Provident sets and rudimentary set forcing

by

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Abstract. Using the theory of rudimentary recursion and provident sets expounded in [MB], we give a treatment of set forcing appropriate for working over models of a theory PROVI which may plausibly claim to be the weakest set theory supporting a smooth theory of set forcing, and of which the minimal model is Jensen’s $J_\omega$. Much of the development is rudimentary or at worst given by rudimentary recursions with parameter the notion of forcing under consideration. Our development eschews the power set axiom. We show that the forcing relation for $\bar{\Delta}_0$ wfs is propagated through our hierarchies by a rudimentary function, and we show that the construction of names for the values of rudimentary and rudimentarily recursive functions is similarly propagated. Our main result is that a set-generic extension of a provident set is provident.

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0. Introduction. There is a certain finitely axiomatisable theory which we call PROV, which is weaker than Kripke–Platek set theory KP, but stronger than Gandy–Jensen set theory GJ. All three theories are true in
HF = $V_\omega = J_1 = L_\omega$; if an axiom of infinity be added to each theory, giving the theories KPI, PROVI and GJI, the minimal transitive models are then respectively the Jensen fragments $J_{\omega^CK}$, $J_\omega$ and $J_2$.

The provident sets are HF and the transitive models of PROVI. We show that every provident set $A$ supports the definition of the forcing relation $\|\cdot\|_P$ when $P \in A$; our main result is that a set-generic extension of a provident set is provident.

For most of this paper we avoid use of the power set axiom; the paper [M4] discusses the problems and possibilities of set forcing over models of Mac Lane or of Zermelo set theory, two theories which include the power set axiom.

We draw on the notation (1) and results of [MB], and in particular we make heavy use of the rudimentary function $T$ which was introduced in [M3]: its properties are that if $u$ is transitive, then $T(u)$ is transitive, with $u$ both a member and a subset of it; every member of $T(u)$ is a subset of $u$; further, the union over all $n$ of $T^n(u)$ is the rudimentary closure of $u \cup \{u\}$.

Provident sets. Let $p$ be a set. Call a function $x \mapsto F(x)$ $p$-rud-rec (short for $p$-rudimentarily recursive) if there is a rud function $H$ such that for every set $x$,

$$F(x) = H(p, F|_x).$$

Examples: the rank function, $\varrho$, and transitive closure, tcl, are $\emptyset$-rud-rec, meaning no parameters required; the evaluation $\text{val}_G(\cdot)$ of the names of a forcing language using a generic $G$ is $G$-rud-rec.

Rud recursion without parameters is treated in [MB, Section 4]; parameters are discussed in Section 5.

The axioms of PROV are such that its transitive models are those transitive sets $A$ such that for each $p$, each $p$-rud-rec $F$ and each $x \in A$, $F(x)$ is in $A$.

Let $c$ be a transitive set; using $T$ we define in §2 a hierarchy giving an initial segment of $L(c)$ by a recursion on the ordinals. The novelty of the definition is that the whole of $c$ is not included at the start, but its members are fed in according to their rank: if we put $c_\nu = \{x \in c \mid \varrho(x) < \nu\}$, then the following $c$-rud recursion on the ordinals holds:

$$c_0 = 0, \quad c_{\nu+1} = c \cap \{x \mid x \subseteq c_\nu\}, \quad c_\lambda = \bigcup\{c_\nu \mid \nu < \lambda\} \text{ at limit } \lambda.$$  

The canonical progress towards $c$ is the hierarchy $P^c_\nu$ defined by setting

\[ P^c_0 = \emptyset, \quad P^c_{\nu+1} = T(P^c_\nu) \cup \{c_\nu\} \cup c_{\nu+1}, \quad P^c_\lambda = \bigcup\{P^c_\nu \mid \nu < \lambda\} \text{ at limit } \lambda. \]

(1) Examples: $(a,b)_2$, sometimes more informally written $(a,b)$, is the Kuratowski ordered pair defined as $\{\{a\}, \{a,b\}\}$. $(a,b,c)_3$ is the Kuratowski ordered triple, defined as $(a,(b,c)_2)_2$. $(a,b,c)$ denotes this function with domain $\{0,1,2\}$: $\{(a,0)_2, (b,1)_2, (c,2)_2\}.}$
0.0. Remark. As $c_\nu = c \cap P^c_\nu$, we might have defined $P^c_\nu$ by a single $c$-rudimentary recursion on ordinals:

$$P^c_0 = \emptyset, \quad P^c_{\nu+1} = \mathbb{T}(P^c_\nu) \cup \{c \cap P^c_\nu\} \cup (c \cap \{x \mid x \subseteq P^c_\nu\}), \quad P^c_\lambda = \bigcup_{\nu<\lambda} P^c_\nu.$$  

The axiomatisation of PROV may then be summarised as

- extensionality
- the empty set exists
- all rudimentary functions are defined everywhere
- every set has a rank
- every set has a transitive closure
- for every transitive $c$ and ordinal $\nu$ the set $P^c_\nu$ exists

**Gentle functions.** Let us review some material from [MB].

**Definition.** A *gentle* function is one of the form $G \circ F$ where $G$ is rudimentary and $F$ is rud-rec.

A *$p$-gentle* function is one of the form $G \circ F$ where $G$ is rudimentary and $F$ is $p$-rud-rec.

If $A$ is a set, then a function is *(A)-gentle* if it is $p$-gentle for some $p \in A$.

To emphasise the absence of a parameter we may write $\emptyset$-gentle or, more accurately, $(\emptyset)$-gentle. In that paper, Proposition 4.5 gives Bowler’s example of two rud-rec functions whose composite is not rud-rec, and Theorem 4.9 his result that the composite of two gentle functions is gentle.

A point to note is that the composition of two $p$-gentle functions is liable not to be $p$-gentle but will be $q$-gentle for some parameter $q$ in the provident closure of $\{p\}$. So for provident $A$ the composition of *(A)-gentle functions is (A)-gentle.*

Proposition 4.12 of [MB] proves that the characteristic function of a predicate $B$ is gentle iff the separator $x \mapsto x \cap B$ is gentle. That yields the following principle:

0.1. **Gentle Separation.** Let $A$ be provident, $a$ and $p$ in $A$, and $B$ a $p$-gentle predicate; then $a \cap B \in A$.

**Proof.** There will be some attempt $f \in A$ at $\chi_B$, that is, a fragment of $\chi_B$, with $a$ included in its domain, and then $x \cap \{y \mid f(y) = 1\}$ will be a set by $\Delta_0$ separation. ■0.1

**Set forcing over provident sets.** Let $A$ be a transitive model of PROVI; let $\mathbb{P}$ be a separative partial ordering which is a member of $A$, and let $\mathbb{P}$ be the provident closure of $\{\mathbb{P}\}$. Many functions and relations involved in the development of forcing are if not actually $\mathbb{P}$-rud-rec, $(\mathbb{P})$-gentle.
The first goal of the paper is to prove that for each \( \ell \) the forcing relation \( p \parallel^p \varphi \), restricted to those sentences of the language of forcing that are \( \Delta_0 \) and of length at most \( \ell \), is \((P)\)-gentle.

The second goal is to analyse the construction of names for the values of functions applied to objects in a generic extension. We speak of this task as the construction of nominators for the functions concerned.

The first stage of that is to show that for each rudimentary function \( R \), say of two variables, there is a \((P)\)-gentle function \( R_P \) of two variables such that for \((A, P)\)-generic \( G \) and all \( x, y \) in \( A \),

\[
\text{val}_G(R_P(x, y)) = R(\text{val}_G(x), \text{val}_G(y)).
\]

In many cases, we can do better, and indeed certain rudimentary functions have basic nominators.

We shall then find \( P \)-rud-rec functions \( \varrho_P \) and \( \text{tcl}_P \) that similarly build names for the rank and the transitive closure of a given object from its forcing name.

Finally we must build names for the stages of a progress \( \nu \mapsto P^d_\nu \) for \( d \) a transitive set in the generic extension. Here we shall repeatedly use the principle that functions rudimentary recursive in the \((P)\)-gentle ternary relation \( p \parallel^p a = b \) are \((P)\)-gentle, which follows from the results of Section 5 of [MB].

The main theorem will then follow easily for provident sets of the form \( P^e_\theta \), and will immediately extend to all provident sets containing \( P \), using the fact—a special case of [MB, Theorem 7.0]—that every provident set is the union of a directed family of sets each of the form \( P^e_\theta \).

In the rest of this paper gentle will normally be used to mean \((P)\)-gentle: where it is necessary to emphasize the absence of parameters we shall write \( \emptyset \)-gentle.

1. Heuristic. We begin with some reminders of the general character of forcing: the present discussion is heuristic, to give the reader a feel for the way the forcing relation will operate. In particular, the methods used in this section for naming old and new objects are, dangerously, simpler than the methods of the formal development to be given in subsequent sections.

Suppose we face the following challenge:

\textit{given a transitive } \( M \), to find a transitive } \( N \supseteq M \) \textit{with } \( \text{On} \cap N = \text{On} \cap M \) \textit{but where } \( N \) \textit{contains a subset of } \( \omega \) \textit{not in } \( M \).

If \( M \) and \( N \) are both provident, such an \( N \) will necessarily violate the axiom of constructibility, for \((L)^N = (L)^M \). Thus we are aiming to add a set \( a \subseteq \omega \) to \( M \).
1.0. We begin by asking questions about \(a\). Suppose we have some information \(p\) about \(a\): what statements about \(a\) will be forced to be true? For example if \(p\) is the statement that \(5 \in a\), then **Not all members of \(a\) are even** is forced by \(p\).

Our beginning intuition for forcing is the idea that we have pieces of partial information about the new object we are adding, and that we build up a picture of the new model from this partial information.

Our pieces of information are called **conditions**, and to start with we suppose that the collection of conditions is a set, \(P\). Experience shows that we should make the following assumptions about \(P\):

1.0.0 \(P\) is partially ordered by a relation \(\leq\); if \(p \leq q\) we think that \(p\) contains more information than \(q\).

1.0.1 To get something interesting we allow the possibility of two conditions being incompatible: we say that \(p\) is compatible with \(q\) if there is some \(r\) stronger than both: \(r \leq p \& r \leq q\); and we say that \(p\) is incompatible with \(q\), in symbols \(p \perp q\), if no such \(r\) exists.

1.0.2 We assume that any condition can be strengthened in two incompatible ways:

\[
\forall p \exists q \leq p \exists r \leq p \; q \perp r.
\]

1.0.3 We suppose that \(P\) has a greatest element \(1^P\), where this condition is the one that gives us no information at all. Thus \(1^P\) is compatible with every condition.

1.0.4 Finally we suppose that \(\mathbb{P} = \text{df} (P, 1^P, \leq)_3\) is separative, that is,

\[
\forall p \forall q (p \not\leq q \Rightarrow \exists r \leq p \; r \perp q).
\]

Such a \(\mathbb{P}\) is called a **notion of forcing**. Let us look at two examples.

**Cohen’s original forcing.** We take

\[
P = \bigcup \{n2 \mid n \in \omega\} = ^\omega 2,
\]

the set of finite maps from \(\omega\) to \(2 = \{0, 1\}\).

We define the ordering by reverse inclusion:

\[
p \leq^\mathbb{P} q \iff q \subseteq p.
\]

This forcing is intended to add a “generic” \(a : \omega \to 2\). We take a symbol \(\hat{a}\) and use it as a name for the new \(a\) that we are trying to add.

The intended meaning of a condition \(p : n \to \omega\) is that \(\hat{a} \upharpoonright n = p\). So if \(n = 6\) and \(p(3) = 1\), then \(p\) will force the statement that \(\hat{a}(\hat{3}) = \hat{1}\).

We suppose that we are in one universe, which we call the ground model, describing a larger universe, which we call the generic extension; the new objects are only partially known to us, so we use dotted letters as names for
them, as \( \dot{a} \). The objects in the ground model are fully known to us, and we name them with hatted letters: thus \( \hat{3} \) is our name for 3 in the language of forcing.

Continuing our discussion of Cohen’s original forcing, we show now that the new real \( \dot{a} \) is not the same as any old real \( \dot{b} \): precisely, we prove the following:

1.1. **Proposition.** Let \( b : \omega \to 2 \). Then \( \forall p \exists q \leq p \: q \forces \dot{b} \neq \dot{a} \).

Notice the topological flavour to this proposition: it is saying that the set of conditions forcing a certain statement is *dense*. Indeed we may topologize \( P \) so that is exactly what is happening.

**Proof of 1.1.** Given \( p \), let \( n = \text{dom}(p) \); \( n \) is of course the least natural number not in the domain of \( p \). Look at \( b(n) \), and let

\[
q = p \cup \{(1 - b(n), n)\}_2.
\]

So in any model in which everything that is forced on a dense set is true, \( \dot{a} \) will be a new subset of \( \omega \).

This notion of density is central to the concept of forcing. One of the properties of the forcing relation, which we shall refer to as the *density property*, is that

\[
p \forces \varphi \iff \exists q \leq p \exists r \leq q \: r \forces \phi.
\]

As we progressively extend the definition of the forcing relation to ever wider classes of formulæ, we shall check at each stage that the density property and other characteristic properties of forcing are preserved.

**Another example.** Let \( \eta \) be an infinite ordinal. This time take

\[
P = \{ p \mid \exists n \in \omega \: p : n \downarrow 1 \to \eta \}.
\]

As before, order by reverse inclusion:

\[
p \leq p \iff q \subseteq p.
\]

This forcing adds a generic \( \dot{f} : \dot{\omega} \downarrow 1 \to \dot{\eta} \): a condition \( p \) with domain \( n \) is a description of \( \dot{f} \upharpoonright \dot{n} \).

So

\[
1^P \forces \dot{f} \upharpoonright \dot{\ell}(p) = \dot{p}.
\]

1.2. **Exercise.** \( 1^P \forces \dot{f} \) is 1-1.

1.3. **Proposition.** \( 1^P \forces \dot{\eta} \) is countable.

**Proof.** By a density argument. Given \( p, n \) not in \( \text{dom}(p) \) and an ordinal \( \xi < \eta \), suppose that \( \xi \) is not in the image of \( p \). We find \( q \leq p \) such that \( n \in \text{dom}(q) \) and \( q(n) = \xi \).

Thus we have shown that \( \forall \xi \leq \eta \forall p \exists q \leq p \: q \forces \hat{\xi} \) is the image of \( \dot{f} \).
2. Forcing in provident sets. Let $M$ be a provident set, and $\mathbb{P} = (P, 1^\mathbb{P}, \leq)_3$ a separative partial order in $M$, with a top point $1^\mathbb{P}$. We suppose that $\omega \in M$.

We aim to define within $M$ a relation $\models$, more exactly $\models^\mathbb{P}$, describing an extension $M[G]$ of $M$, where $G$ is an $(M, \mathbb{P})$-generic filter. Each object in $M$ potentially names an element of $M[G]$. $\models$ is a relation between elements of $P$ and sentences in a language of set theory that we shall gradually build up. In fact the full relation can only be defined schematically within $M$.

This language will start from two two-place relations $=$ and $\in$ and will broadly resemble the formal languages introduced in [M2]. We shall use our devices of dots and type-writer face as before; but the constants will play a different role, and hence we shall use a different mark. To each set $x$ in the universe corresponds a name $x$ for an object in the generic extension. Thus the statement $p \models^\mathbb{P} x \in y$ expresses information about the evaluation of the objects $x$ and $y$ functioning as names of sets to be created in the forcing extension given by the notion of forcing $\mathbb{P}$.

2.0. Definition. $p \models_0 a \in b \iff (p,a) \in b$.

$\models_0$ is our first approximation to the relation $\models$.

2.1. Lemma. If $p \models_0 a \in b$ then $a \in \bigcup \bigcup b$.

2.2. Definition. In future we shall write $\bigcup^2 x$ for $\bigcup \bigcup x$.

2.3. Lemma. $\models_1$ is $\Delta_0$, indeed rudimentary.

2.4. Remark. For relations, $\Delta_0$ and rud are the same: cf. Devlin [De, VI.1.5].

2.5. Definition. $p \models_1 a \in b \iff \exists q \in \bigcup^2 b \left[ q \geq p \& (q,a) \in b \right]$.

2.6. Lemma. For all $p \in \mathbb{P}$, $a$ and $b$:

(2.6.0) $p \models_0 a \in b \Rightarrow p \models_1 a \in b$;

(2.6.1) if $p \models_1 a \in b$ then $a \in \bigcup^2 b$;

(2.6.2) $\models_1$ is rudimentary in $\mathbb{P}$.

2.7. Lemma. If $p \models_1 a \in b$ and $r \leq p$ then $r \models_1 a \in b$.

This last statement shows that $\models_1$ improves $\models_0$ and starts to resemble a forcing relation.

