}$. As mentioned in $\S 1, \Pi_{1}^{1}-T I_{0}$ is equivalent to $\Sigma_{1}^{1}-D C_{0}$ over $A C A_{0}$, and $A T R_{0}+$
$\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{Tl}_{0}$ lies strictly between $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ and $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$. On the other hand, we show that $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD is not provable from ATR $_{0}$. The situation here is similar to, but much more subtle than, that for $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD in Proposition 2.8 .

Theorem 3.1 (essentially Harrington and Kechris [1975]). ATR ${ }_{0} \vdash \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$-TD.
Proof. We follow the proof of Harrington and Kechris [1975, $\S 2]$ but make explicit a property of their construction that we will need in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Let a given game be specified by a $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ degree invariant subset of $\omega^{\omega}$, $B=\{f \mid(\exists i)(\forall j)(\exists k) R(i, j, \bar{f}(k))\}$ where $R$ is a recursive predicate and $\bar{f}(k)$ is the sequence $\langle f(0), \ldots, f(k-1)\rangle$. We define a $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ set $A$ which has members of the same degrees as $B: A=\{\langle i, f, g\rangle \mid(\forall j)(g(j)=\mu k R(i, j, \bar{f}(k)))\}$. Clearly, if $\langle i, f, g\rangle \in A$ then $g \leq_{T} f$ and so $\langle i, f, g\rangle \equiv_{T} f \in B$. Conversely, if $f \in B$ then there is an $i$ such that $(\forall j)(\exists k) R(i, j, \bar{f}(k))$ and so a $g \leq_{T} f$ such that $\langle i, f, g\rangle \in A$. Thus $A, B$ have elements of exactly the same degrees.

We next consider another $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ set $C=\left\{\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \mid g \in A \&(\forall n)\left(\Phi_{i}^{g}(n)\right.\right.$ converges in exactly $f(n)$ many steps) \& $h$ is II's play when he follows the strategy given by $\Phi_{i}^{g}$ against I playing $\left.\langle i, f, g\rangle\right\}$. Note that if $\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \in C$ then $\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \equiv_{T} g$ and $g \in A$.

Now apply $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ determinacy (which follows from ATR $_{0}$ as in Simpson [2009, V.8.2]) to the game specified by $C$. If I has a strategy $s$ then we claim that every degree $\mathbf{t} \geq \mathbf{s}$ has a representative in $A$ : As usual, let I play $s$ against any real $t \in \mathbf{t}$. The resulting play $\langle s(t), t\rangle$ has degree $\mathbf{t}$ and is in $C$ and so of the form $\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle$ with $g \in A$ and $\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \equiv_{T} g$ as required. Thus, in this case, as $B$ is degree invariant, it contains a cone with base the strategy for I in the game specified by $C$. On the other hand, if II has a strategy $s$ for this game, we claim that $B$ is disjoint from the cone above $\mathbf{s}$. If not then there is a $\hat{g} \in B$ and hence one $g \in A$ which computes $s$. Suppose $\Phi_{i}^{g}=s$. Let $f(n) \leq_{T} g$ be the number of steps it takes $\Phi_{i}^{g}(n)$ to converge, and $h$ be II's play following his supposedly winning strategy given by $\Phi_{i}^{g}=s$ against I playing $\langle i, f, g\rangle$. It is clear from the definitions that the play of this game is $\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle$, and it is in $C$ for the desired contradiction.

We now calculate the complexity of the property of a $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ degree invariant subset of $\omega^{\omega}$ containing a cone. We use this calculation in the proof of Theorem 3.3.

Proposition 3.2. ( $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ ) The predicate that (the formula defining) a $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$ degree invariant set of reals contains a cone of degrees is $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$.

Proof. Let $B$ be a degree invariant $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of reals. Define $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ sets $A$ and $C$ as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. It is easy to see that the existence of a strategy $s$ for the closed game given by $C$ is a $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$ property: for every $\sigma$ the result of playing $s$ against $\sigma$ satisfies the $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$ predicate of not being in $C$. If this condition holds then the proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that $A$ intersects
every degree above that of a strategy and hence $B$ contains a cone. On the other hand, if there is no such strategy, then by $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ there is one for II in this game and so again as in the proof of Theorem $3.1, B$ is disjoint from the cone above II's strategy.

We now give a proof of $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD in $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}+\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{Tl}_{0}$, which, as pointed out after Definition 1.7, lies strictly between $A T R_{0}$ and $\Pi_{1}^{1}-C A_{0}$. Thus $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD is strictly weaker than $\Pi_{1}^{1}-C A_{0}$ even over $A T R_{0}$.

Theorem 3.3. $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}+\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{TI}_{0} \vdash \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{4}^{0}$-TD.
Proof. Represent a given $\Delta_{4}^{0}$ degree invariant set $B \subseteq 2^{\omega}$ using the difference hierarchy on $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ sets as in Theorem 1.5. By Remark 1.6, we may assume that each $B_{\xi}, \xi \leq \alpha$, is itself Turing invariant and so (by Theorem 3.1) either is disjoint from a cone or contains one. As $B_{\alpha}=2^{\omega}$ and the $B_{\xi}$ are increasing, there is, by Proposition 3.2 and $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{TI}_{0}$, a least $\gamma$ such that $B_{\gamma}$ contains a cone. If $\gamma$ is a successor ordinal, then we have a cone disjoint from $B_{\gamma-1}$ and contained in $B_{\gamma}$. Depending on the parity of $\gamma$, this cone is either disjoint from, or contained in, $B$ as required.