We define the relation $p \models b = c$ by recursion:

2.8. Definition.

$p \models b = c \iff \exists \alpha \in \bigcup^2 b \left[ r \models_1 \alpha \in c \Rightarrow \exists t \leq r \exists \beta \in \bigcup^2 b (t \models_1 \beta = \gamma \& t \models_1 \gamma \in c) \right] \&$

$\forall r \leq p \left[ r \models_1 \beta \in b \Rightarrow \exists t \leq r \exists \gamma \in \bigcup^2 c (t \models_1 \gamma = \beta \& t \models_1 \gamma \in c) \right] \&$

$\forall \gamma \in \bigcup^2 c \forall r \leq p \left[ r \models_1 \gamma \in c \Rightarrow \exists t \leq r \exists \beta \in \bigcup^2 b (t \models_1 \beta = \gamma \& t \models_1 \beta \in b) \right]$. 
The above definition is $\mathbb{P}$-rud recursive in a suitable sense, which we must now articulate, and therefore will succeed in provident sets of which $\mathbb{P}$ is a member, or, more generally, in $\mathbb{P}$-provident sets.

2.9. DEFINITION. Let $\chi_\infty(p,b,c)$ be the characteristic function of the relation $p \models_\mathbb{P} b = c$, so that it takes the value 1 if $p \models_\mathbb{P} b = c$ and 0 otherwise. Our plan is to show that the graph of $\chi_\infty$ on transitive sets is definable by a $\mathbb{P}$-rudimentary recursion.

2.10. THE DEFINABILITY LEMMA. “$f$ is a $\chi_\infty$ attempt” is $\Delta_0(\mathbb{P}, f)$.

Proof. We must first say that everything in the domain of $f$ is an ordered triple, of which the first component is a member of $\mathbb{P}$; and whenever $(p,b,c) \in \text{Dom}(f)$ and $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are in $b$ and $c$ respectively, and $q \in \mathbb{P}$ then $(q,c,b)$ and $(q,\beta,\gamma)$ are in the domain too. But all that is $\Delta_0(\mathbb{P}, f)$.

Then we must say that $f$ respects the recursive definition: but all that is also a $\Delta_0$ statement about $\mathbb{P}$ and $f$. $\blacksquare$ 2.10

2.11. THE PROPAGATION LEMMA. Let $F(u) = \chi_\infty(\mathbb{P} \times u \times u)$. There is a rudimentary function $H_\infty$ such that for any transitive $P$, if $P \subseteq P^+ \subseteq \mathcal{P}(P)$,

$$F(P^+) = H_\infty(\mathbb{P}, F(P), P^+).$$

In the following argument, and elsewhere, $(\cdot)_i^3$ are basic “un-tripling” functions such that for a poset $\mathbb{P} = (\mathbb{P}, 1^\mathbb{P}, \leq)_3$, $(\mathbb{P})_0^3 = \mathbb{P}$, $(\mathbb{P})_2^3 = 1^\mathbb{P}$, and $(\mathbb{P})_2^2 = \leq$. On this occasion, but not in future, the restricted nature of a quantifier such as $\forall r \leq P$ has been made manifest by re-writing it as $\forall r \in (\leq^{\infty}_{u})$.

Proof of the Propagation Lemma. Let $\Psi(x,f,p,b,c)$ be the $\Delta_0$ formula

$$\forall t \in \mathbb{P}, \forall r \in (x)_2^{u}(p) \quad [r \models_{\mathbb{P}} \beta \in b \Rightarrow \exists t \in (x)_2^{u}(r) \exists \gamma \in \mathbb{P} \ (f(t,\beta,\gamma) = 1 \ & \ t \models_{\mathbb{P}} \gamma \in c)]$$

& $\forall r \in (x)_2^{u}(p) \quad [r \models_{\mathbb{P}} \gamma \in c \Rightarrow \exists t \in (x)_2^{u}(r) \exists \beta \in \mathbb{P} \ (f(t,\gamma,\beta) = 1 \ & \ t \models_{\mathbb{P}} \beta \in b)].$

Define $H_\infty(x,f,v)$ to be

$$\{0,1\} \times ((x)_3^2 \times (v \times v)) \cap \{((p,b,c)_4|_{p,b,c} \Psi(x,f,p,b,c)) \cup \{(0,p,b,c)_4|_{p,b,c} \neg \Psi(x,f,p,b,c)\}). \quad \blacksquare$$

2.12. DEFINITION.

$$\chi_\infty \models \exists \{0 \times u \times u\} \ | \ u \text{ transitive} \ & \ u \in \exists Q\}.$$

2.13. PROPOSITION. Let $e$ be a transitive set of which $\mathbb{P}$ is a member, and let $\eta_0$ be minimal such that $\mathbb{P} \in P^e_{\eta_0}$, so that $\eta_0 = \varphi(\mathbb{P}) + 1$. Then

$$(2.13.0) \quad \chi_\infty \models P^e_{\omega} \subseteq P^e_{\eta_0 + \omega};$$
there are integers $s_\nu$ and $g_\nu$ such that if $\lambda$ is a limit ordinal, and
\[ \chi_\nu \models P_\lambda^e \subseteq P_{\eta_0 + \lambda}^e; \]
then for each $k \in \omega$, $\chi_\nu \models P_{\lambda + k}^e \in P_{\eta_0 + \lambda + s_\nu + g_\nu}^e$;
(2.13.2) for each limit ordinal $\lambda$, $\chi_\nu \models P_\lambda^e \subseteq P_{\eta_0 + \lambda}^e$.

Proof. Much as in [MB]. Iterating $H_\nu$ from $\chi_\nu \models \emptyset$ gives $\chi_\nu \models P_\omega^e \subseteq P_{\eta_0 + \omega}^e$;
and then continue the induction by showing for each limit $\lambda$ that

[i] if $\chi_\nu \models P_\lambda^e \subseteq P_{\eta_0 + \lambda}$ then $\chi_\nu \models P_\lambda^e$ is a member of $P_{\eta_0 + \lambda + \omega}^e$;
[ii] if $\chi_\nu \models P_\lambda^e$ is a member of $P_{\eta_0 + \lambda + \omega}^e$, then so is $\chi_\nu \models P_{\lambda + k}^e$ for each $k \in \omega$.

The proof of [i] uses the Definability Lemma 2.10 and the presence of the parameter $P$; and the proof of [ii] uses the Propagation Lemma 2.11. The integers $s_\nu$ and $g_\nu$ are the separational and generational delays calculated by [MB] Theorem 6.12 and Proposition 6.32. \(\blacksquare\)

Propagation of $\chi_\nu$. The progress $(P_{\nu}^e)_{\nu}$ was defined in \(\S6\) of [MB] for $c$ a transitive set.

We could continue to work with progresses of the above kind, but a problem would then arise at the end of the paper, in the proof that a set-generic extension of a provident set is provident. It is better to change tack now and work with other progresses, which might be called construction
...
\(e \in P^{c;m}_{\varnothing(e)+1}\); and so by [MB Proposition 6.35], the right side is included in the left.

Now for the general case: the special case tells us that for each \(\zeta\) with \(\varnothing(P) < \zeta < \theta\), \(P_{\varnothing(\zeta);m}^e = P_{\varnothing(\zeta)}^e\). Taking the union over all such \(\zeta\) gives \(P_{\varnothing;0}^e = P_{\varnothing}^e\), the equalities \(P_{\varnothing;0}^e = P_{\varnothing;1}^e\) and \(P_{\varnothing}^e = P_{\varnothing}^e\), proved as in [MB Proposition 6.35], complete the proof. \(\blacksquare_{2.15}\)

This reconstruction of \(P_{\varnothing}^e\) shortens the delay for most \(\chi^e\):

2.16. PROPOSITION. For any ordinal \(\nu \geq \eta\), and any limit ordinal \(\lambda > \eta\):

1. \(\chi^e_{\nu} = \chi^e_{\eta} \mid P^{e;m}_{\nu}\); \(\Box_{2.16.0}\)
2. \(\chi^e_{\nu} \subseteq P^{e;m}_{\nu+6}\); \(\Box_{2.16.1}\)
3. \(\chi^e_{\lambda} \subseteq P^{e;m}_{\lambda}\); \(\Box_{2.16.2}\)
4. \(\chi^e_{\nu} \mid P^{e;m}_{\nu+12}\). \(\Box_{2.16.3}\)

*Proof.* (2.16.0) is true by definition for \(\nu = \eta\); thereafter, the function \(H_{\eta}\) preserves its truth at successor stages, and at limit stages, we simply take unions on both sides.

(2.16.1): The ‘6’ reflects the delay in the creation of Kuratowski ordered pairs.

(2.16.2): At limit stages, that delay no longer exists.

(2.16.3): Fix \(\nu \geq \eta\). Let \(\chi^+ = \chi^e_{\nu+6} \cap P^{e;m}_{\nu+6}\); then \(\chi^+ \subseteq P^{e;m}_{\nu+7}\) by definition of the progress. Since \(\chi^e_{\nu} \subseteq P^{e;m}_{\nu+6}\), \(\chi^e_{\nu} = \chi^+ \cap (2 \times (P \times (P^{c;m}_{\nu} \times P^{e;m}_{\nu})))\).

By [MB Lemmata 6.15 and 6.16], \(x, y \in P^{c;m}_{\zeta} \Rightarrow x \cap y = x \setminus (x \setminus y) \in P^{c;m}_{\zeta+2} \) & \(x \times y \in P^{c;m}_{\zeta+3}\).

\(P^{c;m}_{\nu+1} \subseteq P^{e;m}_{\nu+1}\), so \(P^{c;m}_{\nu} \times P^{c;m}_{\nu} \subseteq P^{e;m}_{\nu+4}\); \(P \times (P^{c;m}_{\nu} \times P^{c;m}_{\nu}) \in P^{c;m}_{\nu+7}\) and \(\{0, 1\} \times (P \times (P^{c;m}_{\nu} \times P^{c;m}_{\nu})) \in P^{c;m}_{\nu+10}\).

We conclude that \(\chi^e_{\nu} \subseteq P^{c;m}_{\nu+12}\). \(\blacksquare_{2.16}\)

**Propagation of \(\chi^e\).** We may now define \(p \models a \in b\):

2.17. DEFINITION.

\[p \models a \in b \iff \exists s \leq p \exists \beta \subseteq 3 \exists \beta \in \varnothing \exists t \models \beta \models a \g t \models b\]

2.18. REMARK. This is not a definition by recursion: indeed, it is visibly rudimentary in \(p \models b = c\).

2.19. DEFINITION. Let \(\chi^e(p, a, b)\) be the characteristic function of the relation \(p \models a \in b\).

2.20. PROPOSITION. There is a natural number \(s^e\) such that for each ordinal \(\nu \geq \eta\), \(\chi^e \mid P^{c;m}_{\nu} \subseteq P^{c;m}_{\nu+s^e}\), where \(e\) and \(\eta\) are as in Definition 2.14.
Proof. There are rudimentary functions \( R \) and \( S \) such that

\[
\chi_{\epsilon} \upharpoonright P_\nu^{c_\nu} = 2 \times \text{Dom}(\chi_\nu^c) \cap \{(1, p, a, b, 4) \mid R(p, a, b, \chi_\nu^c) = 1 \}
\]

\[
\cup \{(0, p, a, b, 4) \mid R(p, a, b, \chi_\nu^c) = 0 \} = S(\chi_\nu^c).
\]

We may take \( s_\epsilon = 12 + c_\nu \). \( \blacklozenge 2.20 \)

**Familiar properties of forcing.** We check as our definition of forcing develops that it has the expected density properties, and we establish familiar properties of equality and the substitution properties of \( = \) for \( \epsilon \):

2.21. **Proposition.** If \( p \models b = c \) and \( q \leq p \) then \( q \models b = c \).

\( p \models a = b \Leftrightarrow \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \ r \models a = b \).

2.22. **Proposition.** For all \( p \in \mathbb{P}, a, b \) and \( c \):

(2.22.0) \( p \models b = b \);

(2.22.1) \( p \models b = a \) then \( p \models a = b \);

(2.22.2) \( p \models a = b \) and \( p \models b = c \) then \( p \models a = c \).

**Proof.** (0) Let \( b \) be a counter-example of minimal rank. The definition of \( p \models b = b \) involves various \( r, \beta \in \bigcup \mathbb{B} b \), for which \( p \models \beta = \beta \) by the minimality condition on \( b \).

(1) From the symmetry of the definition.

(2) If \( q \models 1 \alpha \epsilon a \) then \( \exists r \leq q \exists \beta (r \models 1 \beta \epsilon b \wedge r \models 1 \alpha = \beta) \), so \( \exists s \leq r \exists \gamma (s \models 1 \gamma \epsilon c \wedge s \models \beta = \gamma) \); the \( t \) we seek is \( s \); \( s \models 1 \alpha = \beta \wedge 1 \beta = \gamma \); so, assuming we have minimised the rank of a possible failure \( b \), \( s \models 1 \beta = \gamma \) and \( s \models 1 \gamma \epsilon c \), as required. \( \blacklozenge 2.22 \)

2.23. **Lemma.** \( q \leq p \& p \models a \epsilon b \Rightarrow q \models a \epsilon b \).

2.24. **Lemma.** \( p \models a \epsilon b \Leftrightarrow \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \ r \models a \epsilon b \).

2.25. **Proposition.** If \( p \models a \epsilon b \) then \( p \models a \epsilon b \).

**Proof.** Let \( r \leq p \); take \( s = r \) and \( \beta = a \); then \( s \models 1 \beta = a \) and \( s \models 1 \beta \epsilon b \). \( \blacklozenge 2.25 \)

2.26. **Proposition.** If \( p \models a \epsilon b \) and \( p \models a = c \) then \( p \models c \epsilon b \).

**Proof.** Let \( s \leq p \). We seek \( t \leq s \) and \( \beta \in \bigcup \mathbb{B} b \) such that \( t \models 1 \beta = c \) and \( t \models 1 \beta \epsilon b \). We know that there are \( t \leq s \) and \( \beta \in \bigcup \mathbb{B} b \) such that \( t \models 1 \beta = a \) and \( t \models 1 \beta \epsilon b \); since \( p \models a = c \) and \( t \leq p \), \( t \models 1 \beta = c \). \( \blacklozenge 2.26 \)

2.27. **Proposition.** If \( p \models a \epsilon b \) and \( p \models b = d \), then \( p \models a \epsilon d \).

**Proof.** Let \( s \leq p \). We seek \( t \leq s \) and \( \delta \in \bigcup \mathbb{D} d \) such that \( t \models 1 \delta = a \) and \( t \models 1 \delta \epsilon d \). Since \( p \models a \epsilon b \), there are \( r \leq s \) and \( \beta \in \bigcup \mathbb{B} b \) such that \( r \models 1 \beta = a \wedge t \models 1 \beta \epsilon b \). Since \( p \models b = d \) and \( r \leq p \), there are \( t \leq r \) and \( \delta \in \bigcup \mathbb{D} d \) such that \( t \models 1 \beta = \delta \) and \( t \models 1 \delta \epsilon d \); as \( t \models 1 \beta = \delta \) and \( t \models 1 \beta = a \), \( t \models 1 \delta = a \). \( \blacklozenge 2.27 \)
Forcing the negation of a statement. We have defined \( p \models \Phi \) for \( \Phi \) of the form \( x \in y \) or \( x = y \), and now wish to define \( p \models \neg \Phi \) in these cases. The definition is characteristic of forcing; and we will maintain it as we extend our definition of forcing to ever larger classes of formulæ.

2.28. Definition. \( p \models \neg \Phi \iff \forall q \leq p \, q \not\models \Phi \).

We shall use this definition in our next proposition: notice that it has the immediate consequence that

\[
\forall p \exists q \leq p \left[ q \models \Phi \lor q \models \neg \Phi \right].
\]

Further it renders Modus Ponens effective:

2.29. Proposition. If \( p \models \Phi \rightarrow \Psi \) and \( p \models \Phi \) then \( p \models \Psi \).

Proof. if \( p \models \neg \Phi \lor \Psi \) then \( \forall q \leq p \, \exists r \leq q \left( r \models \neg \Phi \lor r \models \Psi \right) \); but the first alternative is impossible for \( r \leq p \) if \( p \models \Phi \), and so \( r \models \Psi \); by density \( p \models \Psi \). \( \blacksquare \)

2.30. Remark. We have given this proof now; it only applies, of course, to those formulæ for which a forcing definition has been given.

Installing the ground model. Before we turn to the definition of the generic extension of a model, we identify objects that will serve as names for the elements of the ground model, and thus ensure that our generic structure is indeed an extension of our ground model. It is convenient to assume that \( 1^P \) is actually the ordinal 1.