To finish the proof we show that $\gamma$ cannot be a limit. For each $\xi<\gamma$, let $A_{\xi}$ be a $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ set of reals with members of the same Turing degrees as $B_{\xi}$ and $C_{\xi}$, the associated $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ set as defined in Theorem 3.1. Consider the $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ game specified by $C=\left\{\langle\langle\langle\xi, i\rangle, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \mid\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \in C_{\xi}\right\}$, i.e. I first chooses a $\xi$ and then plays the game determined by $C_{\xi}$. If I has a winning strategy in this game, say his first move is to play $\langle\xi, i\rangle$. The rest of his strategy then gives him a winning strategy in $C_{\xi}$ which (by the proof of Theorem 3.1) would be the base of a cone in $B_{\xi}$ contrary to the assumption that it is disjoint from a cone. Thus (by $\Pi_{1}^{0}$-DET), II has a strategy $s$ for the game specified by $C$. Restricting I to play a given $\xi<\gamma$ as the first part of his first move gives a strategy $s_{\xi}$ for II in $C_{\xi}$ uniformly recursive in $s$. As, by the proof of Theorem 3.1, each $s_{\xi}$ is the base of a cone disjoint from $B_{\xi}$, $s$ is the base of a cone disjoint from all the $B_{\xi}$ for $\xi<\gamma$ and so disjoint from $B_{\gamma}=\bigcup_{\xi<\gamma} B_{\xi}$ for the desired contradiction.

We now prove that one cannot get $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD from ATR $_{0}$ alone. A crucial ingredient is H. Friedman's [1967, II] $\omega$-incompleteness theorem (see Simpson [2009, VIII.5.6]). Note that a countable coded $\omega$-model specified by a set $\mathcal{M}$ is a structure for second order arithmetic in which the numbers are the numbers (in the ambient universe) and the sets are the columns $(\mathcal{M})_{n}=\{x \mid\langle n, x\rangle \in \mathcal{M}\}$.

Theorem 3.4 (H. Friedman). Let $S$ be a recursive set of sentences of second order arithmetic which includes $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$. If there exists a countable coded $\omega$-model of $S$, then there exists a countable coded $\omega$-model of $S \cup$ $\{\neg \exists$ countable coded $\omega$-model of $S\}$.

Theorem 3.5. ATR $_{0} \nvdash \Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD.
Proof. For convenience we work in the real world, although certainly $\Pi_{1}^{1-}$ $\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ suffices. All models $\mathcal{M}$ or $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ in our proof, beginning with $\mathcal{M}_{0} \vDash T_{0}$, will be countable coded $\omega$-models of $T_{0}=$ ATR $_{0}$. By Theorem 3.4 , there is an $\mathcal{M}_{1} \vDash S_{1}$ where $S_{1}=T_{0} \& \neg \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash T_{0}$. As $\mathcal{M}_{1}$ is a coded $\omega$-model, there is an $\hat{\mathcal{M}}_{1}$ containing it such that $\hat{\mathcal{M}}_{1} \vDash T_{1}$ where $T_{1}=T_{0} \& \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash S_{1}$. Applying Theorem 3.4 again, we get an $\mathcal{M}_{2} \vDash S_{2}$ where $S_{2}=T_{1} \& \neg \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash T_{1}$. We now set $T_{2}=T_{0} \& \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash S_{2}$ and continue similarly to get $\hat{\mathcal{M}}_{2} \vDash T_{2}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{3} \vDash S_{3}$ with $S_{3}=T_{2} \& \neg \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash T_{2}$ and $\hat{\mathcal{M}}_{3} \vDash T_{0} \& \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash S_{3}$. Then we proceed similarly by induction to get $\mathcal{M}_{n+1} \vDash S_{n+1}$ with $S_{n+1}=T_{n} \& \neg \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash T_{n}$ and $\hat{\mathcal{M}}_{n+1} \vDash T_{n+1}$ with $T_{n+1}=T_{0} \& \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash S_{n+1}$.

We now let $T$ be the theory containing $T_{0}$ with new constants $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ and assertions saying that for all $n$, the $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ are countable coded $\omega$-models of $S_{n}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ is a member of $\mathcal{M}_{n+1}$ (in the sense that as a set it is coded in $\mathcal{M}_{n+1}$ by being one of the columns of $\left.\mathcal{M}_{n+1}\right)$. Any finite subset of $T$ is satisfied by one of the $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ just constructed. (Unravelling the definitions of $T_{n}$ and $S_{n}$ shows that any model $\mathcal{M}_{n+1}$ of $S_{n+1}$ contains an $\mathcal{M}_{n} \vDash S_{n}$ and so by induction a sequence of $\mathcal{M}_{i}$ for $i<n$ as required in $T$.) Thus there is a model $\hat{\mathcal{N}}$ of $T$. (Note that this model is only given by a compactness argument, so it is expected to be nonstandard.)

We now consider the $\omega$-submodel $\mathcal{N}$ of $\hat{\mathcal{N}}$ specified by taking as its second order part all sets coded in any of the $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ in $\hat{\mathcal{N}}$. First note that $\mathcal{N} \vDash \mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ : If there is a well-ordering $\alpha$ in $\mathcal{N}$ then it is a member of some $\mathcal{M}_{n} \subset \mathcal{N}$ and so also well-ordered in $\mathcal{M}_{n}$. If we have any arithmetic predicate $S$ for which we want a hierarchy to witness $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ in $\mathcal{N}$, consider the same formula interpreted in $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ (which we may assume contains the set parameters in $S$ as well as $\alpha$ ). As $\mathcal{M}_{n} \vDash$ ATR $_{0}$, the desired hierarchy of sets exists in $M_{n}$. Since the properties required of it are arithmetic, they hold in $\mathcal{N}$ as well.

We now define, in $\mathcal{N}$, degree invariant classes $A, B \subset \mathcal{N}: A=\{X \mid$ the least $n$ such that $X$ fails to compute both an $\mathcal{M} \vDash S_{n}$ and its satisfaction predicate, is even $\}$ and $B=\{X \mid$ the least $n$ such that $X$ fails to compute both an $\mathcal{M} \vDash S_{n}$ and its satisfaction predicate, is odd $\}$. Clearly $A$ and $B$ are disjoint.

We claim that $A \cup B=\mathcal{N}$. Consider any $X \in \mathcal{N}$, so $X \in \mathcal{M}_{i}$ for some $i$. We see, by the definition of the $\mathcal{M}_{n}$, that no member of $\mathcal{M}_{i}$ can be an $\mathcal{M} \vDash S_{i}$ and so no such is computable from $X$. (If $\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{M}_{i}$ and $\mathcal{M} \vDash S_{i}$ then, by the definition of $S_{i}, \mathcal{M} \vDash T_{i-1}$ but, again by the definition of $S_{i}, \mathcal{M}_{i} \vDash$ $\neg \exists \mathcal{M} \vDash T_{i-1}$ for the desired contradiction.) Thus there is some $n \in \omega$ and so a least one such that no $\mathcal{M}$ computable from $X$ can be a model of $S_{n}$. (Notice that if $X \in \mathcal{M}_{i}$ computes a model $\mathcal{M}$ then, as $\mathcal{M}_{i}$ is a model of $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$, the satisfaction predicate for $\mathcal{M}$ is also in $\mathcal{M}_{i}$.) Thus $X \in A \cup B$ as required.

Next, we claim that both $A$ and $B$ are unbounded in the Turing degrees of $\mathcal{N}$. The point here is that $\mathcal{M}_{n} \vDash S_{n}$, but it and every model $\mathcal{M}$ computable from it together with its satisfaction predicate is in $\mathcal{M}_{n+1}$ and so $\mathcal{M} \not \models S_{n+1}$. Thus $\mathcal{M}_{n} \oplus \operatorname{Sat}\left(\mathcal{M}_{n}\right) \in A$ for $n$ odd and $\mathcal{M}_{n} \oplus \operatorname{Sat}\left(\mathcal{M}_{n}\right) \in B$ for $n$ even where $\operatorname{Sat}(\mathcal{M})$ is the full satisfaction predicate (elementary diagram) for $\mathcal{M}$. Of course, the degrees of the $\mathcal{M}_{n}$ are cofinal in those of $\mathcal{N}$ for both the even and the odd $n$.

All that remains to see that $A$ is a counterexample to $\Delta_{4}-\mathrm{TD}$ in $\mathcal{N}$ is to show that it (and analogously $B$ ) is $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$. To this end we write out the definition of $A: X \in A \Leftrightarrow(\exists n)\left((\exists m)(n=2 m) \&\left(\forall Y, W \leq_{T} X\right)(Y\right.$ is not a countable coded $\omega$-model of $S_{n}$ with $W$ its satisfaction predicate) \& $\left(\exists Z, V \leq_{T} X\right)$ ( $Z$ is a countable coded $\omega$-model of $S_{n-1}$ with satisfaction predicate $V$ ). As usual, we represent a set $Z \leq_{T} X$ by an index of a characteristic function $\Phi_{e}^{X}$ computable from $X$. Thus to say $\left(\exists Z, V \leq_{T} X\right) \Theta(Z, V)$ is to say $(\exists e, i)\left(\Phi_{e}^{X}\right.$ and $\Phi_{i}^{X}$ are total characteristic functions \& $\left.\Theta\left(\Phi_{e}^{X}, \Phi_{i}^{X}\right)\right)$. Now being total is a $\Pi_{2}^{X}$ property. Once we have guaranteed totality for $\Phi_{e}^{X}$ and $\Phi_{i}^{X}$, the substitution of $\Phi_{e}^{X}$ and $\Phi_{i}^{X}$ for $Z$ and $V$ can be done at no additional quantifier costs since quantifier free formulas in $Z, V$ and $X$ now have $\Delta_{1}^{X}$ equivalents. Thus if $\Theta$ is $\Sigma_{3}^{X, Z, V}$, then $\left(\exists Z, V \leq_{T} X\right) \Theta(Z, V)$ is equivalent to a $\Sigma_{3}^{X}$ formula. Similarly, $\left(\forall Y, W \leq_{T} X\right) \Psi(Y, W)$ is equivalent to a $\Pi_{3}^{X}$ formula if $\Psi$ is $\Pi_{3}^{X, Z, V}$. Thus we are left with analyzing the rest of the relations in the formula.

Any set $Z$ can be effectively viewed as a sequence of its columns $\left\langle(Z)_{n}\right\rangle$ and the associated structure for second order arithmetic is given by specifying the $(Z)_{n}=\{m \mid\langle n, m\rangle \in X\}$ as its second order part. The first order part remains the same as in the ambient universe. So each $Z$ is, in this way, recursively interpreted as an $\omega$-model. That $V$ is the satisfaction predicate for the model coded in this way by $Z$ is then a $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ relation. (See Simpson [2009, V.2] for these definitions.) Once we have the satisfaction set $V$ for $Z$, to say that a formula is true in $Z$ is then, of course, a $\Delta_{1}^{0}$ relation. Thus the whole formula is of the form $\exists\left(\exists \& \Pi_{3} \& \Sigma_{3}\right)$ and so $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$ as required.

Next we prove a reversal of Theorem 3.1 over $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$. We begin by pointing out that a standard fact on iterations of the Turing jump holds in $A C A_{0}$.