2.31. Definition. Set \( \hat{y} = \text{df} \{ (1^P, \hat{x}) \mid x \in y \} \).

This is a rudimentary recursion in the parameter \( 1^P \), being of the form

\[
F(a) = G(1^P, F \upharpoonright a)
\]

where \( G \) is the rudimentary function \( (i, f) \mapsto \{i\} \times \text{Im}(f) \); thus with our convention that \( 1^P = 1 \), the recursion may be regarded as pure.

2.32. Lemma. If \( q \models \xi \in \hat{x} \) then \( \exists a \in x \, \xi = \hat{a} \).

Proof. If \( q \leq p \) and \( (p, \xi) \in \hat{x} \) then \( p = 1^P \) and \( \xi = \hat{a} \) for some \( a \in x \). \( \blacksquare \)

2.33. Proposition. For all \( x \) and \( y \), the following hold:

\[
\begin{align*}
x \in y & \Rightarrow 1^P \models \hat{x} \in \hat{y}, \\
x = y & \Rightarrow 1^P \models \hat{x} = \hat{y}, \\
\exists p \, p \models \hat{x} = \hat{y} & \Rightarrow x = y, \\
x \neq y & \Rightarrow 1^P \models \neg (\hat{x} = \hat{y}), \\
\exists p \, p \models \hat{x} \in \hat{y} & \Rightarrow x \in y, \\
x \notin y & \Rightarrow 1^P \models \neg (\hat{x} \in \hat{y}).
\end{align*}
\]
Proof. If \( x \in y \), then \( (1^p, \hat{x}) \in \hat{y} \), so \( 1^p \models_{\emptyset} \hat{x} \in \hat{y} \) and so \( 1^p \models \hat{x} \in \hat{y} \). If \( x = y \), \( \hat{x} = \hat{y} \) and so \( 1^p \models \hat{x} = \hat{y} \), by 2.22.

We prove the third line inductively: suppose \( p \models \hat{x} = \hat{y} \) for \( a \in x \) and \( r \leq p \), \( r \models \hat{a} \in \hat{a} \). there will be a \( b \) and \( s \leq r \) with \( s \models \hat{a} = \hat{b} \) and \( s \models b \in \hat{y} \); but then \( b = c \) for some \( c \in y \); so \( s \models \hat{a} = \hat{c} \), so by induction \( a = c \); and thus \( x \subseteq y \); similarly \( y \subseteq x \) and so \( x = y \).

The next line is the contrapositive, by definition of forcing for negation.

If \( p \models \hat{x} \in \hat{y} \) then for some \( r \leq p \) and some \( b \), \( r \models \hat{x} = \hat{b} \) and \( r \models b \in \hat{y} \) so for some \( c \in y \), \( b = \hat{c} \); so \( r \models \hat{x} = \hat{c} \); by line 3, \( x = c \), and thus \( x \in y \).

Thus the fifth line is proved; and the sixth is its contrapositive. ■2.33

3. Extension of the definition of forcing to all \( \hat{A}_0 \) sentences.
So far we have set up the beginnings of a definition of forcing, for atomic sentences and their negations. We wish to extend the definition of \( \models \) to all \( \hat{A}_0 \) sentences of the forcing language, on these lines:

3.0. Proposed Definition.

\[
\begin{align*}
p \models \varphi \land \psi & \iff p \models \varphi \land p \models \psi, \\
p \models \neg \varphi & \iff \forall q \leq p q \not\models \varphi, \\
p \models \bigwedge_{\epsilon \in y} \varphi(\epsilon) & \iff \forall q \leq p \forall (s, \beta) \in y \left( q \leq s \implies \exists r \leq q r \models \varphi(\beta) \right).
\end{align*}
\]

The Forcing Theorem for \( \hat{A}_0 \) sentences will follow if we can arrange that such classes as \( P \cap \{ p \mid p \models \varphi \} \) and \( P \cap \{ p \mid p \models \neg \varphi \} \) are sets, where \( \varphi \) is a \( \hat{A}_0 \) sentence of the language of forcing.

The annotated language \( L \). We must describe our language of forcing in greater detail. The first step is to define in some recursive manner a language \( L \subseteq HF \), which is a first-order language with no constants other than those that we shall call token constants, with the two binary predicate symbols = and \( \epsilon \), connectives \( \land \) and \( \land \), and the restricted quantifier \( \bigwedge_{\epsilon \in y} \), where in the rules of formation \( \eta \) is required to be a distinct variable from \( \epsilon \). There are no unrestricted quantifiers. Other propositional connectives and the existential restricted quantifier \( \bigvee_{\epsilon \in y} \) may be introduced by definition.

We shall need the customary notions of free and bound occurrence of a variable in a formula, and we imagine that each formula of \( L \) is accompanied by an annotation saying which occurrences of variables are bound by which occurrences of quantifiers. As we build up formulæ, we have to update the annotations, and we imagine all that going on inside \( HF \).

We then define \( L^u \) as the language resulting from \( L \) when all token constants are replaced by constants \( a \) for \( a \in u \), and \( E^u \) to be the set of sentences of \( L^u \), meaning those wffs with no free variables. If \( u \) is rud closed and non-empty, and the map \( a \mapsto a \) is basic, then \( L \subseteq L^u \subseteq u \).
We shall denote by Subst(ϕ, x/α) the result of substituting the constant α for the free occurrences of the formal variable x in the formula ϕ; we give the familiar recursive definition of this process below, but in fact we shall think of it as accomplished by passing from ϕ ∈ L^u to the corresponding formula ϕ_0 in L, with the constants of ϕ replaced (in a 1-1 manner) by token constants, then looking up inside HF the free occurrences of x in ϕ_0 and replacing them by occurrences of an as yet unused token constant, and then reverting to a formula of L^u by replacing each occurrence of the new token constant by an occurrence of α, and reversing the other replacements of constants of ϕ. In this way Subst will become a function that is rudimentary in the subset of HF which is recursive in the ordinary sense and which codes all the necessary information about L. As that subset is recursive, we shall simply say that Subst is rudimentary.

3.1. Definition. We define the tree-rank τ of a formula, the substitution of a constant for a free occurrence of a variable in a formula, and, when the formula is a sentence, the set Rub(ϕ) of sentences to which reference will be made when deciding whether p ⊧ ϕ. In the following, x and y are distinct formal variables.

- ψ atomic:  
  \( \tau(ψ) = 0, \quad Rub(ψ) = \emptyset, \)  
  Subst(ϕ = x, x/α) = α = α,  
  Subst(ϕ ∈ x, x/α) = α ∈ α,  
  Subst(ϕ ∈ y, x/α) = α ∈ y,  
  Subst(ϕ ∈ y, x/α) = y ∈ α.

- ψ = ϑ ∧ ϕ:  
  \( \tau(ψ) = \max(\tau(ϑ), \tau(ϕ)) + 1, \quad Rub(ψ) = \{ϑ, ϕ\}, \)  
  Subst(ψ, x/α) = Subst(ϑ, x/α) ∧ Subst(ϕ, x/α).

- ψ = ¬ϑ:  
  \( \tau(ψ) = \tau(ϑ) + 1, \quad Rub(ψ) = \{ϑ\}, \)  
  Subst(ψ, x/α) = ¬Subst(ϑ, x/α).

- ψ = Λy ∈ x ϑ:  
  \( \tau(ψ) = \tau(ϑ) + 1, \)  
  Subst(ψ, x/α) = Λy ∈ α Subst(ϑ, x/α).

- ψ = Λy ∈ a ϑ:  
  \( \tau(ψ) = \tau(ϑ) + 1, \quad Rub(ψ) = \{\text{Subst}(ϑ, x/α) | \exists p ∈ P \ (p, α) ∈ a\}, \)  
  Subst(ψ, x/α) = Λy ∈ a Subst(ϑ, x/α).
3.2. Remark. As we have defined it above, viewing formulæ as trees, substitution is \(\emptyset\)-rud-rec. But we have seen that we may treat substitution as rudimentary, by viewing formulæ as annotated sequences.

3.3. Remark. To go from \(\bigwedge_{x \in a} \varphi(x)\) to \(\{\varphi[a] \mid \exists s \in P (s, \alpha) \in a\}\) is to form the image of the substitution function, and is thus rudimentary. The annotations will tell us where are the free occurrences of \(x\) in \(\varphi\).

3.4. Definition. Let \(\chi_{\Vert-}^\ell\Vdash u\), for \(u\) a transitive set and \(k \in \omega\), be the characteristic function of the forcing relation restricted to those \(\Delta_0\) sentences \(\varphi\) of the forcing language with \(\tau(\varphi) \leq \ell\) and all \(a\) with \(a\) occurring in \(\varphi\) being in \(u\).

Let \(\chi_{\Vert-} \Vdash u\) be \(\bigcup_{\ell < \omega} \chi_{\Vert-}^\ell\).

3.5. Proposition. For \(u\) transitive and \(e\) and \(\eta\) as in Definition 2.14:

(3.5.0) \(\chi_{\Vert-}^0 \Vdash u\) is rudimentary in \(\chi_{\Vert=} \Vdash u\);

(3.5.1) for each \(\ell\), \(\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell+1} \Vdash u\) is rudimentary in \(\chi_{\Vert=} \Vdash u\), and thus rudimentary in \(\chi_{\Vert=} \Vdash u\);

(3.5.2) for each \(\ell\) there is a natural number \(s_\ell\) such that for each ordinal \(\nu > \eta\), \(\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell+1} \Vdash P_{\nu}^{e;=}\) is total and is a set, being definable over \(P_{\nu}^{e;=}\).

Proof. For (3.5.0), note that \(\chi_{\Vert-}^0 \Vdash u\) is rudimentary in \(\chi_{\Vert=} \Vdash u\) and \(\chi_{\Vert=} \Vdash u\), which is rudimentary in \(\chi_{\Vert=} \Vdash u\).

(3.5.1): The passage from \(\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell} \Vdash u\) to \(\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell+1} \Vdash u\) is rudimentary in \(\mathbb{P}\) and Subst, being given uniformly by these clauses:

\[
\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell+1}(p, \varphi \land \vartheta, \vec{b}, \vec{c}) = \inf\{\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell}(p, \varphi, \vec{b}), \chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell}(p, \vartheta, \vec{c})\},
\]

\[
\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell+1}(p, \exists \varphi, \vec{a}) = 1 - \sup\{\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell}(q, \varphi, \vec{a}) \mid q \leq p\},
\]

\[
\chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell+1}(p, \bigwedge_{\varphi \in \eta} \varphi, \eta/a, \vec{b}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \forall q \leq p \forall (s, \alpha) \in a \text{ } (q \leq s \Rightarrow \exists r \leq q \chi_{\Vert-}^{\ell}(r, \varphi, \varphi/\alpha, \eta/a, \vec{b}) = 1), \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}
\]

The notation \(\eta/a\) indicates that the free occurrences of the variable \(\eta\) have been replaced by occurrences of the constant \(a\). Only certain substitutions have been indicated explicitly: we think of wffs as accompanied by annotations, as described above; so, for example, in the longest line of the above equations, where visually \(\varphi\) should be \(\text{Subst}(\varphi, \vec{a}/\alpha)\), the details of the substitutions would be in the annotations.

(3.5.2): Argue as in the proofs of Proposition 2.16 and 2.20, using (3.5.1). (3.5.3) now follows. \(\blacksquare_{3.5}\)
Once we know that there is at least one rud-closed transitive $v$ containing $\mathbb{P}$ with $\chi \models v$ total and a set, we may advance the definition of $\chi \models$ more generally, as we now show in Proposition 3.11.

**Rudimentary generation of the sentences of the forcing language.** Suppose that $u$ is transitive, that $u \subseteq u^+ \subseteq \mathcal{P}(u)$, and that $S$ is a subset of $\mathcal{E}^u$, so that $S$ is a set of sentences, all of whose constants are in $u$. We define a ternary function $H_{\mathcal{E}}$ which will yield a larger set of sentences, all of whose constants are in $u^+$, thus:

$$H_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathbb{P}, S, u^+) = \text{df}$$

$$S \cup \{a = b \mid a, b \in u^+\}$$

$$\cup \{a \epsilon b \mid a, b \in u^+\}$$

$$\cup \{\varphi \land \varphi \mid \varphi, \varphi \in S\}$$

$$\cup \{\neg \varphi \mid \varphi \in S\}$$

$$\cup \{\land_{x \in a} \varphi \mid a \in u^+ \land \forall(p, \alpha) \in a (p \in \mathbb{P} \Rightarrow \text{Subst}(\varphi, x/\alpha) \in S)\}.$$  

**3.6. Lemma.** $H_{\mathcal{E}}$ is rudimentary in the parameter $\text{HF}$; more exactly, it is rudimentary in the subset of $\text{HF}$ that codes the annotation, described above, of formulæ of the language $\mathcal{L}$.

**3.7. Lemma.** $S \subseteq \mathcal{E}^u \Rightarrow H_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathbb{P}, S, u^+) \subseteq \mathcal{E}^{u^+}$.

**3.8. Lemma.** For each $\varphi \in H_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathbb{P}, S, u^+)$, $\text{Rub}(\varphi) \subseteq S$.

**3.9. Lemma.** There is a rudimentary function $H_{\models}$ such that for every $\mathbb{P}$, $u$ and $S$ as above,

$$\chi \models H_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathbb{P}, S, u^+) = H_{\models}(\mathbb{P}, \chi \models S, u^+).$$

**Proof sketch.** $H_{\models}$ would be built from the rudimentary function $H_{=} \text{supplied by Lemma 2.11 and other rudimentary functions suggested by the clauses of the Proposed Definition 3.0.} \quad \blacksquare 3.9$

**3.10. Lemma.** Suppose that $(u_n)_{n \leq \omega}$ is a strict continuous progress, and that $u_0$ is a rud-closed transitive set. Suppose that $\mathcal{E}_0 = \mathcal{E}^{u_0}$, that for each $n$, $\mathcal{E}_{n+1} = H_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathbb{P}, \mathcal{E}_n, u_{n+1})$, and put $\mathcal{E}_\omega = \bigcup_{n < \omega} \mathcal{E}_n$. Then $\mathcal{E}_\omega = \mathcal{E}^{u_\omega}$.

**Proof.** Note that if $\varphi \in \text{Rub}(\varphi)$ then $\tau(\varphi) < \tau(\varphi)$. Now prove by induction on $k \in \omega$ that for each $n \in \omega$, if $\tau(\varphi) = k$ and all $a$ with $a$ occurring in $\varphi$ are in $u_{n+1}$ then $\varphi \in \mathcal{E}_{n+k+1}$. \quad \blacksquare 3.10

**3.11. Proposition.** Suppose that $(u_n)_{n \leq \omega}$ is a strict continuous progress, with $u_0$ a rud-closed transitive set containing $\mathbb{P}$ and $\chi \models \mathcal{E}^{u_0}$ total and definable over $u_0$. Then the same is true of $u_\omega$.
Proof. By Lemma 3.10, any $\varphi \in \mathcal{E}^{u_\omega} \setminus \mathcal{E}_0$ is in some $\mathcal{E}_{n+1}$, and $\text{Rub}(\varphi) \subseteq \mathcal{E}_n$. By Lemma 3.9, we can build $\chi\models \mathcal{E}_{n+1}$ inside $u_\omega$. So the definition of $p \models \varphi$ over $u_\omega$ will take the expected form “there is a set $\mathcal{E}$ closed under $\text{Rub}$ with $\phi \in \mathcal{E}$ and a function $\chi$ defined on $\mathcal{E}$ that satisfies the recursive definition of $\chi\models$; moreover, $\chi(p, \varphi, \bar{a}) = 1$.” ■

A further speed-up. In [MB, Section 9], a definition of truth for $\check{\Delta}_0$ formulæ is given that begins by de-nesting restricted quantifiers. That method could be used here: one would first define $p \models \varphi$ for quantifier-free sentences $\varphi$ and then extend that definition to de-nested $\check{\Delta}_0$ sentences, adapting appropriately the steps of [MB, §9]. Finally one would argue that every $\check{\Delta}_0$ sentence is logically equivalent to a de-nested one.

This device then makes it evident that for each $\varphi \in L$ and constants for $\bar{a}$, $p \models \varphi[\bar{a}]$ is rudimentary in an appropriate fragment of $\chi$ and thus a gentle predicate of $p$, $\varphi$, and $\bar{a}$.

Forcing $\check{\Delta}_0$ statements

3.12. Proposition. For every $\check{\Delta}_0$ wff $\varphi$,

$q \leq p \models \varphi \Rightarrow q \models \varphi$,

$p \models \varphi \iff \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q q \models \varphi$,

$p \models \forall x \varphi \iff \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists (t, \beta) \in y (r \leq t \land r \models \varphi[\beta])$,

$p \models \varphi[\alpha] \land \alpha = \beta \Rightarrow p \models \varphi[\beta]$.