Lemma 3.6. $\left(\mathrm{ACA}_{0}\right)$ Let $\alpha$ be a well-ordering. If $0^{\eta} \leq_{T} X$ for every $\eta<\alpha$, i.e. there is an e such that $\Phi_{e}^{X}$ is a total characteristic function for a set satisfying the $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ formula determining $0^{\eta}$, then $0^{\alpha}$ exists and indeed $0^{\alpha} \leq_{T} X^{\prime \prime}$.

Proof. If $\alpha$ is a successor ordinal, the result follows immediately from ACA $_{0}$. Otherwise, say $\alpha$ is a limit ordinal. The function $f$ taking $\eta<\alpha$ to the least $e$ satisfying the conditions of the lemma is total by hypothesis and
exists by $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$. Indeed, $f \leq_{T} X^{\prime \prime}$. The set $\left\{\langle n, \eta\rangle \mid \Phi_{f(e)}^{X}(n)=1\right\}$ then also exists, satisfies the definition of $0^{\alpha}$ and is recursive in $X^{\prime \prime}$.

Theorem 3.7. $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}+\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$-TD $\vdash \mathrm{ATR}_{0}$.
Proof. Let $\alpha$ be a well-ordering. We want to prove that $0^{\alpha}$ exists. Let $W$ be a low nonrecursive $R E A$ operator, i.e. $(\forall X)\left(X<_{T} W^{X} \& X^{\prime} \equiv_{T}\left(W^{X}\right)^{\prime}\right)$ and the indices for the required Turing reductions are the same for all $X$. (The standard construction for such an operator clearly works in $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$.)

Consider the set

$$
P=\left\{X \mid(\exists \beta<\alpha)\left(0^{\beta} \oplus X \equiv_{T} W^{X}\right)\right\}
$$

To see that this set is $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ rewrite its defining condition by saying that there is a $\beta<\alpha$ and an $e$ such that $\Phi_{e}^{W^{X}}$ is a total characteristic function for a set that satisfies the $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ defining condition for $0^{\beta}$ and $W^{X} \equiv_{T} \Phi_{e}^{W^{X}} \oplus X$. As $\left(W^{X}\right)^{\prime}$ is uniformly recursive in $X^{\prime}$, totality of $\Phi_{e}^{W^{X}}$ is $\Pi_{2}^{X}$, as is every $\Pi_{2}^{W^{X}}$ predicate (uniformly). Thus the condition defining $P$ is $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$. Let $\hat{P}$ be the Turing closure of $P$, i.e. $\hat{P}=\left\{X \mid(\exists Y)\left(Y \in P \& X \equiv_{T} Y\right)\right.$. Similarly, $\hat{P} \in \Sigma_{3}^{0}$.

By $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$-TD there is a cone of degrees in $\hat{P}$ or its complement. Let $\hat{X}$ be a set in the base of such a cone. If $\hat{X} \in \hat{P}$ let $X \equiv_{T} \hat{X}$ be in $P$. If not, let $X=\hat{X}$. By Lemma 3.6, it suffices to prove that $0^{\eta} \leq_{T} X$ for every $\eta<\alpha$ to conclude that $0^{\alpha}$ exists. If not, then, by ACA $_{0}$, there is a least $\gamma<\alpha$ such that $0^{\gamma} \not \leq_{T} X$. Note that, again by Lemma $3.6,0^{\gamma}$ exists. We now work toward a contradiction.

If $X \in P$, let $\beta<\alpha$ be as required in the definition of $P$ and so by the leastness of $\gamma, \gamma \leq \beta$ (and $0^{\gamma} \leq_{T} 0^{\beta}$ ) as $0^{\beta} \oplus X \equiv_{T} W^{X}>_{T} X$. Now we have $X<_{T} X \oplus 0^{\gamma} \leq_{T} X \oplus 0^{\beta} \equiv_{T} W^{X}<_{T}\left(W^{X}\right)^{\prime} \equiv_{T} X^{\prime}$. By Posner and Robinson [1981, Theorem 3 relativized to $X$ ], which can easily be proven in $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$, there is a $\hat{Y}$ such that $X<_{T} \hat{Y}$ and $X^{\prime} \equiv_{T} \hat{Y}^{\prime} \equiv_{T} \hat{Y} \oplus X \oplus 0^{\gamma}$. By our choice of $W$, we have $\hat{Y}<_{T} W^{\hat{Y}}<_{T} \hat{Y}^{\prime}$. On the other hand, our assumptions guarantee that $\hat{Y} \in \hat{P}$ and so there is a $Y \in P$ with $Y \equiv_{T} \hat{Y}$. Let $\delta$ be the witness for $Y$ being in $P$, i.e. $Y \oplus 0^{\delta} \equiv_{T} W^{Y}$. If $\delta<\gamma$, then $0^{\delta} \leq_{T} X \leq_{T} Y$, which contradicts $Y<_{T} W^{Y}$. On the other hand, if $\delta \geq \gamma$, then $0^{\gamma} \leq_{T} 0^{\delta}$ and so $0^{\delta} \oplus Y \geq_{T} Y^{\prime}>_{T} W^{Y}$ for another contradiction.

Finally, suppose $X \notin P$. As $0^{\gamma} \not \leq_{T} X$, we have, again by Posner and Robinson [1981], a $Y>_{T} X$ with $Y^{\prime} \equiv_{T} Y \oplus 0^{\gamma} \equiv_{T} Y \oplus 0^{\gamma} \oplus X^{\prime}$. By pseudojump inversion for REA operators (Jockusch and Shore [1983]), which can also easily be proven in $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$, there is a $Z$ with $Z>_{T} Y$ such that $W^{Z} \equiv_{T} Y^{\prime}$. Now, as $Z \oplus 0^{\gamma} \equiv_{T} Y \oplus 0^{\gamma} \equiv_{T} Y^{\prime} \equiv_{T} W^{Z}, \gamma$ is a witness that $Z \in P \subseteq \hat{P}$. This is the desired final contradiction to $\hat{X}$ being the base of a cone outside of $\hat{P}$ and so to the existence of $\gamma$ as required.
4. $\Sigma_{4}^{0}, \Delta_{5}^{0}$ and $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$ sets. We now prove generalizations to all levels of the arithmetic hierarchy of weaker versions of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 due to Harrington and Kechris [1975] and Martin [1974], respectively. We prove the first in $R C A_{0}$ and the second in $\Pi_{1}^{1}-C A_{0}$.

Lemma 4.1 (essentially Harrington and Kechris). $\mathrm{RCA}_{0} \vdash \Sigma_{n}^{0}$ determi$n a c y \rightarrow \Sigma_{n+1}^{0}$-TD.

Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem 3.1. Given a $\Sigma_{n+1}^{0}$ degree invariant set $B=\{f \mid(\exists n) Q(n, f)\}$ with $Q \in \overline{\Pi_{n}^{0}}$, set $A=\{\langle n, f\rangle \mid Q(n, f)\}$. Clearly, $A$ is $\Pi_{n}^{0}$ and has elements of exactly the same degrees as $B$. Now as in Theorem 3.1 let $C=\left\{\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \mid g \in A \&(\forall n)\left(\Phi_{i}^{g}(n)\right.\right.$ converges in exactly $f(n)$ many steps) \& $h$ is II's play when he follows the strategy given by $\Phi_{i}^{g}$ against I playing $\left.\langle i, f, g\rangle\right\}$. Note that $C \in \Pi_{n}^{0}$, and if $\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \in C$ then $\langle\langle i, f, g\rangle, h\rangle \equiv_{T} g$ and $g \in A$. By $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ determinacy, $C$ is determined. The analysis to show that $B$ contains or is disjoint from a cone is now exactly as in Theorem 3.1. -

Lemma 4.2 (essentially Martin). $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0} \vdash \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{0}$-TD $\leftrightarrow \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{n+1}^{0}$-TD.
Proof. As $\Delta_{n+1^{-}}^{0}$ TD is a $\Pi_{3}^{1}$ sentence, we can use $\Delta_{2}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ and its equivalent $\Sigma_{2}^{1}-\mathrm{AC}_{0}$ to prove it as $\Delta_{2}^{1}$-CA is $\Pi_{3}^{1}$-conservative over $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$. (See Simpson [2009, VII.6.9.1 and IX.4.9].) Let a game be specified by a degree invariant $\Delta_{n+1}^{0}$ set $A \subseteq 2^{\omega}$. Apply the Kuratowski analysis (Theorem 1.5 and Remark 1.6 to represent $A$ by a sequence $A_{\xi}$ of degree invariant uniformly $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ sets. By $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$-TD each of these sets either contains or is disjoint from a cone. By $\Delta_{2}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ we have the sequence telling us which is the case. We may then take the least $\gamma$ such that $A_{\gamma}$ contains a cone $\left(A_{\alpha}=2^{\omega}\right.$ if no other). Now by $\Sigma_{2}^{1}-\mathrm{AC}_{0}$ we have a sequence $s_{\eta}$ of bases of cones disjoint from $A_{\eta}$ for $\eta<\gamma$. The degree of this sequence is then the base of a cone disjoint from all the $A_{\eta}$ for $\eta<\gamma$. Its join with the base of a cone contained in $A_{\gamma}$ is then the base of a cone contained in or disjoint from $A$ depending on the parity of $\gamma$.

As $\Pi_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ proves $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$ determinacy (Welch [2011]), we now have a bound on what is needed to prove $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{4}^{0}$ and so $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{5}^{0}$ Turing determinacy.

Corollary 4.3. $\Pi_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0} \vdash \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{4}^{0}$-TD \& $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{5}^{0}$-TD.
4.1. A lower bound for $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD. As mentioned in $\$ 1$ there can be no reversals here. While we have seen that $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{5}^{0}$-TD is provable already in $\Pi_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ (Corollary 4.3), this is the end of provable Turing determinacy in full second order arithmetic, $\mathrm{Z}_{2}$. Martin ([1974] and [1974a]; see also [n.d.]) has shown that $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD implies the existence of $\beta_{0}$, the least ordinal $\gamma$ such that $L_{\gamma}$ is a model of $Z_{2}$. None of these results have been published, so we
indicate how to modify arguments of Martin's and ours from MS [2014] to give a slightly different proof of this result in $\Pi_{1}^{1}-C A_{0}$.

Lemma 4.4 (Martin). $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD $\vdash \beta_{0}$ exists.
Proof. Here we work in $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD but assume $\beta_{0}$ does not exist and consider the same theory as in MS [2014]:

$$
T=K P+" V=L "+(\forall \gamma)\left(L_{\gamma} \text { is countable inside } L_{\gamma+1}\right)
$$

which implies that $\beta_{0}$ does not exist.
We first note that as in MS [2014, Lemma 2.1] the set

$$
A=\left\{\alpha \mid L_{\alpha} \vDash T \text { and every member of } L_{\alpha} \text { is definable in } L_{\alpha}\right\}
$$

is unbounded in the ordinals: If not, let $\delta=\sup A$, and let $\alpha$ be the least admissible ordinal greater than $\delta$. (Note that $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ implies that for every $X$ the least ordinal admissible in $X$ exists.) Let $\mathcal{M}$ be the elementary submodel of $L_{\alpha}$ consisting of all its definable elements. Then $\delta \in \mathcal{M}$. Since $\beta_{0}$ does not exist, every ordinal is countable, and hence there is a bijection between $\omega$ and $\delta$, and the $<_{L}$-least such bijection belongs to $\mathcal{M}$. Thus $\delta \subseteq \mathcal{M}$, indeed $\delta+1 \subseteq \mathcal{M}$. Since the Mostowski collapse of $\mathcal{M}$ is admissible and contains $\delta+1$, it must be $L_{\alpha}$. It follows that every member of $L_{\alpha}$ is definable in $L_{\alpha}$ and hence that $\alpha \in A$ for the desired contradiction.