We shall often use the following general principle in our development.

3.13. Proposition. Suppose we have a name $z$ such that

$$\forall p \forall \alpha (p \models \alpha \in z \Rightarrow p \models \varphi[\alpha])$$

for some formal wff $\varphi$. Then $\forall p \forall \alpha (p \models \alpha \in z \Rightarrow p \models \varphi[\alpha])$.

Proof. We gradually weaken the hypothesis. Suppose that $p \models \alpha \in z$. Then for some $q \geq p$, $(q, \alpha) \in z$, so $q \models \alpha \in z$; so $q$ and therefore also $p$ forces $\varphi[\alpha]$.

Now suppose that $p \models \alpha \in z$. This tells us that

$$\forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists \beta \models r \models \beta \in z \land r \models \alpha = \beta.$$ 

So for such $r$, $r \models \varphi[\beta]$; and so $r \models \varphi[\alpha]$. The class of such $r$ being dense below $p$, $p \models \varphi[\alpha]$. ■

Axioms of Extensionality and Foundation. We may now prove that the Axiom of Extensionality is forced: that reduces to proving the following, which presents no difficulty.

3.14. Proposition. If $p \models \forall x (x \in b \Rightarrow x \in a)$ and $p \models \forall x (x \in a \Rightarrow x \in b)$, then $p \models a = b$.

3.15. Proposition. $\models \text{Foundation}$. 

Proof. Given $x$, consider $A = \{a \mid \exists p \in P \ (p, a) \in x\}$. Then $A$ is a $\Delta_0$ subclass of $\bigcup^2 x$ and therefore a set; assuming it is non-empty, let $c$ be an element of $A$ of minimal rank. Then $c \in A$ but $\bigcup^2 c \cap A$ is empty; so if $(p, c) \in x$, $p \parallel \neg c \in \bigcup x \equiv \emptyset$. Thus $\parallel x \not\equiv \emptyset \rightarrow \sqrt{\forall x \in \eta \cap x = \emptyset}$. Thus $\parallel x = \emptyset \rightarrow \bigvee y \in x y \cap x = \emptyset$.

3.15. Preservation of $\Delta_0$ statements about the ground model. Now that we have defined forcing for $\Delta_0$ statements and have seen how elements of the ground model are named in the language of forcing, we may verify that $\Delta_0$ statements about them, if true, are forced.

3.16. Lemma. $\forall p \in P \forall y (p \parallel \bigwedge x \in \hat{y} \varphi \iff \forall x \in y p \parallel \varphi(\hat{x}))$.

Proof. $p \parallel \bigwedge x \in \hat{y} \varphi \iff \forall q \leq p \forall (s, \beta) \in \hat{y} (q \leq s \Rightarrow \exists r \leq q r \parallel \varphi[\beta])$

$\iff \forall q \leq p \forall x \in y (\exists r \leq q r \parallel \varphi(\hat{x}))$

$\iff \forall x \in y \forall q \leq p (\exists r \leq q r \parallel \varphi(\hat{x}))$

$\iff \forall x \in y p \parallel \varphi(\hat{x})$.

3.17. Proposition. Let $\Phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ be a $\Delta_0$ statement true of $a_1, \ldots, a_n$. Then $P \models \Phi[\hat{a}_1, \ldots, \hat{a}_n]$.

Proof. The cases that $\Phi$ are either atomic or the negation of atomic are covered by Proposition 2.33. We then proceed by induction on the length of $\Phi$; propositional connectives are easily handled, as a 0-1 law applies in this context; and the last lemma covers restricted quantifiers.

3.18. Proposition. Let $\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ be a $\Delta_0$ statement such that $\models \varphi[a_1, \ldots, a_n]$. Then $P \models \varphi[\hat{a}_1, \ldots, \hat{a}_n]$.

4. Generic extensions of a transitive set. Let $M$ be a transitive set and $P$ a notion of forcing in $M$. The aim in life of an $(M, P)$-generic filter $G$ is to create a transitive set $M[G]$ out of the Lindenbaum algebra of the language of forcing, with the property that what is true in the model is what is forced by some $p \in G$. That principle is known as the Forcing Theorem.

4.0. Definition. $\Delta$ is dense open in $P$ if

$\forall p \in P \exists q \in \Delta q \leq p$ and $\forall p \in \Delta \forall q \leq p q \in \Delta$.

4.1. Definition. $G \subseteq P$ is $(M, P)$-generic if $\forall p \in G \forall q \in G \exists r \in G r \leq p \land r \leq q, \forall p \in G \forall q p \leq q \Rightarrow q \in G$, and $G \cap \Delta \neq \emptyset$ for each $\Delta \in M$ that is dense open in $P$.

Formally, those definitions work for any transitive set $M$. 
For forcing over models of ZF that definition of generic would suffice to prove the Forcing Theorem; but for models of certain weaker theories such as KP, it is inadequate: we shall find in a later section that if \( M \) is admissible, we must require \( G \) to meet all dense open subsets of \( P \) that are unions of a \( \Sigma_1 \) and a \( \Pi_1 \) class over \( M \) if we are to show that \( M[G] \) will be admissible. Ironically, for models of the still weaker theory PROVI, all is well again: we shall show in this section that if a filter \( G \) is generic as defined above, then the Forcing Theorem will hold for \( \Delta_0 \) formulæ. We assume henceforth that \( M \) models PROVI.

We know from its being a filter that \( G \) will be consistent in the sense that for no sentence \( \varphi \) of the language \( L^P \) can there be a \( p \in G \) with \( p \models P \varphi \) and a \( q \in G \) with \( q \models P \neg \varphi \). Let \( \Delta(\varphi) = \{ p \in P \mid p \models P \varphi \lor p \models P \neg \varphi \} \); this is a dense open subclass of \( P \). If \( \varphi \) is \( \Delta_0 \), \( \Delta(\varphi) \) will be a set of \( M \) by gentle separation. If \( G \) meets \( \Delta(\varphi) \), then some \( p \in G \) decides \( \varphi \) in the sense that it forces either \( \varphi \) or \( \neg \varphi \). We shall refer to this property as the completeness of \( G \).

4.2. Definition. Suppose now that \( G \) is \((M, P)\)-generic. Define (externally to \( M \)) \( \text{val}_G : M \to V \) by

\[
\text{val}_G(b) = \{ \text{val}_G(a) \mid \exists p \in G \ (p, a) \in b \}. 
\]

4.3. Remark. This is a rudimentary recursion with parameter \( G \): \( \phi(b) = H(G, \phi \upharpoonright b) \) where \( H(g, x) = \text{df} \ x^{\text{“}(\text{Dom}(x))^{“}g} \). In [M4] it is shown that certain transitive models of Zermelo set theory fail to support such recursions: thus it is necessary to assume that PROVI is true in the “background” set theory.

4.4. Remark. An immediate consequence of the definition is that if \( p \in G \) and either \( p \models_0 \in a \) or \( p \models_1 \in a \), then \( \text{val}_G(\alpha) \in \text{val}_G(a) \).

4.5. Proposition. For all \( a \) and \( b \) the following hold:

\[
(4.6) \quad \text{val}_G(a) = \text{val}_G(b) \iff \exists p \in G \ p \models a = b, \\
(4.7) \quad \text{val}_G(a) \in \text{val}_G(b) \iff \exists p \in G \ p \models a \in b.
\]

We divide the proof into four lemmata.

4.8. Lemma. If \( p \in G \) and \( p \models a = b \) then \( \text{val}_G(a) = \text{val}_G(b) \).

Proof by induction on rank. Let \( x \in \text{val}_G(a) \). Let \( (q_0, \alpha) \in a \) with \( q_0 \in G \) and \( \text{val}_G(\alpha) = x \). Let \( q \in G \) be below both \( p \) and \( q_0 \). Consider the class

\[
P \cap \{ r \mid r \leq q \ & \ & \exists \beta \in \bigcup^2 b \ r \models_1 \beta \in b \ & \ & r \models a = \beta \}. 
\]

That is dense below \( q \), and is a set by \( \dot{\Delta}_0 \) separation, once one has replaced the predicate \( r \models a = \beta \) by an evaluation by an appropriate fragment of \( \chi_*= \).
It is therefore met by $\mathcal{G}$; so let $r \in \mathcal{G}$ be below $q$ and $\beta \in \bigcup^2 b$ with $r \models \alpha = \beta$ and $r \models 1 \beta \in b$.

From the second property of $r$, $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\beta) \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$, and from the first, applying the induction hypothesis, $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\alpha) = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\beta)$; thus $x \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$; as $x$ was arbitrary, $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) \subseteq \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$.

A similar argument shows that $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b) \subseteq \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a)$. \[\Box\]

4.9. Lemma. If $p \in \mathcal{G}$ and $p \models a \in b$ then $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$.

Proof. $\{r \in P \mid \exists \beta \in \bigcup^2 b \models \beta = a \& r \models 1 \beta \in b\}$ is dense below $p$ and is a set, and so there is an $r \in \mathcal{G}$ and a $\beta \in \bigcup^2 b$ such that $r \models \beta = a$, which by the previous lemma implies that $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\beta) = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a)$, and, by Remark 4.4, such that $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\beta) \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$; so $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$. \[\Box\]

4.10. Lemma. If $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$, then for some $p \in \mathcal{G}$, $p \models a = b$.

Proof by induction. We show first that $\exists p \in \mathcal{G} p \models \bigwedge_{\alpha \in a} (\alpha \in b)$. If not, then by density, $\exists p \in \mathcal{G} p \models \bigvee_{\alpha \in a} \neg (\alpha \in b)$; indeed there will then exist $p \in \mathcal{G}$ and $a \in \bigcup^2 a$ such that $p \models \alpha \in a$ and $p \models \neg (\alpha \in b)$. Given such $p$ and $a$, $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$; so there is a $\beta \in \bigcup^2 b$ and a $q \in \mathcal{G}$ with $(q, \beta) \in b$, and $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$.

By the induction hypothesis, there will be an $r \in \mathcal{G}$, which we may suppose to be below both $q$ and $p$, such that $r \models \alpha = \beta$ and $r \models 1 \beta \in b$; so $r \models \alpha \in b$, contrary to our hypothesis on $p$.

A similar argument will show that $\exists p \in \mathcal{G} p \models \bigwedge_{\alpha \in a} (\alpha \in b)$; and we may now invoke the fact that Extensionality is forced, to conclude that there is a $p \in \mathcal{G}$ such that $p \models a = b$. \[\Box\]

4.11. Lemma. If $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$, then for some $p \in \mathcal{G}$, $p \models a \in b$.

Proof. The hypothesis implies that there are $q \in \mathcal{G}$ and $c$ such that $(q, c) \in b$ and $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c)$. By the previous lemma, there is a $p_0$ in $\mathcal{G}$ such that $p \models c = \varepsilon_0$; then if $p \in \mathcal{G}$ is below both $p_0$ and $q$, then $p \models \varepsilon \in b$ and so $p \models a \in b$. \[\Box\]

The proof of Proposition 4.5 is now complete. \[\Box\]

4.12. Definition. $M^p[\mathcal{G}] = \{\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) \mid a \in M\}$.

We check that $M \cup \{\mathcal{G}\} \subseteq M^p[\mathcal{G}]$.

4.13. Proposition. For all $x \in M$, $\hat{x} \in M$ and $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\hat{x}) = x$; hence $M \subseteq M^p[\mathcal{G}]$.

Proof. By the providence of $M$ and an easy application of Proposition 2.33. \[\Box\]

We have a canonical name for $\mathcal{G}$:

4.14. Definition. $\hat{\mathcal{G}} = \{(p, \hat{p}) \mid p \in P\}$. 


Note that $\mathcal{G} \in M$ as $M$ is provident and $a \mapsto \hat{a}$ is rud-rec.

4.15. PROPOSITION. $\text{val}_G(\mathcal{G}) = \mathcal{G}$.

Proof.Both sides equal \{val$_G(\hat{p}) \mid p \in \mathcal{G}\}$. ■ 4.15

4.16. COROLLARY. $\mathcal{G} \in M^P[\mathcal{G}]$ and hence

$M \cup \{\mathcal{G}\} \subseteq M^P[\mathcal{G}] \subseteq \text{Prov}(M \cup \{\mathcal{G}\})$.

4.17. THE FORCING THEOREM. Given $A$, $P$ and $\mathcal{G}$, for each $\Delta_0$ formula $\varphi$ and $a_1, \ldots , a_n$ in $A$:

$A^P[\mathcal{G}] \models \varphi[\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a_1), \ldots , \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a_n)] \iff \exists p \in \mathcal{G} (p \parallel^P \varphi[a_1, \ldots , a_n])^A$.

Proof. First, the case of atomic $\varphi$ is covered by Proposition 4.5.

For Boolean conjunctions: $\exists s \in \mathcal{G}$ ($s \leq p$ & $s \leq q$) iff $p$ and $q$ are both in $\mathcal{G}$.

For negations: there is a dense class to be met by $\mathcal{G}$, and we must show that the class in question is a set. Note that $P \cap \{t \mid \lnot \exists r \leq t (r \models \varphi[\dot{\beta}])\}$ is a member of the provident set that is the ground model: take an attempt at $\chi_\ast$ that covers all; then this set is obtainable as a separator that is $\Delta_0$ in that attempt.

Now consider the problem of a restricted quantifier ($^2$) Suppose $p \models \bigwedge_{r \in b} \varphi(r)$, and let $b = \text{val}_G(b)$. Suppose $A[\mathcal{G}] \models \exists \beta \in b$ where $a = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a)$. Then there is a $q$ in $\mathcal{G}$ and an $\eta$ such that $q \models \eta \in b$ and $q \models a = \eta$. Then densely below $q$, there are $r$ such that $r \models \varphi[\eta]$. So some such $r$ is in $\mathcal{G}$; so $A[\mathcal{G}] \models \varphi[\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\eta)]$; but $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\eta) = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(a) = a$. Thus $A[\mathcal{G}] \models \bigwedge_{r \in b} \varphi(r)$.

Conversely, suppose that $A[\mathcal{G}] \models \bigwedge_{r \in b} \varphi(r)$, and suppose that $b \in A$ with $b = \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$. Let

$X = \mathbb{P} \cap \{t \mid \exists \beta \in \bigcup b \ t \models \beta \in b \ \& \ \lnot \exists r \leq t (r \models \varphi[\beta])\}$.

$X$ is a set and is downwards closed, i.e. open in the usual topology on $\mathbb{P}$.

Let $\Delta = X \cup \{p \mid \mathcal{O}_p \cap X = \varnothing\}$, where $\mathcal{O}_p = \{q \mid q \leq p\}$.

$\Delta$ is a dense open set, and so meets $\mathcal{G}$. Let $p \in \mathcal{G} \cap \Delta$. If $p \in X$, then for some $\beta \in \bigcup b$, $p \models \beta \in b$, but for no $r \leq p$ does $r \models \varphi[\beta]$; so $p \models \lnot \varphi[\beta]$; so $A[\mathcal{G}] \models \lnot \varphi[\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\beta)]$; but $\text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\beta) \in \text{val}_{\mathcal{G}}(b)$.

Thus $p \notin X$; and so there is no $q$ below $p$ with $q \in X$. So

$\forall q \leq p \ \forall \beta \in \bigcup b \ (q \models \beta \in b \ \Rightarrow \ \exists r \leq q \ r \models \varphi[\beta])$,

which says precisely that $p \models \bigwedge_{r \in b} \varphi(r)$. ■ 4.17

5. Construction of nominaters for rudimentary functions. Our aim in this section is to prove a theorem about the construction of names in a provident set for the values of a rudimentary function in a set-generic
extension of that set. We state it now, and shall later give more precise formulations of particular cases.

5.0. **Theorem.** Let \( R \) be a rudimentary function of some number of arguments. Then there is a function \( R^P \), of the same number of arguments, with the property that if \( A \) is a provident set and \( P \in A \) a notion of forcing, then \( A \) is closed under \( R^P \) and, further, if \( G \) is an \((A, P)\)-generic, then (to take the case of a function of two variables) for all \( x \) and \( y \) in \( A \),

\[
\text{val}_G(R^P(x, y)) = R(\text{val}_G(x), \text{val}_G(y)).
\]

**Definition.** We shall call the function \( R^P \) the nominator of the function \( R \). Usually its definition is uniform in \( P \) and \( A \). We shall use the phrase “Cohen term” to speak of the value of a nominator given some arguments.