We now define a $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$ set and so a game $Q$ using the same r.e. operator $W$ as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, as well as some notions from MS [2014]. As there, we consider complete extensions of $T$ defined from the play of the game whose term models are $\omega$-models (albeit in ways more complicated than simply being the plays of the two players). (The term model of such an extension is the structure whose members are (equivalence classes) of formulas $\varphi(x)$ which, in the appropriate theory, define unique elements. It is an $\omega$-model if its natural numbers are the terms $x=1+\cdots+1$.)

The idea of the following definition is that $Q$ is the set of all $X$ such that there is a completion of $T$ with degree $W^{X}$ which is "better" than all completions of degree $X$. Here, the "better" of two completions is the one whose term model is either well-founded or has a larger well-founded part than the other. Let

$$
\begin{aligned}
& Q=\{X \mid(\exists \hat{T})\left[\hat{T} \equiv_{T} W^{X} \& \hat{T} \text { is a complete extension of } T\right. \\
& \quad \text { whose term model } \mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}} \text { is an } \omega \text {-model } \\
& \&(\forall \tilde{T})\left(\tilde{T} \equiv_{T} X \& \tilde{T} \text { is a complete extension of } T\right. \\
& \quad \text { whose term model } \mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}} \text { is an } \omega \text {-model } \\
&\left.\left.\left.\rightarrow \mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}} \backslash \mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}} \text { is either empty or has a least element }\right)\right]\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

We need some terminology from MS [2014] to explain the notation in this definition. Here $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is the image inside $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ of the "intersection" of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$, i.e. the union of all the $L_{\beta}$ in $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ which can be coded by reals that
belong to both $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$. (Recall that since every set in these models is countable, every such $L_{\beta}$ can be coded by a real in $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$.) Note that by MS [2014, Claim 2.6], $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is $\Sigma_{2}^{0}$. We use $\mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}}$ to denote the set of ordinals in $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$.

To see that $Q$ is $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$, we rewrite the definition in terms of indices of reductions (from $W^{X}$ and $X$ ) as in Theorem 3.7 and use the quantifier counting from MS [2014]. To say that some $Z$ is a complete (consistent) extension of $T$ is $\Pi_{1}^{0}$, and that its term model is an $\omega$-model is $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ (MS [2014, Claim 2.4]). The term model of such a theory is obviously recursive in the theory, as is its satisfaction relation. Since $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is $\Sigma_{2}^{0}$, saying that $\mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}} \backslash \mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}}$ is empty is $\Pi_{3}^{0}$, and that it has no least element is $\Pi_{4}^{0}$. By these calculations the definition of $Q$ has the form $\exists\left[\Sigma_{3} \& \Pi_{1} \& \Pi_{2} \& \forall\left(\Sigma_{3} \& \Pi_{1} \& \Pi_{2} \rightarrow \Pi_{3} \vee \Pi_{4}\right)\right]$. The set $Q$ is thus $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$, and so is its closure $\hat{Q}$ under Turing degree.

By $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD, $\hat{Q}$ contains, or is disjoint from, a cone. By Shoenfield's absoluteness theorem (which is provable in $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ by Simpson [2009, VII.4.14]), the base $\mathbf{z}$ of the cone can be taken to be in $L$. Let $\alpha$ be an admissible ordinal such that $L_{\alpha} \models T$ and every element of $L_{\alpha}$ is definable in $L_{\alpha}$ and such that $Z \in L_{\alpha}$. (Such an ordinal exists by the unboundedness result at the beginning of this proof.) Let $\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$ be the theory of $L_{\alpha}$. So, in particular $Z, Z^{\prime} \leq_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$.

We first claim that $\operatorname{Th}_{\alpha} \notin \hat{Q}$. Take $Y \equiv_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$; we will show that $Y \notin Q$. To see this, consider any $\hat{T} \equiv_{T} W^{Y}$ with term model $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ as in the definition of $Q$. Let $\tilde{T}=\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$ with term model $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}=L_{\alpha}$. So, we see that $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}} \neq L_{\alpha}$ because their theories have different Turing degrees, and also that $\left(\operatorname{Th}\left(\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}\right)\right)^{\prime} \equiv_{T}\left(\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}\right)^{\prime}$ because $W^{Y}$ is low over $Y$.

Claim 4.5. If $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}} \neq L_{\alpha}, \mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}=T$ and $\left(\operatorname{Th}\left(\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}\right)\right)^{\prime} \equiv_{T}\left(\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}\right)^{\prime}$, then $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is ill-founded and its well-founded part is at most $L_{\alpha}$.

Indeed, let $L_{\beta}$ be the well-founded part of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$. We cannot have $\beta>\alpha$ because then $\left(\operatorname{Th}_{\alpha}\right)^{\prime} \leq_{T}\left(\operatorname{Th}\left(\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}\right)\right)^{\prime}$. If $\beta=\alpha$, then $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ must be ill-founded because $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}} \neq L_{\alpha}$. If $\beta<\alpha$, then $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ must be ill-founded because otherwise $\left(\operatorname{Th}\left(\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}\right)\right)^{\prime}=\left(\operatorname{Th}\left(L_{\beta}\right)\right)^{\prime} \leq_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$ contradicting our assumption that $\left(\operatorname{Th}\left(\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}\right)\right)^{\prime} \equiv_{T}\left(\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}\right)^{\prime}$. This proves the claim.

It follows that $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}=L_{\beta}$ and that $\mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}} \backslash \mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}}$ is nonempty and has no least element, showing that $Y \notin Q$.

Second, we find another degree $X \geq_{T} Z$ which is in $Q$ and hence in $\hat{Q}$. As $Z^{\prime} \leq_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$, there is (by pseudojump inversion) an $X>_{T} Z$ such that $W^{X} \equiv_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$. Let $\hat{T}=\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$ and its term model $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}=L_{\alpha}$. Since $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is well-founded, whatever $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is, $\mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}} \backslash \mathrm{On}^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{I}}}$ is always either empty or has a least element.

Thus, we have $\operatorname{Th}_{\alpha} \notin \hat{Q}$ and $X \in \hat{Q}$, both above z, the supposed base of a cone inside or disjoint from $\hat{Q}$, for the final contradiction.

Corollary 4.6 (Martin). $\mathrm{Z}_{2}$ does not prove $\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD. Indeed, $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+$ $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{5}^{0}$-TD proves that for every set $Y$ there is a $\beta$-model of $\mathrm{Z}_{2}$ containing $Y$ and hence much more than the consistency of $\mathrm{Z}_{2}$.

Proof. Recall that $L_{\beta_{0}} \cap \mathbb{R}$ is a model of $Z_{2}$ and indeed a $\beta$-model. Thus $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{5}^{0}$-TD proves the consistency of $Z_{2}$. As Lemma 4.4 relativizes to any $Y, \Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{5}^{0}$-TD proves that, for every set $Y$, there is a $\beta$-model of $\mathrm{Z}_{2}$ containing $Y$.
4.2. A lower bound for $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD. As mentioned before, we cannot find reversals from $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{4}^{0}$-TD. Relying on several notions and results of MS [2012] and [2014], we do, however, show that we cannot get by with much less than Corollary 4.3. The following proof is somewhat complicated and builds on the proof of Lemma 4.4. Recall that $\alpha_{2}$ is the least 2 -admissible ordinal, and equivalently, the least ordinal such that $L_{\alpha_{2}} \cap \mathbb{R}=\Delta_{3}^{1}$ CA $_{0}$.

Lemma 4.7. $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD $\vdash \alpha_{2}$ exists.
Proof. We assume, for the sake of a contradiction, that $\alpha_{2}$ does not exist. We extend the theory $T$ of $\operatorname{MS}[2014, \S 2]$ by setting

$$
\begin{aligned}
T= & K P+" V=L "+(\forall \gamma)\left(L_{\gamma} \text { is countable inside } L_{\gamma+1}\right) \\
& + \text { no ordinal is } \Sigma_{2} \text {-admissible. }
\end{aligned}
$$

By the same proof as in the second paragraph of the proof of Lemma 2.1 of MS [2014] (or at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 4.4 above), if $\alpha_{2}$ does not exist then

$$
A=\left\{\alpha \mid L_{\alpha} \vDash T \text { and every member of } L_{\alpha} \text { is definable in } L_{\alpha}\right\}
$$

is unbounded in the ordinals.
We now define a set $P$ which plays the role of $Q$ in the previous proof. Again, $P$ is the set of all $X$ such that there is a model of $T$ of degree $W^{X}$ which is better than any of degree $X$, but this time we need $P$ to be $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$. Let
$P=\left\{X \mid(\exists \hat{T})\left[\hat{T} \equiv_{T} W^{X} \& \hat{T}\right.\right.$ is a complete extension of $T$
whose term model $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is an $\omega$-model
$\&(\forall \tilde{T})\left(\tilde{T} \equiv_{T} X \& \tilde{T}\right.$ is a complete extension of $T$
whose term model $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ is an $\omega$-model
$\rightarrow$ conditions $R_{I}$ new or $R_{I} 3$ hold) $\left.]\right\}$.
The conditions $R_{I}$ new and $R_{I} 3$ are defined in Section 2 of MS [2014]. Instead of repeating the whole background developed there, we just use a few lemmas from that section to prove below the few properties we need. Before doing that, let us notice that since every element of $\mathcal{M}_{\text {I }}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ is definable by a real (because $T$ says that every set is countable), we can compare their elements by looking at the reals coding them. Thus, when
we say $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}} \subseteq \mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$, we mean that every element of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is coded by a real in $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ which also belongs to $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$. (As both models are standard, we can confidently talk about reals, i.e. subsets of $\omega$, being in one or both of them.) The main properties about $R_{I}$ new, $R_{I} 3$, and $R_{I I} 3$ are the following:

1. If one of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$ is well-founded, then $R_{I}$ new holds if and only if $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is isomorphic to the well-founded part of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$.
2. If $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ are incomparable, then either $R_{I} 3$ or $R_{I I} 3$ holds.
3. If $R_{I} 3$ holds, then $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ is ill-founded, and if $R_{I I} 3$ holds then $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is ill-founded.
4. The conditions $R_{I}$ new and $R_{I} 3$ are $\Pi_{3}^{0}$.