5.1. **Corollary.** Let \( A \) be provident, \( P \in A \) and \( G \) is an \((A, P)\)-generic. Then \( A[G] \) is rud-closed and so a model of \( GJ \).

**Proof of the Corollary.** Suppose (to take a function of two variables) that \( R(x, y) \) is a rudimentary function and that \( x \) and \( y \) are in \( A[G] \). Then there are \( a \) and \( b \) in \( A \) so that \( x = \text{val}_G(a) \) and \( y = \text{val}_G(b) \). Applying the nominator of \( R \), the corresponding Cohen term \( R^P(a, b) \) exists in \( A \): let \( z = \text{val}_G(R^P(a, b)) \). Then \( z \in A[G] \), and by the theorem \( R(x, y) = z \). Since \( R(x, y) = z \) is a \( \Delta_0 \) statement, and therefore absolute for transitive sets containing \( x \), \( y \) and \( z \), we know that it is true in \( A[G] \) that \( R(x, y) = z \). \( \blacksquare \)

**Some general lemmata about forcing**

5.2. **Lemma.** If \( a \subseteq b \), \( \text{val}_G(a) \subseteq \text{val}_G(b) \).

**Proof.**

\[
\text{val}_G(a) = \{ \text{val}_G(\alpha) \mid \exists p \in G \ (p, \alpha) \in a \} \\
\subseteq \{ \text{val}_G(\beta) \mid \exists p \in G \ (p, \beta) \in b \} = \text{val}_G(b). \quad \blacksquare \]

5.3. **Lemma.** Let \( u \) be transitive. Then \( \text{val}_G(u) \) is transitive.

**Proof.** If \( x \in \text{val}_G(u) \), then \( \exists \alpha \exists p \in G \ (p, \alpha) \in u \ & \ \text{val}_G(\alpha) = x \). But \( \alpha \in \bigcup^2 u \subseteq u \) so \( \alpha \subseteq u \); so \( \text{val}_G(\alpha) \subseteq \text{val}_G(u) \). \( \blacksquare \)

5.4. We note alternative ways of naming an object. For given \( y \), put

\[
\mathcal{A}_0(y) = \{(p, x) \mid p \models_0 x \in y\}, \\
\mathcal{A}_1(y) = \{(p, x) \mid p \models_1 x \in y\}, \\
\mathcal{A}(y) = \{(p, x) \mid p \models x \in y\}.
\]

5.5. **Remark.** \( \mathcal{A}_0(y) \subseteq y \); \( \mathcal{A}_0(y) \subseteq \mathcal{A}_1(y) \subseteq P \times \bigcup^2 y \), so \( \mathcal{A}_0(y) \) and \( \mathcal{A}_1(y) \) are sets, whereas \( \mathcal{A}(y) \) is a proper class whose intersection with a set will be a set provided one has rud-rec separation.
5.6. Remark. \( \mathcal{A}_0(\mathcal{A}_1(y)) = \mathcal{A}_1(y) = \mathcal{A}_1(\mathcal{A}_0(y)) = \mathcal{A}_1(\mathcal{A}_1(y)) \) and
\( \mathcal{A}_0(\mathcal{A}_0(y)) = \mathcal{A}_0(y) \).

5.7. Lemma. If \( q \models w \in \mathcal{A}_1(y) \), then \( q \models w \in y \); if \( q \models w \in y \), then \( q \models A_1(w) \).

5.8. Lemma. Let \( \mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{M} \) and let \( \mathcal{G} \) be \((\mathcal{M}, \mathbb{P})\)-generic. Then if \( y \in \mathcal{M} \),
\[ \text{val}_G(\mathcal{A}_0(y)) = \text{val}_G(\mathcal{A}_1(y)) = \text{val}_G(y). \]

Proof. That \( \text{val}_G(y) = \text{val}_G(\mathcal{A}_0(y)) \subseteq \text{val}_G(\mathcal{A}_1(y)) \) is immediate from the definition of \( \text{val}_G(\cdot) \) and Lemma 5.2. It remains to show that \( \text{val}_G(\mathcal{A}_1(y)) \subseteq \text{val}_G(y) \).

Suppose that \( p \in \mathcal{G} \) and \( z \in \mathcal{M} \) are such that \( p \models z \in \mathcal{A}_1(y) \) and \( p \models z \notin y \). Then there are \( w \in \mathcal{M} \) and \( q \in \mathcal{G} \) with \( q \leq p \), \( q \models w \in \mathcal{A}_1(y) \), (so by the previous lemma, \( q \models w \in y \)), but also \( q \models w = z \) and therefore \( q \models w \notin y \), a contradiction.

The proof. To prove Theorem 5.0 we begin by working through the list, given in \([\text{M3, p. 166}]\) and discussed in greater detail at the beginning of \([\text{MB, §2}]\), of the nine functions \( R_0, \ldots, R_8 \), the auxiliary function \( A_{14} \), and some others, and show for each function how, given names (in the ground model) for its arguments in the generic extension, we may build names for its values. Certain of the nominators are rudimentary, even basic, functions of their arguments, others will be \( \mathbb{P} \)-gentle. We shall do the rudimentary ones first. We assume that \( \mathbb{P} = (\mathbb{P}, \leq^\mathbb{P})_3 \).

Although we shall not always obtain a nominator for a rudimentary function as a rudimentary function of the names of its arguments, as we shall see with \( x \setminus y \), we may check as we go that we always find a nominator that is rudimentary in the relation \( \chi_\ell \models \) for some \( \ell \).

5.9. Remark. Composition of rudimentary nominators will of course be rudimentary.

A basic nominator for \( R_0 : x, y \mapsto \{x, y\} \)

5.10. Definition. \( \{a, b\}^\mathbb{P} = \text{df} \{ (1^\mathbb{P}, a), (1^\mathbb{P}, b) \} \).

5.11. Lemma. \( \{a, b\}^\mathbb{P} \) is a basic function of the variables shown.

5.12. Proposition. \( \text{val}_G(\{a, b\}) = \text{val}_G(a), \text{val}_G(b) \).

5.13. Corollary. \( 1^\mathbb{P} \models (a, b)^\mathbb{P} = \{a, b\} \).

Basic nominators for ordered pairs and triples. Those can be obtained by composition.

5.14. Definition. \( \{x\}^\mathbb{P} = \text{df} \{ (1^\mathbb{P}, x) \} \).

5.15. Definition. \( (x, y)^2 = \text{df} \{ \{x\}^\mathbb{P}, \{x, y\}^\mathbb{P} \}^\mathbb{P} \).

5.16. Definition. \( A_2(x, y, z) = \text{df} \{ x, (y, z)^2 \}^\mathbb{P} \).
5.17. Definition. \((x, y, z)_3 = df (x, (y, z)_2)_2^P\).

5.18. Lemma. The four functions just introduced are basic functions of the variables shown.

**A basic nominator for** \(x \cup y\)

5.19. Definition. \(x \cup y = df x \cup y\).

**A basic nominator for** \(R_2 : x \mapsto \bigcup x\)

5.20. Definition.

\[
\bigcup^P x = df (P \times \bigcup^5 x) \cap \{(p, \alpha) \mid \exists (q, \beta) \in x \ (p \leq q \& p \parallel_1 \alpha \in \beta)\}.
\]

5.21. Remark. \(\bigcup^P\) is a basic function, being the application of a \(\Delta_0\) separator.

5.22. Lemma. If \(p \parallel_0 \gamma \epsilon \bigcup^P x\), then \((p, \gamma)_2 \in P \times \bigcup^5 x\).

5.23. Lemma. If \(p \parallel_1 \gamma \epsilon \bigcup^P x\), then \((p, \gamma)_2 \in P \times \bigcup^5 x\).

5.24. Remark. Hence if \(p \parallel_0 \gamma \epsilon \bigcup^P x\), then there are many \(\beta\) and \(t\) (dense below \(p\)) for which \(t \parallel_1 \beta = \gamma\) and \(t \parallel_1 \beta \epsilon \bigcup^P x\).

5.25. Proposition. \(\text{val}_G(\bigcup^P x) = \bigcup \text{val}_G(x)\).

5.26. Corollary. \(1^P \parallel^P \bigcup^P x = \bigcup x\).

**A basic nominator for** \(R_4 : x, y \mapsto x \times y\)

5.27. Definition.

\[
x \times^P y = df \{(p, (\alpha, \beta)_2^P) \mid p \parallel_1 \alpha \epsilon x \& p \parallel_1 \beta \epsilon y\}.
\]

5.28. Remark. \(\cdot \times^P \cdot\) is evidently rudimentary, but it is actually basic in \(P\), being the result of applying a \(\Delta_0\) separator to the set \(P \times [\{1^P\} \times [\{1^P\} \times (x \cup y)] \leq 2] \leq 2\).

5.29. Proposition. \(\text{val}_G(x \times^P y) = \text{val}_G(x) \times \text{val}_G(y)\).

5.30. Corollary. \(1^P \parallel^P x \times^P y = x \times y\).

**A basic nominator for** \([x]^1\)

5.31. Definition. \(F^{1P}_1(x) = df \{(p, \{\alpha\}_2^P) \mid (p, \alpha)_2 \in x\}\).

Again, this rudimentary term can be shown to be basic, using the fact that \(F^{1P}_1(x) \subseteq P \times (\{1^P\} \times \bigcup^2 x)\).

5.32. Proposition. \(\parallel^P [x]^1 = F^{1P}_1(x)\).

Proof. If \(q \parallel_1 \alpha \epsilon F^{1P}_1(x)\), then there is a \(p \geq q\) with \((p, \alpha)_2 \in F^{1P}_1(x)\), so that there is an \(\alpha\) with \((p, \alpha)_2 \in x\), \(1^P \parallel^P [x]^1 = \{\alpha\}\) and \(q \parallel_1 \alpha \epsilon x\).
Conversely, if \( q \forces F^P \bigvee_{\alpha \in \chi} z = \{ y \} \), then there are \( y \) and \( r \leq q \) with \( r \forces y \in x \) and \( r \forces F^P z = \{ y \} \). So \( (p, y)_2 \in x \) for some \( p \geq r \), so that \( (p, \{ y \}^P)_2 \in F_1^P(x), r \forces \{ y \}^P \in F_1^P(x) \) and so \( r \forces F^P z \in F_1^P(x) \). \( \blacksquare \)

**A basic nominator for \([x]^{\leq 2}\)**

5.33. **Remark.** \([x]^{\leq 2}\) is easier to get than \([x]^2\), because the latter will require us to be certain that two names denote different things; we could obtain such a term by using the identity \([x]^{\leq 2} = \cup(x \times x)\); the following is slightly simpler.

5.34. **Definition.** \( F_{\leq 2}^P(x) = \{ (r, \{ \alpha, \beta \})^P \mid r \forces \alpha \in x \wedge r \forces \beta \in x \} \).

5.35. **Remark.** That function is basic since its value is a \( \Delta_0 \) subset of \( P \times \bigcup((\{1\} \times 2)^x) \times ((\{1\} \times 2)^x) \).

5.36. **Proposition.** \( \vdash x^{\leq 2} = F_{\leq 2}^P(x) \).

**Proof.** If \( t \forces a \in F_{\leq 2}^P(x) \), there are \( s \leq t \) and \( b \) such that \( s \forces a = b \) and \( s \forces b \in F_{\leq 2}^P(x) \). So there are \( r \geq s \), \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) with \( b = \{ \alpha, \beta \}^P \), and conditions \( p \) and \( q \) with

\[
(r \leq p \wedge r \leq q \wedge (p, \alpha) \in x \wedge (q, \beta) \in x),
\]

so that \( s \forces a = b = \{ \alpha, \beta \} \in [x]^{\leq 2} \).

If \( s \forces a \in [x]^{\leq 2} \) then there are \( t \leq s \), \( \alpha \), \( \beta \) such that \( t \forces \alpha \in x \wedge t \forces \beta \in x \) and \( t \forces a = \{ \alpha, \beta \} \), so that there are \( p \) and \( q \) with \( t \leq p, t \leq q, (p, \alpha) \in x \) and \( (q, \beta) \in x \); so \( (t, \{ \alpha, \beta \}^P)_2 \in F_{\leq 2}^P(x) \), so \( t \forces a \in F_{\leq 2}^P(x) \). \( \blacksquare \)

**A basic nominator for \( u^* \).** We recall the definition:

\[
u^* = \{ u \cup [u]^{\leq 2} \cup (u \times u)\},
\]

and that for \( u \) transitive, \( u^* \) is transitive.

Then a basic nominator for it can be found by composition using the preceding ones.

**Gentle nominators for the other rudimentary generators.** We show that for the remaining rud generators we get nominators of the form \( G(P, x, y) \cap A \) where \( G \) is a rudimentary function and \( A \) is a separator that is rudimentary in an appropriate segment of \( \chi_\omega \); such nominators will be gentle by the principle of gentle separation.

**Remark.** That that should be so is suggested by our theory of companions, at least for DB functions. Each of them has a 2-companion \( W \) that is generated by \( \bigcup \) and \( \times \) and is therefore such that \( W^P \) is basic; so if \( R(x, y) \subseteq W(\{x, y\}) \), then we may expect \( R^P(x, y) \) to be of the form
We have defined \( (p, \alpha) \in R(x, y) \); and as \( z \in R(x, y) \) is \( \Delta_0, \alpha \in \hat{R}(x, y) \) will be \( \hat{\Delta}_0 \).

**A gentle nominator for** \( R_1 : x, y \mapsto x \setminus y \). Set

\[
x \prec y =_{df} A_1(x) \cap \{ (p, \alpha) \mid p \models \alpha \in \hat{R}(x, y) \}.
\]

Then \( x \prec y \), being a subclass of \( P \times \bigcup^2 x \), will be a set if \( P \) is, being the application of a separator that is \( \Delta_0 \) in some appropriate attempt at \( \chi\epsilon \).

Let \( z = x \prec y \). For each \( p \) and \( \alpha \) with \( p \not\models \alpha \in z, \alpha \not\in \beta \wedge \alpha \in x \) so by our general principle, the same is true for each \( p \) and \( \alpha \) with \( p \models \alpha \in z \). Hence \( \models t \in x \wedge \alpha = \beta \).

Conversely, suppose that \( q \models \alpha \in x \wedge t \in x \). We seek \( s \leq r \) and \( (s, \alpha) \in z \) with \( s \leq t \) and \( s \models \alpha = \beta \). We know that

\[
\exists \bar{s} \leq r \exists (t, \alpha) \in x \ s \leq t \& s \models \alpha = \beta.
\]

so that for such an \( s, s \models \alpha \in x \) and \( s \models \alpha \not\in y \), so \( (s, \alpha) \in z \). Hence we may take \( \bar{s} = \bar{t} = s \).

**A gentle nominator for** \( R_3 : x \mapsto \text{Dom}(x) \)

5.37. **Definition.**

\( \text{Dom}^P(x) =_{df} (P \times \bigcup^{10} x) \cap \{ (p, \alpha) \mid \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists \beta \in \bigcup^{10} x \ r \models P (\beta, \alpha)^P_2 \in x \} \).

5.38. **Proposition.** \( 1^P \models P R^P_3(x) = \hat{R}_3(x) \).

**A gentle nominator for** \( R_5 : x \mapsto x \cap \{ (a, b)_2 \mid a, b \in b \} \)

5.39. **Definition.**

\( R^P_5(x) =_{df} \{ (p, \gamma) \mid \exists \alpha \in \bigcup^{10} x \exists \beta \in \bigcup^{10} x \ \gamma = (\alpha, \beta)^P_2 & p \models P \alpha \in \beta \} \).

That is a set since \( (\alpha, \beta)^P_2 \) is basic, so we can easily find a companion (i.e. a bounding set), and then apply the separator induced by the relation \( p \models \alpha \in \beta \).

5.40. **Proposition.** \( 1^P \models P R^P_5(x) = \hat{R}_5(x) \).

**A gentle nominator for** \( R_6 : x \mapsto \{ (b, a, c)_3 \mid (a, b, c) \in x \} \)

5.41. **Definition.**

\( R^P_6(x) =_{df} \{ (p, \delta) \mid \exists (q, \tau) \in x \ \exists \alpha \in \bigcup^1 x \exists \beta \in \bigcup^m x \ \exists \gamma \in \bigcup^n x \ \gamma \geq (\beta, \alpha, \gamma)^P_3 \& p \models P \ x = (\alpha, \beta, \gamma)^P_3 \} \).

We have defined \( (\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)^P_3 \) above; it is basic; so we can use it to predict the whereabouts of \( \delta \); \( l, m, n \) must then be given appropriate values.