The first property is proved in Lemma 2.9 of MS [2014] with the fact that the definition of $R_{I}$ new implies that $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}} \subseteq \mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$. For the second, we observe, by MS [2014, Lemma 2.17], that if neither of $R_{I} 3$ and $R_{I I} 3$ hold, then there are ordinals $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ such that $\star_{1}\left(\beta_{1}, \beta_{2}\right)$ holds, which by MS [2014, Lemma 2.18(b)] implies that $\alpha$ is 2 -admissible, where $\alpha$ is such that $\mathcal{A}=L_{\alpha}$. But since $\alpha_{2}$ does not exist, there are no 2-admissible ordinals, and hence this is a contradiction. The third property follows from the definition of $R_{I} 3$ in MS [2014, Definition 2.16], which asserts that a subset of the ordinals in $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ has no least element. Finally, the fourth property follows from MS [2014, Claim 2.7] for $R_{I} n e w$ and from MS [2014, Definition 2.16 and Claim 2.11] for $R_{I} 3$.

The rest of the proof is similar to that of the previous lemma. To see that $P$ is $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$, we again rewrite the definition in terms of indices of reductions (from $W^{X}$ and $X$ ). The conditions $R_{I}$ new and $R_{I} 3$ are $\Pi_{3}^{0}$. As remarked above, $\Pi_{2}^{W^{X}}$ relations are uniformly $\Pi_{2}^{X}$ and, of course, the relation $Z \leq_{T} Y$ is $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$. It is then routine to calculate that $P$ is $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$.

The closure $\hat{P}$ of $P$ under $\equiv_{T}$ is then also a $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$ set. By $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD, $\hat{P}$ contains, or is disjoint from, a cone. By Shoenfield's absoluteness theorem, the base $\mathbf{z}$ of the cone can be taken to be in $L$. Let $\alpha$ be an admissible ordinal such that $L_{\alpha} \models T$ and every element of $L_{\alpha}$ is definable in $L_{\alpha}$ and such that $Z \in L_{\alpha}$. (Such an ordinal exists by the unboundedness result at the beginning of this proof.) Let $\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$ be the theory of $L_{\alpha}$. So in particular $Z, Z^{\prime} \leq_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$.

We first claim that $\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha} \notin \hat{P}$. Take $Y \equiv_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$; we will show that $Y \notin P$. To see this, consider any $\hat{T} \equiv_{T} W^{Y}$ with term model $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ as in the definition of $P$. Let $\tilde{T}=\mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$ with term model $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}=L_{\alpha}$. So $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}} \neq L_{\alpha}$ because their theories have different Turing degrees. Thus, $\mathcal{M}_{\text {I }}$ cannot be the well-founded part of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$, and hence $R_{I}$ new cannot hold. Since $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$ is well-founded, $R_{I} 3$ cannot hold either. So $Y \notin P$.

Second, we find a degree $X \geq_{T} Z$ which is in $P$, and hence in $\hat{P}$. As $Z^{\prime} \leq_{T} \mathrm{Th}_{\alpha}$, there is (by pseudojump inversion) an $X>_{T} Z$ with $W^{X} \equiv_{T}$ $\operatorname{Th}_{\alpha}$. We claim that $X \in P$. Let $\hat{T}=\operatorname{Th}_{\alpha}$ with term model $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}=L_{\alpha}$.

Consider any $\tilde{T} \equiv_{T} X$ with term model $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ as in the definition of $P$. So, we have $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }} \neq L_{\alpha}$ because their theories have different Turing degrees, and we have $\left(\operatorname{Th}\left(\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}\right)\right)^{\prime} \equiv_{T}\left(\operatorname{Th}_{\alpha}\right)^{\prime}$ because $W^{X}$ is low over $X$. By Claim 4.5, $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ is ill-founded and its well-founded part is at most $L_{\alpha}$. If $\mathcal{A}_{\text {II }}=L_{\alpha}$, then $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ is isomorphic to the well-founded part of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$, and hence $R_{I}$ new holds. Otherwise, $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{I}}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{\text {II }}$ are incomparable. Since $R_{I I} 3$ does not hold (because $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{II}}$ is well-founded), $R_{I} 3$ must hold, proving that $X \in P$.

As $\operatorname{Th}_{\alpha}, X \geq_{T} Z$, we see that $\mathbf{z}$ is not the base of a cone for $\hat{P}$ for the final contradiction, and so $\alpha_{2}$ exists as required.

Corollary 4.8. $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ does not prove $\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD. Indeed, $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ $+\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{4}^{0}$-TD proves that for every set $Z$ there is a $\beta$-model of $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ containing $Z$ and hence much more than the consistency of $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$.

Proof. By Simpson [2009, VII.5.17 and the notes thereafter], $L_{\alpha_{2}} \cap \mathbb{R}$ is a model of $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ and indeed a $\beta$-model. Thus $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\Sigma_{4}^{0}$-TD proves the consistency of $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$. As Lemma 4.7 relativizes to any $Z, \Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}+\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{4}^{0}$-TD proves that, for every set $Z$, there is a $\beta$-model of $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ containing $Z$. -
5. Questions. There are several natural questions left open here. For the first two we expect that answers should require some new interesting models of fragments of $Z_{2}$.

Question 5.1. Does $\mathrm{WKL}_{0}$ or some other known principle strictly between RCA $A_{0}$ and ACA $A_{0}$ prove $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD?

Question 5.2. Does $\Delta_{3}^{0}$-TD (or some stronger version) prove $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$ over WKL ${ }_{0}$ ?

Question 5.3. Clarify the status of $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD over $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}$. In particular does $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}+\Sigma_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{Tl}_{0}$ (or equivalently $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$-IND) or $\mathrm{ATR}_{0}$ with full induction prove $\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD? If not, does $\mathrm{ACA}_{0}+\Delta_{4}^{0}$-TD prove $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{Tl}_{0}$ ?

Question 5.4. Does $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{4}^{0}$-TD (or some stronger version) prove $\Pi_{1}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ over ATR $_{0}$ ?

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