5.42. **Proposition.** \( 1^P \models P R^P_6(x) = \hat{R}_6(x) \).
A gentle nominator for $R_7: x \mapsto \{(b, c, a)_3 \mid (a, b, c)_3 \in x\}$

5.43. Definition.

$$R_7^\mathbb{P}(x) = \text{df} \{ (p, \delta) \mid \exists (q, \tau) \in x \exists \alpha \in \mathbb{U}^x \exists \beta \in \mathbb{U}^x \exists \gamma \in \mathbb{U}^x \ [q \geq p \wedge \delta = (\beta, \gamma, \alpha)_3^\mathbb{P} \wedge p \parallel^\mathbb{P} \tau = (\alpha, \beta, \gamma)_3^\mathbb{P} \} \}. $$

5.44. Proposition. $1^\mathbb{P} \parallel^\mathbb{P} R_7^\mathbb{P}(x) = \hat{R}_7(x).$

A gentle nominator for $A_{14}: x, w \mapsto x^\sim \{w\}$

5.45. Definition.

$$A_{14}^\mathbb{P}(x, w) = \text{df} (P \times \bigcup_{10} x) \cap \{ (p, \alpha) \mid p \parallel^\mathbb{P} \alpha = A_{14}^\mathbb{P}(x, \beta) \}. $$

5.46. Proposition. $1^\mathbb{P} \parallel^\mathbb{P} A_{14}^\mathbb{P}(x, w) = \hat{A}_{14}(x, w).$

A gentle nominator for $R_8: x, y \mapsto \{ x^\sim \{w\} \mid w \in y \}$

5.47. Definition.

$$R_8^\mathbb{P}(x, y) = \text{df} \{ (p, \gamma) \mid \exists (q, \beta) \in y p \leq q \wedge \gamma = A_{14}^\mathbb{P}(x, \gamma) \}. $$

5.48. Lemma. $R_8^\mathbb{P}(x, y)$ is a set.

Proof. Define

$$F(x, y) = \text{df} \big((P \times \bigcup_{10} x) \times \bigcup y\big) \cap \{ ((p, \alpha)_2, \beta)_2 \mid p \in P \wedge p \parallel^\mathbb{P} \beta = x \}. $$

Note that if $u$ is any transitive set containing $\mathbb{P}$, $x$ and $y$, $F \upharpoonright (u \times u)$ is rudimentary in $\mathbb{P} \times u \times u$.  

Set $G(x, y, \beta) = A_{14}(F(x, y), \beta)$. Then $G$ is rudimentary in $F$ and $\beta \in \bigcup y \Rightarrow A_{14}^\mathbb{P}(x, \beta) = G(x, y, \beta).$

Now set $H(x, y) = \{ G(x, y, \beta) \mid \beta \in \bigcup_{10} y \}. Then H is rudimentary in G, and $R_8^\mathbb{P}(x, y)$ is the result of applying a $\Delta_0$ separator to $P \times H(x, y)$. Therefore there is a rudimentary function $E$ such that for all such $u$, $R_8^\mathbb{P}(u \times u) = E(x = \{ P \times u \times u \}).$ \hfill 5.48

5.49. Proposition. $1^\mathbb{P} \parallel^\mathbb{P} R_8^\mathbb{P}(x, y) = \hat{R}_8(x, y).$

5.50. Remark. Suppose that $Q(\bar{x}) = R(S(\bar{x}), T(\bar{x}))$, where $Q, R, S, T$ are rudimentary, and that we have already found functions $R^\mathbb{P}, S^\mathbb{P}, T^\mathbb{P}$ as in the statement of the theorem. We may obtain $Q^\mathbb{P}$ by composition: define $Q^\mathbb{P}(\bar{x}) = R^\mathbb{P}(S^\mathbb{P}(\bar{x}), T^\mathbb{P}(\bar{x})).$

The proof of Theorem 5.0 as stated is now complete. \hfill 5.0

We must now prove that each of these functions is of uniform finite delay.
Proposition of nominators for rudimentary functions

5.51. Proposition. Let \( R \) be a rudimentary function of some number of arguments, and let \( R^\mathcal{P} \) be the corresponding nominator. There is a natural number \( s_R \) such that whenever \( e \) is a transitive set with \( \mathcal{P} \in e \), and \( \nu \) is an ordinal not less than \( \varrho(\mathcal{P}) \),
\[
R^\mathcal{P} \upharpoonright P^{e;\mathcal{P}}_{\nu+s_R} = \nu \in P^{e;\mathcal{P}}_{\nu+12},
\]

Proof. We have seen that the nominators for \( R_0, R_2 \) and \( R_4 \) proved to be themselves rudimentary, and hence \( s_R \) can be taken in these cases to be 1 plus the rudimentary constant for \( u \mapsto R \upharpoonright u \). The nominators corresponding to the other functions in the standard generating set are all rudimentary in appropriate fragments of \( \chi=\mathcal{P} \), and so the proof in those cases follows from the corresponding result for \( \chi=\mathcal{P} \). We give the argument for \( R_8 \).

Let \( \nu \geq \eta \). We know that \( \chi=\mathcal{P} \upharpoonright P^{e;\mathcal{P}}_{\nu+12} \), and that for some rudimentary function \( E \), \( R^\mathcal{P} \upharpoonright P^{e;\mathcal{P}}_{\nu+12} = E(\chi=\mathcal{P} \upharpoonright P^{e;\mathcal{P}}_{\nu+12}) \), so we may take \( s_{R_8} = 12 + c_E \).

Once the theorem has been established for the nine generators, it remains only to observe that the property in question is preserved under composition. If, for example, \( Q(\bar{x}) = R(S(\bar{x}), T(\bar{x})) \), then \( s_Q \) can be taken to be \( c_R + \max\{c_S, c_T\} + c_o \), where \( c_o \) is the constant of the rudimentary function that composes fragments of \( R^\mathcal{P}, S^\mathcal{P} \) and \( T^\mathcal{P} \) to a fragment of \( Q^\mathcal{P} \). \( \blacksquare \)

5.52. Remark. At this point we know that all the axioms of \( \mathbf{GJ}_0 \) are forced by the trivial condition.

No new ordinals! There is a long-established principle that a generic extension will contain no ordinals not in the ground model. In \[M4\] an admittedly pathological example of forcing over an improvident but transitive model of Zermelo set theory is presented where this principle breaks down. So our task here is to present a proof, working in the theory \( \mathbf{PROVI} \), of the following:

5.53. Proposition. If \( p \models \bar{x} \in \hat{\mathbb{On}} \) then \( \exists q \leq p \exists \zeta \leq \varrho(x) \ q \models \hat{\zeta} = \bar{x} \).

Plainly the statement of the proposition requires every ordinal to have a hat; but hatting is \( 1^\mathcal{P} \)-rud-rec, so available in \( \mathbf{PROVI} \). Proposition 3.16 then yields

5.54. Proposition. For each ordinal \( \eta \), \( 1^\mathcal{P} \models \hat{\eta} \) is an ordinal.

The second requirement is that there should be enough set theory to prove that the principle of trichotomy for two ordinals is forced. So let \( \zeta \) and \( \eta \) be ordinals.

5.55. Lemma. Either \( \zeta \cap \eta = \eta \) or \( \zeta \cap \eta \in \eta \).

Proof. \( \eta \setminus \zeta \) if non-empty has, by Foundation, a least element, \( \xi \) say; then show that \( \xi = \eta \cap \zeta \). \( \blacksquare \)
5.56. TRICHOTOMY FOR ORDINALS. \( \zeta \in \eta, \zeta = \eta \) or \( \eta \in \zeta \).

Proof. Consider the four statements

1a. \( \zeta \cap \eta = \eta \)
1b. \( \zeta \cap \eta \in \eta \)
2a. \( \zeta \cap \eta = \zeta \)
2b. \( \zeta \cap \eta \in \zeta \)

We know that \([(1a \ or \ 1b) \ and \ (2a \ or \ 2b)]\) holds. Of the four possibilities, (1b and 2b) is impossible, as it would imply \( \zeta \cap \eta \in \zeta \cap \eta \), contradicting Foundation; the three disjuncts of the proposition correspond to (1b and 2a), (1a and 2a), (1a and 2b). \( \blacksquare \)

The final requirement is that rank should be definable in the ground model; but \( \varrho \) is \( \varnothing \)-rud-rec.

5.57. Lemma. \( \Vdash \dot{\text{On}} \) is transitive.

5.58. Lemma. There are no \( p \in P \) and \( x \) such that \( p \Vdash \dot{x} \in \dot{\text{On}} \land \dot{\varrho(x)} \in \dot{x} \).

Proof. Suppose such an \( x \) exists; let it be a member of the transitive set \( u \). By rewriting its definition in terms of the attempts \( \chi\Vdash \upharpoonright u, \varrho \Vdash u \) and \( \dot{\varrho(u)} \), we see that the class

\[ u \cap \{ x \mid \exists p \in P \ p \Vdash x \in \dot{\text{On}} \land \dot{\varrho(x)} \in \dot{x} \} \]

is a set by \( \Delta_0 \) separation, and non-empty by the initial supposition. Call that set \( A \).

Let \( x \) be a member of \( A \) with \( \varrho(x) \) minimal. Then \( x \in A \) and \( \bigcup^2 x \cap A = \varnothing \). Let \( \eta = \varrho(x) \), and let \( p \Vdash \dot{x} \in \dot{\text{On}} \land \dot{\eta} \in \dot{x} \). So \( \exists q \leq p \exists r \geq q \ (r,y) \in x \) & \( q \Vdash \dot{\eta} = y \).

Let \( \zeta = \varrho(y) \). Since \( y \in \bigcup^2 x, \zeta \in \eta \), so by Proposition 3.17, \( 1^P \Vdash \dot{\zeta} \in \dot{\eta} \);
\( q \Vdash \dot{\eta} = y \), so \( q \Vdash \dot{\varrho(y)} \in \dot{y} \); so \( y \in A \), in contradiction to the choice of \( x \). \( \blacksquare \)

We complete the proof of Proposition 5.53 by noting that the law of trichotomy for ordinals is forced:

5.59. Lemma. \( \Vdash \text{Trichotomy for ordinals} \).

Proof. We have just seen that Trichotomy for ordinals is provable in \( \text{GJ}_0 \), and we know that all axioms of \( \text{GJ}_0 \) are forced. \( \blacksquare \)

Now Lemma 5.58 implies that if \( p \Vdash \dot{x} \in \dot{\text{On}} \), and \( \eta = \varrho(x) \) then \( p \Vdash \dot{\eta} \notin \dot{x} \). By Trichotomy, \( p \Vdash \dot{x} \notin \dot{\eta} \lor \dot{\eta} = \dot{x} \); which implies that there are \( q \leq p \) and \( \zeta \leq \eta \) with \( q \Vdash \dot{x} = \dot{\zeta} \) as required. \( \blacksquare \)

5.60. Remark. In Section 6 of [M2], a forcing construction is done over a non-standard model \( \mathbb{N} \), and it was there blithely stated without proof...
that the generic extension would bring no new “ordinals”. Fortunately the model \( \mathcal{N} \) was power-admissible, and therefore certainly a model of PROVI, which is a sub-theory of KP, so that the present remarks justify that blithe statement; that is reassuring in view of the models presented in [M4].

We record two related arguments.

5.61. **Lemma.** \( \varphi(\text{val}_G(x)) \leq \varphi(x) \).

*Proof.*

\[
\varphi(\text{val}_G(x)) = \sup\{ \varphi(\text{val}_G(y)) + 1 \mid (1, y) \in x \} \\
\leq \sup\{ \varphi(y) + 1 \mid (1, y) \in x \} \\
\leq \varphi(x). \quad \blacksquare_{5.61}
\]

5.62. **Lemma.** If \( p \vdash \hat{\zeta} \epsilon x \) then \( \zeta < \varphi(x) \).

*Proof by eps-recursion on \( x \).* If \( p \vdash \hat{\zeta} \epsilon x \) then there are \( q \) and \( r \) with \( q \leq p, q \leq r, (r, y) \in x \) and \( q \vdash \hat{\zeta} = y \). Hence for all \( \eta < \zeta \), \( q \vdash \hat{\eta} \epsilon y \) and so by induction, \( \eta < \varphi(y) \), so \( \zeta \leq \varphi(y) < \varphi(x) \). \( \blacksquare_{5.62} \)

6. **Construction of rudimentarily recursive nominators for rank and transitive closure.** Rank and transitive closure are pure rud-rec; we show here that \( P \)-rud-rec nominators exist for them.

6.0. **Lemma.** Let \( A \) be provident and closed under \( F \) and \( F^\sim \): for example if \( F \) is gentle. Then

\[
\text{val}_G(\{(p, F(y)) \mid p, y \in x\}) = \{\text{val}_G(F(y)) \mid y \exists p \in G (p, y) \in x\}.
\]

*Proof.* Let \( Z = \{(p, F(y)) \mid p, y \in x\} \). Then \( Z \) is in \( A \) by the hypotheses concerning the closure of \( A \) under \( F, F^\sim \) and related functions. Then \( \text{val}_G(Z) = \{\text{val}_G(z) \mid z \exists p \in G (p, z) \in Z\} \).

So if \( w \in \text{val}_G(Z) \), then \( \exists z \exists p \in G [w = \text{val}_G(z) \& (p, z) \in Z] \). So \( \exists y [(p, y) \in x \& z = F(y)] \). So \( w = \text{val}_G(F(y)) \) where for some \( p \in G, (p, y) \in x \). So the LHS is contained in the RHS.

Conversely, if \( (p, y) \in x \) and \( p \in G \), then \( (p, F(y)) \in Z \) and \( p \in G \); so \( \text{val}_G(F(y)) \in \text{val}_G(Z) \). \( \blacksquare_{6.0} \)

Let \( S(\cdot) \) be the basic function \( z \mapsto z \cup \{ z \} \).

6.1. **Lemma.** There is a rud function \( S^P(\cdot) \) such that \( \text{val}_G(S^P(x)) = S(\text{val}_G(x)) \).

*Proof.* By composition. \( \blacksquare_{6.1} \)

6.2. **Definition.** \( \varrho^P(x) = \{ (p, S^P(\varrho^P(y))) \mid (p, y) \in x \& p \in P \} \).

6.3. **Remark.** \( \varrho^P \) is rud-rec in the parameter \( P \).
6.4. **Lemma.** Let $A$ be provident, and $P \in A$. For all $x \in A$,
\[ \text{val}_G(g^P(x)) = \varrho(\text{val}_G(x)). \]

**Remark.** That all makes sense: if $x$ is in $A$, the name $g^P(x)$ is in $A$. Note that $\varrho(\text{val}_G(x))$ is evaluated in the universe. At present we do not know that the evaluation can be carried out in $A^P[G]$.

**Proof.**
\[ \varrho(\text{val}_G(x)) \]
\[ = \bigcup \{ \varrho(y) + 1 \mid y \in \text{val}_G(x) \} \quad \text{definition of } \varrho \]
\[ = \bigcup \{ \varrho(\text{val}_G(w)) + 1 \mid w \not\in \exists P \in G \ (p, w) \in x \} \quad \text{definition of } \text{val}_G(x) \]
\[ = \bigcup \{ \varrho(\text{val}_G(p^P(w))) + 1 \mid w \not\in \exists P \in G \ (p, w) \in x \} \quad \text{induction hypothesis} \]
\[ = \bigcup \{ \varrho(S^P(g^P(w))) \mid w \not\in \exists P \in G \ (p, w) \in x \} \quad \text{property of } S^P \]
\[ = \bigcup \varrho\left( \bigcup \left\{ (p, S^P(g^P(w))) \mid p, w \not\in (p, w) \in x \right\} \right) \quad \text{property of } \bigcup^P \]
\[ = \varrho(g^P(x)) \quad \text{by the definition of } g^P. \quad \blacksquare_{6.4} \]

6.5. **Definition.** $tcl^P(x) = \bigcup x \bigcup^P \left\{ (p, tcl^P(z)) \mid (p, z) \in x \right\}$.

6.6. **Remark.** $tcl^P$ is rud-rec in the parameter $P$.

6.7. **Lemma.** Let $A$ be provident, and $P \in A$. For all $x \in A$,
\[ \text{val}_G(tcl^P(x)) = tcl(\text{val}_G(x)). \]

**Proof.** By similar reasoning:
\[ tcl(\text{val}_G(x)) \]
\[ = \text{val}_G(x) \bigcup \text{tcl}(y) \mid y \in \text{val}_G(x) \quad \text{definition of } tcl \]
\[ = \text{val}_G(x) \bigcup \text{tcl}(y) \mid y \not\in \exists P \in G \exists z \ (p, z) \in x \text{ & } y = \text{val}_G(z) \quad \text{definition of } \text{val}(x) \]
\[ = \text{val}_G(x) \bigcup \text{tcl}(\text{val}_G(z)) \mid z \not\in \exists P \in G \ (p, z) \in x \quad \text{definition of } \text{val}(x) \]
\[ = \text{val}_G(x) \bigcup \text{tcl}(\text{val}_G(z)) \mid z \not\in \exists P \in G \ (p, z) \in x \quad \text{induction hypothesis} \]
\[ = \text{val}_G(x) \bigcup \text{tcl}(\text{val}_G(z)) \mid z \not\in \exists P \in G \ (p, z) \in x \quad \text{Lemma 6.0} \]
\[ = \text{val}_G(x) \bigcup \text{tcl}(\text{val}_G(z)) \mid z \not\in \exists P \in G \ (p, z) \in x \quad \text{properties of } \bigcup^P \text{ and } \bigcup^P \]
\[ = \text{tcl}(\text{val}_G(x)) \quad \text{by the definition of } tcl^P. \quad \blacksquare_{6.7} \]

6.8. **Proposition.** Let $A$ be provident, and $P \in A$. Let $G$ be $(A, P, \Delta_0)$-generic. Then $A^P[G]$ is closed under rank and transitive closure.

6.9. **Remark.** A similar result will hold whenever $F$ is rud-rec, given by $G$, where $G^P$ is rudimentary; $G^P$ may be permitted to have as a parameter a name $a$ for a parameter $\text{val}_G(a)$ in the extension.
We pause for breath. The next stage will be to show that the generic extension is closed under the formation of certain canonical progresses; but we digress to discuss the case of primitive recursively closed sets, which is now easy.

7. Construction of primitive recursive nominators for primitive recursive functions. Jensen and Karp give, following Gandy, this definition: there are some initial functions, which are all rudimentary; two versions of substitution: \( F(\bar{x}, \bar{y}) = G(\bar{x}, H(\bar{x}), \bar{y}) \) and \( F(\bar{x}, \bar{y}) = G(H(\bar{x}), \bar{y}) \); and this recursion schema:

\[ F(z, \bar{x}) = G(\bigcup \{ F(u, \bar{x}) \mid u \in z \}, z, \bar{x}). \]

7.0. Lemma. Let \( A \) be transitive and primitive recursively closed, and let \( F \) be primitive recursive. Then

\[ \text{val}_G(\{ (p, F(y)) \mid p, y (p, y) \in x \}) = \{ \text{val}_G(F(y)) \mid y \exists p \in G \ (p, y) \in x \}. \]

Proof. As before. \( \blacksquare \)

For notational simplicity there is only one \( x \) in the following, but it could easily be replaced by a finite sequence.

7.1. Proposition. Let \( A \) be transitive and primitive recursively closed. Let \( \mathbb{P} \in A \), and let \( G \) be \((A, \mathbb{P})\)-generic. Suppose that \( G(f, z, x) \) is primitive recursive, and that it has a nominator, \( G^\mathbb{P} \), primitive recursive in the parameter \( \mathbb{P} \), so that for all \( f, z, x \) in \( A \),

\[ \text{val}_G(G^\mathbb{P}(f, z, x)) = G(\text{val}_G(f), \text{val}_G(z), \text{val}_G(x)). \]

Suppose that \( F(z, x) = G(\bigcup \{ F(u, x) \mid u \in z \}, z, x) \). Define \( F^\mathbb{P} \) by

\[ F^\mathbb{P}(z, x) = G^\mathbb{P}(\bigcup^\mathbb{P}(\{ (p, F^\mathbb{P}(u, x)) \mid p, u (p, u) \in z \}), z, x). \]

Then \( F^\mathbb{P} \) is primitive recursive in the parameter \( \mathbb{P} \), and for all \( z, x \in A \),

\[ \text{val}_G(F^\mathbb{P}(z, x)) = F(\text{val}_G(z), \text{val}_G(x)); \]

so that \( F^\mathbb{P} \) is a primitive recursive nominator for \( F \).

Proof. For fixed \( x \) by recursion on \( z \):

\[
F(\text{val}_G(z), \text{val}_G(x)) \\
= G(\bigcup \{ F(w, \text{val}_G(x)) \mid w \in \text{val}_G(z) \}, \text{val}_G(z), \text{val}_G(x)) \\
= G(\bigcup \{ F(\text{val}_G(u), \text{val}_G(x)) \mid u \exists p \in G \ (p, u) \in z \}, \text{val}_G(z), \text{val}_G(x)) \\
= G(\bigcup \{ \text{val}_G(F^\mathbb{P}(u, x)) \mid u \exists p \in G \ (p, u) \in z \}, \text{val}_G(z), \text{val}_G(x)) \\
= G(\bigcup \{ \text{val}_G(\bigcup^\mathbb{P}(\{ (p, F^\mathbb{P}(u, x)) \mid p, u (p, u) \in z \})), \text{val}_G(z), \text{val}_G(x)) \\
= G^\mathbb{P}(\bigcup^\mathbb{P}(\{ (p, F^\mathbb{P}(u, x)) \mid p, u (p, u) \in z \}), z, x) \\
= \text{val}_G(F^\mathbb{P}(z, x)). \blacksquare
\]
The above confirms an observation made some years ago by Jensen:

7.2. COROLLARY. A set-generic extension of a primitive recursively closed set is primitive recursively closed.

8. Construction of nominators for the stages of a progress. Let $e$ be a transitive set in the ground model of which $P$ is a member, and let $\theta$ be indecomposable, exceeding $\eta =_{df} \varrho(e)$. Then $P_\theta^e$ is provident. Let $\dot{d}$ be the Cohen term $\dot{e} \cup \{\dot{G}\}^P$, so that $\text{val}_G(\dot{d})$ will be the transitive set $d = e \cup \{G\}$.

8.0. REMARK. $\dot{d}$ will be a member of $P_{\varrho(P)^+}^e$ for some (small) $k$, given the definition of $\dot{G}$, our convention that $1^P = 1$ and the fact that $\text{\text{\text{-}rud-rec}}$.

Our task is to build for each $\nu < \theta$ a name $N(\nu)$ for the stage $P_\nu^d$ of the progress towards $d$.

A simplified progress. Now $\varrho(\mathcal{G}) \leq \varrho(P) < \eta$, so that for $\nu \geq \eta$, $d_\nu = e_\nu \cup \{G\}$. It might be that $\varrho(\mathcal{G}) < \varrho(P)$; to avoid building names which make allowance for that uncertainty, we shall build names for the terms of a slightly different progress $(Q_\nu^d)$.

8.1. DEFINITION. For $\nu < \eta$,
$$Q_\nu^d = P_\nu^e, \quad Q_\eta^d = P_\eta^e \cup \{G\};$$
for $\nu \geq \eta$,
$$Q_{\nu+1}^d = \mathbb{T}(Q_\nu^d) \cup \{d_\nu\} \cup d_{\nu+1}, \quad Q_\lambda^d = \bigcup_{\nu < \lambda} Q_\nu^d \quad \text{for } \lambda = \bigcup \lambda > \eta.$$  

8.2. PROPOSITION. If $\theta$ is indecomposable, then $Q_\theta^d$ is provident and equals $P_\theta^d$.

Proof. By [MB, Theorem 6.34]. \hfill \blackslug

Names using dynamic predicates. With that in mind, we now define names $N(\nu)$ such that $\text{val}_G(N(\nu)) = Q_\nu^d$.

8.3. DEFINITION. $\dot{d}_\nu =_{df} \dot{e}_\nu \cup \{\dot{G}\}^P$ for $\nu \geq \eta$. Moreover, for $\nu < \eta$,
$$N(\nu) = \mathbb{P}_\nu^e, \quad N(\eta) = \mathbb{P}_\eta^e \cup \{\dot{G}\}^P;$$
for $\nu \geq \eta$,
$$N(\nu + 1) = \mathbb{T}^P(N(\nu)) \cup \{\dot{d}_\nu\} \cup \dot{d}_{\nu+1}, \quad N(\lambda) = \bigcup \{1^P, N(\nu) \mid \nu < \lambda\} \quad \text{for } \lambda = \bigcup \lambda > \eta.$$  

8.4. LEMMA. For $\nu \geq \eta$, $N(\nu) \in P_{\nu+\omega}^e$.

Proof by cases. For $\nu = \eta$, by inspection; for successor ordinals, by knowledge of the birthday of $\mathbb{T}^P$; for limit $\lambda$ by knowledge of the delay of $\bigcup^P$. \hfill \blackslug

8.5. PROPOSITION. Each $N(\nu)$ for $\nu < \theta$ is in $P_\theta^e$.  

Proof. All those names are in \( P^e_{\theta^*} \), which was shown in Proposition 2.15 to equal \( P^e_{\theta} \). ■8.5

8.6. PROPOSITION. Let \( G \) be \((P^e_{\theta}, \mathbb{P})\) generic and let \( \nu < \theta \). Then
\[
\text{val}_G(N(\nu)) = Q^d_{\nu}.
\]

Proof. By induction on \( \nu \). ■8.6

Pre-nominators for rud-rec functions

8.7. We may use the above idea to construct what one might call a pre-nominator of a rud-rec function.

Suppose that in \( M[G] \), \( F \) is given by \( G \) and the parameter \( g = \text{val}_G(\gamma) \).

Let \( H = H_G \) be the rudimentary function \((\text{MB} \ 5.9)\) such that for transitive \( P \) and \( P^+ \) with \( P^+ \subseteq P(P) \), \( F \restriction P^+ = H(g, F \restriction P, P^+) \).

Define for \( \nu < \eta \), \( E(\nu) = \hat{F} \restriction P_{e\nu} \); thereafter define
\[
E(\nu + 1) = H_{P^+}(\delta, E(\nu), N(\nu)),
\]
and for limit \( \lambda \), \( E(\lambda) = \bigcup_{\nu < \lambda} \{ (1^p, E(\nu)) \mid \nu < \lambda \} \). Then an easy induction shows that for every \( \nu \), \( \text{val}_G(E(\nu)) = F \restriction Q^d_{\nu + 1} \).

8.8. REMARK. To show that the sequences \((N(\nu))_\nu\) and \((E(\nu))_\nu\) are \((\text{P})\)-gentle, one could repeat their definition and those of \((P^e_{\nu^*}u)_\nu\) and \( T^P \) by a single simultaneous rudimentary recursion, a method seen in Definition 2.14 above and the proof of \([\text{MB}]\) Proposition 4.19. With a little extra work one would then get a \((\text{P})\)-gentle nominator for \( F \).

9. Generic extensions of provident sets and of Jensen fragments.

We are now in a position to prove the following theorem:

9.0. THEOREM. Let \( \theta \) be an indecomposable ordinal strictly greater than the rank of a transitive set \( e \) which contains the notion of forcing, \( \mathbb{P} \). Let \( G \) be \((P^e_{\theta}, \mathbb{P})\)-generic. Then \((P^e_{\theta})^{P[G]} = P^e_{\theta} \cup \{G\} \) and hence is provident.

Proof. \((P^e_{\theta})^{P[G]} \) contains \( P^e_{\theta} \cup \{G\} \), as we have for each \( \nu < \theta \) built a name in \( P^e_{\theta} \) that evaluates under \( G \) to \( Q^e_{\nu} \cup \{G\} \), and we know by Proposition 8.2 that \( Q^e_{\theta} \cup \{G\} \) equals \( P^e_{\theta} \cup \{G\} \).

For the converse direction, we know that \( P^e_{\theta} \cup \{G\} \) is provident, and has \( G \) as a member and hence can support the \( G \)-rudimentary recursion defining \( \text{val}_G(\cdot) \). Further \( P^e_{\theta} \cup \{G\} \) includes \((P^e_{\nu})_\nu\), which is defined by an \( e \)-rudimentary recursion, and so includes \((P^e_{\nu})^{P[G]} \). ■9.0

REMARK. Thus, in this special case, a generic extension of a model of \( \text{PROVI} \) is a model of \( \text{PROVI} \). We shall use this result to establish it more generally.
Remark. Theorem 9.0 remains true if the hypothesis on $\theta$ is weakened to requiring that $\theta > \varrho$.

Proof that a generic extension of a provident set is provident

9.1. Theorem. Let $A$ be provident, $\mathbb{P} \in A$ and $\mathcal{G}$ $(A, \mathbb{P})$-generic. Then $A^\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{G}]$ is provident.

Proof. Let $\theta =_{df} On \cap A$ and let $T = \{c \mid c \in A \& c$ is transitive $\& \mathbb{P} \in c\}$. Then

$$A = \bigcup \{P^c_\theta \mid c \in T\},$$

since the union on the right contains each element of $A$ and is contained in $A$. It follows that

$$A^\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{G}] = \bigcup_{c \in T} (P^c_\theta)^\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{G}].$$

By Theorem 9.0, as each $P^c_\theta$ is provident and contains $\mathbb{P}$,

$$A^\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{G}] = \bigcup_{c \in T} P^c_{\theta \cup \{\mathcal{G}\}}$$

and each $P^c_{\theta \cup \{\mathcal{G}\}}$ is provident. Now [MB] Theorem 6.7 and Proposition 6.35 yields

Lemma. If $\theta$ is indecomposable and $D$ is a collection of transitive sets each of rank less than $\theta$ and such that the pair of any two is a member of a third, then $\bigcup_{d \in D} P^d_\theta$ is provident.

Take $D = \{c \cup \{\mathcal{G}\} \mid c \in T\}$ to complete the proof. $\blacksquare_{9.1}$

Remark. Theorem 9.0 and Corollary 4.16 give the elegant characterization noted by Bowler, that if $A$ is provident, $\mathbb{P} \in A$ and $\mathcal{G}$ is $(A, \mathbb{P})$-generic then $A^\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{G}] = \text{Prov}(A \cup \{\mathcal{G}\})$.

Generic extensions of $\mathbb{P}$-provident sets. Our methods will prove the following more general result:

9.2. Theorem. Let $\lambda$ be a limit ordinal $\geq \omega^2$. Write $\eta$ for the largest indecomposable not greater than $\lambda$. Let $T$ be a set of transitive sets, and put $A = \bigcup_{c \in T} P^c_\lambda$ and $B = \bigcup_{c \in T} P^c_\eta$. Suppose that both $A$ and $B$ are closed under pairing. Then for any $\mathbb{P} \in B$, forcing with $\mathbb{P}$ is definable over $A$, and if $\mathcal{G}$ is $(A, \mathbb{P})$-generic, then $A[\mathcal{G}]$ is $\mathbb{P}$-provident; indeed $A[\mathcal{G}]$ will be $q$-provident for every $q$ in $B[\mathcal{G}]$.

Proof. In these circumstances, $B$ will be provident, so forcing with $\mathbb{P}$ over $B$ is by now well-established; each of the relations and functions $\chi_\omega$, $\chi_\eta$, $R^\mathbb{P}$ and $F^\mathbb{P}$ will progress through each $P^c_\lambda$ for $c \in T$, and the closure of $A$ under pairing shows that these functions and relations will be total on $A$. $\blacksquare_{9.2}$
Genericity at every limit level

9.3. PROPOSITION. Let $e$ be a transitive set with $\mathbb{P} \in e$. Let $\theta$ be indecomposable, greater than $\varrho(e)$. Let $\lambda$ be a limit ordinal not less than $\theta$. Let $\kappa \geq \lambda + \omega$, and let $\mathcal{G}$ be $(P^e_\kappa, \mathbb{P})$-generic. Put $d = e \cup \{\mathcal{G}\}$; then $d$ is also transitive of rank $< \theta$. Suppose that $P^e_\lambda[\mathcal{G}] = P^d_\lambda$. Then $P^e_{\lambda + \omega}[\mathcal{G}] = P^d_{\lambda + \omega}$.

Proof. At this level, where we are above the rank of both $e$ and $d$, $P^e_{\nu + 1} = T(P^e_\nu)$ and $P^d_{\nu + 1} = T(P^d_\nu)$.

(i) $P^d_\lambda = \text{val}_e(P^e_\lambda)$; for as $\lambda$ is a limit ordinal, $P^e_\lambda$ is rud-closed. Hence $T(P^d_\lambda) = \text{val}_e(T(P^e_\lambda)) \in P^e_{\lambda + \omega}[\mathcal{G}]$ as, $T(P^e_\lambda)$ being $(P^e_\theta)$-gentle, $T(P^e_\lambda) \subseteq P^e_{\lambda + \omega}$. Iterating $T$, we see that $P^d_{\lambda + \omega} \subseteq P^e_{\lambda + \omega}[\mathcal{G}]$.

(ii) In the other direction, both $e$ and $\mathcal{G}$ are in $P^d_\nu$; as $\theta \leq \lambda$, $P^d_{\lambda + \omega}$ will be both $e$- and $\mathcal{G}$-provident; so $P^e_{\lambda + \omega} \subseteq P^d_{\lambda + \omega}$, and therefore as $\text{val}_e(\cdot)$ is $\mathcal{G}$-rud-rec, $P^e_{\lambda + \omega}[\mathcal{G}] \subseteq P^d_{\lambda + \omega}$. 9.3

Consider now the special case that $e = T^\mathbb{P}_\eta$, a fragment of the constructible hierarchy, and let $\xi$ be the least indecomposable not less than $\eta$. The above argument yields

9.4. LEMMA. Let $\mathbb{P} \in T^\mathbb{P}_\eta$. Suppose that $\nu$ is a limit ordinal $\geq \xi$, that $\mathcal{G}$ is $(T^\mathbb{P}_{\nu + \omega}, \mathbb{P})$-generic, and that $T^\mathbb{P}_\nu[\mathcal{G}] = P^d_\nu$, where $d = T^\mathbb{P}_\eta \cup \{\mathcal{G}\}$. Then $T^\mathbb{P}_{\nu + \omega}[\mathcal{G}] = P^d_{\nu + \omega}$.

Then, reverting to Jensen’s notation, that gives us the following

9.5. THEOREM. Let $\mathbb{P} \in J^\mathbb{P}_\xi$, where $\xi$ is indecomposable. Let $\mathcal{G}$ be $(L, \mathbb{P})$-generic. Then for each ordinal $\zeta \geq \xi$, $J^\mathbb{P}_\xi(\mathcal{G}) = J^\mathbb{P}_{\zeta}[\mathcal{G}]$; in particular each set in $J^\mathbb{P}_{\zeta}(\mathcal{G})$ is $\text{val}(\cdot)$ for some $a \in J^\mathbb{P}_\xi$.

Here is an application, which fleshed out an argument outlined in a letter from Sy Friedman.

9.6. PROPOSITION. Let $\theta < \eta \leq \zeta < \xi$ be ordinals, with $\eta$ indecomposable. Suppose that $\mathbb{P} \in J^\mathbb{P}_\eta$ and that $\mathcal{G}$ is $(J^\mathbb{P}_\xi, \mathbb{P})$-generic. Let $x \subseteq \theta$, with $x \in J^\mathbb{P}_\xi$ and $x \in J^\mathbb{P}_\zeta(\mathcal{G})$. Then $x \in J^\mathbb{P}_\xi$.

Proof. We have $\hat{x} \in J^\mathbb{P}_\xi$. Since $J^\mathbb{P}_\xi[\mathcal{G}] = J^\mathbb{P}_\zeta(\mathcal{G})$, $x = \text{val}(y)$ for some $y \in J^\mathbb{P}_\xi$. Therefore some condition $p$ in $\mathcal{G}$ forces $y = \hat{x}$; so $x = \{\nu < \theta \mid p \models \hat{\nu} \in y\}$. The map $\nu \mapsto \hat{\nu}$, restricted to the $\nu$ less than $\theta$, is in $J^\mathbb{P}_{\theta + 1}$, and the relation $p \models \hat{\nu} \in \hat{z}$ is rudimentary in $\chi_\omega$; an appropriate segment of that characteristic function is in $J^\mathbb{P}_\xi$, by propagation starting from $\eta$; and therefore $x \in J^\mathbb{P}_\zeta$. 9.6

A similar argument leads to an extension of a result in [MB]:

9.7. PROPOSITION. If a set $c$ is such that there is a progress $(Q^c_\nu)_{\nu}$ given by a $c$-rudimentary recursion with $Q^c_\lambda = L_\lambda$ for every limit $\lambda \geq \omega$, then $c$ is not set-generic over $L$. 
Provident sets and rudimentary set forcing

Proof. Suppose to the contrary that \( G \) is \((L, \mathbb{P})\)-generic where \( \mathbb{P} \in L \) and \( c \in L^\mathbb{P}[G] \). Let \( \eta \) be indecomposable with \( \mathbb{P} \in L_\eta \), \( c \in L_\eta^\mathbb{P}[G] \), and \( \eta \geq \omega^\omega \), so that \( \eta = \omega \eta \), and therefore \( L_\eta = J_\eta = T_\eta \). Let \( \lambda = \eta + \omega \).

9.8. Remark. (i) \( T_\lambda^\mathbb{P}[G] \) is \( c \)-provident and so includes \( Q_\lambda^c = L_\lambda \);
(ii) so if \( A \in L_\lambda \), \( A = \text{val}_G(a) \) for some \( a \in T_\lambda \), and there will be a condition \( p \) in the generic filter \( G \) with \( p \models \mathbb{P} \hat{A} = a \);
(iii) for such \( p \) and any \( z \in L \), \( p \models \mathbb{P} \hat{z} \not\in a \iff z \in A \).

From our analysis in \( \S 2 \) of the forcing relation, we know that the characteristic function of the predicate \( p \models \mathbb{P} \hat{x} \in a \) is \( \mathbb{P} \)-gentle; and therefore from the discussion in [MB, \S 6] of the rate of convergence of a gentle function in a progress—see in particular the proof of [MB, Theorem 6.38]—we know the following:

9.9. Proposition. There is a natural number \( s \) such that if \((P_m)_{m<\omega}\) is a strict progress, with \( \mathbb{P} \in P_0 \), \( P_0 \mathbb{P}\)-provident, \( p \in \mathbb{P} \), then for any \( n \) and any \( a \in P_n \),

\[
P_n \cap \{z \mid z \models \mathbb{P} \hat{z} \not\in a\} \in P_{(n+1)s}.
\]

9.10. Lemma. There is a primitive recursive function \( f : \omega \times \omega \to \omega \) such that for each \( k, n < \omega \), and \( A \in L \), if \( A \subseteq L_{\eta+k} \) and \( A = \text{val}_G(a) \) for some \( a \in T_{\eta+n} \) then \( A \in T_{\eta+f(k,n)} \).

Proof. Case \( k = 0 \). We suppose that \( A \subseteq L_\eta = T_\eta \) and for some \( a \in T_{\eta+n} \), \( A = \text{val}_G(a) \).

Then there is a condition \( p \in G \) with \( p \models \mathbb{P} \hat{A} = a \). So, using Remark (iii) and applying the proposition to the strict progress \((T_{\eta+m})_{m<\omega}\), we shall have

\[
A = T_{\eta+n} \cap \{z \mid z \models \mathbb{P} \hat{z} \not\in a\} \in T_{\eta+(n+1)s}.
\]

Therefore we may set \( f(0, n) = (n + 1)s \).

Case \( k = \ell+1 \). We suppose that \( A \subseteq L_{\eta+\ell+1} \) and that for some \( a \in T_{\eta+n} \),
\( A = \text{val}_G(a) \).

Then there is a condition \( p \in G \) with \( p \models \mathbb{P} \hat{A} = a \).

Let \( B \in A \). Then \( B \subseteq L_{\eta+\ell} \) and for some \( b \in T_{\eta+n} \), \( B = \text{val}_G(b) \).

[Actually \( b \) will be in \( \bigcup \mathbb{A} a \) and therefore in \( T_{\eta+n-3} \), if \( n \geq 3 \). So we are giving a little ground: unimportant in the present case, but perhaps a fact to be stored for the future.]

So by the case \( k = \ell, \) \( B \in T_{\eta+f(\ell,n)} \). Thus

\[
A = T_{\eta+f(\ell,n)} \cap \{z \mid z \models \mathbb{P} \hat{z} \not\in a\} \in T_{\eta+(f(\ell,n)+1)s}.
\]

So we may set \( f(\ell + 1, n) = (f(\ell, n) + 1)s \). \( \Box \)

The lemma is proved, and Remark 9.8(ii), implies, under the current hypotheses on \( c \), that \( L_\lambda \subseteq T_\lambda \); but that is false, as \( L_{\eta+1} \in L_\lambda \) but
\( L_{\eta+1} \notin T_\lambda = J_{\eta+1} \), by the proof of [MB] Proposition 6.68]. Thus \( c \) cannot be set-generic over \( L \). \( \blacksquare_{9.7} \)

10. **Persistence of certain systems.** We suppose throughout that we are forcing over a provident set (or model, meaning possibly ill-founded) \( M \) by some \( \mathbb{P} \in M \). Our first task is for each of the schemes of foundation, collection and separation, to show that if they hold in \( M \) then in \( M[\mathcal{G}] \). We call that the phenomenon of persistence. Establishing the persistence of a given axiom divides into two steps: first, showing that the axiom is forced; and second, showing that what is forced is true in the generic extension. The first step generally uses the truth of the axiom concerned, possibly in an apparently stronger form, in the ground model. The second step succeeds if the generic meets all appropriately definable dense subclasses of \( \mathbb{P} \), which it will do given the truth in the ground model of sufficiently strong instances of the separation scheme.

**Extension of the definition of forcing to all formulæ.** We may extend the definition of forcing, schematically, to all formulæ, thus:

10.0. **Definition.** \( p \models \bigwedge \mathfrak{F} \Phi \iff \forall x \ p \models \Phi(x) \).

10.1. **Proposition.** \( p \models \bigvee \mathfrak{F} \Phi \iff \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists x \ r \models \Phi(x) \).
\( p \models \bigvee_{\mathfrak{F}y} \Phi \iff \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists (t, \beta) \in y (r \leq t \& r \models \Phi(\beta)) \).

10.2. **Proposition.** \( p \models \Phi \iff \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists r \models \Phi \).
\( \models x = \alpha \wedge \Phi(\alpha) \rightarrow \Phi(x) \).

**Proof.** Already proved for atomic wffs, an easy induction thereafter. \( \blacksquare_{10.2} \)

10.3. **Exercise.** Show that if \( p \models \bigwedge \mathfrak{F} (\Phi \rightarrow \Psi(x)) \) and \( \Phi \) is a sentence of \( \mathcal{L}^\mathbb{P} \) (so that, intuitively, \( x \) has no free occurrence in \( \Phi \)), then \( p \models \Phi \rightarrow \bigwedge \mathfrak{F} \Psi(x) \).

This exercise, coupled with our remarks about *Modus Ponens* above, ensures that we may apply mathematical reasoning to statements in our forcing language.

**Complexity of some classes of formulæ.** For a class \( \Gamma \) of wffs, such as \( \Sigma_t \) or \( \Pi_t \), let \( \Sigma_1 \Gamma \) be the class of wffs of the form \( \exists x \ \Psi \) where \( \Psi \in \Gamma \); let \( \Delta_0 \Gamma \) be the class of those wffs where a formula from \( \Gamma \) is preceded by a finite string of restricted quantifiers; and let \( \models \Gamma \) be the class of wffs of the form \( p \models \mathbb{P} \Phi \) where \( \Phi \) is in \( \Gamma \).

10.4. **Some computations for** \( \varphi \mathbb{P} \mathbb{D} \_0 \):  
- (10.4.0) \( p \models \mathbb{P} \varphi \) is a \( \mathbb{P} \)-gentle predicate of \( p \) and \( \phi \), and therefore \( \Delta_1^{\text{PROVI}} \);  
- (10.4.1) \( p \models \mathbb{P} \bigwedge \mathfrak{F} \varphi(x) \) is \( \forall x \ p \models \mathbb{P} \varphi(x) \), and thus \( \Pi_1^{\text{PROVI}} \);  
- (10.4.2) \( p \models \mathbb{P} \bigvee \mathfrak{F} \varphi(x) \) is \( \forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists x \ r \models \mathbb{P} \varphi(x) \), and thus \( \Delta_0 \Sigma_1^{\text{PROVI}} \);
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(10.4.3) $p \models P \wedge \forall x \in a \exists \eta \exists t (q \models x \in a \Rightarrow r \models \varphi[t, x])$, and thus $\Delta_0\Sigma_1^\text{PROVI}$ and $\Sigma_1^K\text{PI}$.

(10.4.4) $p \models P \wedge \exists x \in a \exists \eta \varphi[x, y]$, and thus $\Pi_2^\text{PROVI}$.

More generally for positive $k$, all $\models \Pi_k$ predicates are $\Pi_k^\text{PROVI}$, as $\Delta_0$ quantifiers such as $\forall q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists t (q \models \varphi[t, x])$ will usually be interpolated between successive unrestricted quantifiers $\exists \exists$ of the $\Pi_k$ formula, and thus absorbed, while $\models \Sigma_k$ predicates will be $\Delta_0\Sigma_k^\text{PROVI}$.

When appropriate forms of Collection hold in $M$, those initial restricted quantifiers can also be absorbed; for example $\Delta_0$-collection implies that every $\Delta_0\Sigma_1$ formula is equivalent to a $\Sigma_1$ formula, so that $\models P \Sigma_1$ predicates are $\Sigma_1^K\text{PI}$. Thus (in $\text{KP}$) if $P$ is a set, $\models P$ restricted to $\Sigma_1$ wffs will be $\Sigma_1$; and in $\text{ZF}$, forcing for $\Sigma_n$ wffs is $\Sigma_n$.

Remark. Initial restricted quantifiers can also be absorbed in contexts such as $V = L$ when the lemma of Sy Friedman discussed in §5 of [M2] holds.

Completeness and consistency. By the consistency of forcing we shall mean the principle that no condition forces both a formula and its negation; by the completeness of forcing we shall mean the principle that every condition can be refined to one that decides a given formula.

The consistency and completeness of forcing are maintained by our system of definitions as we progressively enlarge the definition of forcing to wider classes of formulæ: they follow from the way forcing handles negation.

Problem. Let us take $G$-completeness to mean that each statement is decided by some $p \in G$. The class of conditions that decide is certainly dense; but is it a set?

$P \cap \{p \mid p \models \Phi \lor p \models \neg \Phi\}$ will be a set if we have enough separation. If $\Phi$ is $\Delta_0$, it will be a set by gentle separation. For other $\Phi$, it will be a set if we have both ($\models \Phi$)-separation and ($\Delta_0 \neg \models \Phi$)-separation.

10.5. Remark. There is a point to be made here, similar to the problem of defining truth for all formulæ. We have defined the forcing relation $\chi_{\models \varphi}$ for all $\Delta_0$ sentences $\varphi$ of our formal language, essentially by a single recursion, so that every set is a member of a transitive set $u$ such that $\chi_{\models \varphi} \upharpoonright \mathcal{E}^u$ is total and a set. A definition of truth for a single $\Delta_0$ sentence is achieved by recursion over the transitive closure of the sets named in that sentence; in the case of forcing we must start our recursion from the transitive closure of the union of $\{P\}$ and some set containing each set $a$ of which the name $a$ occurs in the sentence.
But we are not able to make a single definition for all formulæ with arbitrarily many unrestricted quantifiers, but must introduce a sequence of definitions schematically. This would become very apparent in the Boolean-valued presentation of forcing, where truth values are assigned in a complete Boolean algebra, and we must invoke the axiom of replacement for each quantifier to see that the supremum over a class is actually the supremum over a set.

**Persistence of Foundation**

10.6. **Proposition.** $(\Delta_0 \models_P \Gamma)$-foundation implies that $\Gamma$-foundation is forced.

**Proof.** Let $\Phi$ be in $\Gamma$. Let $A = \{ a \mid \exists p \in P \ p \models_P \Phi[a] \}$. Then $A$ is $(\Delta_0 \models_P \Phi)$.

Form $C = \{ c \mid c \in A \vee \exists d \in A \vee \exists e \in A \}$. Then $C$ is also $(\Delta_0 \models_P \Gamma)$, so, assuming $A \neq \emptyset$, let $c$ be $C$-minimal. Then for some $p$, $p \models_P \Phi[c]$, but $p$ will also force that $c$ is $\Phi$-minimal. ■

**Persistence of Collection.** It is convenient to take Collection in the form $\forall x \in a \exists y \Phi \Rightarrow \exists b \forall x \in a \exists y \in b \Phi$.

Suppose that $p \models \bigwedge x \in a \bigvee y \in b \Phi$. Let $B(p, s) = \{ q \mid q \leq p \& q \leq s \}$. Note that $B$ is $P$-rudimentary. Then

$$\forall (s, \beta) \in a \forall q \in B(p, s) \exists r \leq q \exists y \in r \models_P \Phi(y, \beta).$$

After massaging the displayed formula and applying $(\models_P \Phi)$-collection we shall reach a $b$ such that

$$\forall (s, \beta) \in a \forall q \in B(p, s) \exists r \leq q \exists y \in b \models_P \Phi(y, \beta).$$

Let $w = \{ (I^P, y)_2 \mid y \in b \}$. Then $p \models \bigwedge x \in a \bigvee y \in w \Phi$, as required. We have proved:

10.7. **Proposition.** $(\models \Gamma)$-collection implies that $\Gamma$-collection is forced.

**Remark.** Collection is more natural than replacement in the context of forcing.

**Persistence of Separation.** Given $a$ and $\Phi$, let $b = (P \times \bigcup a) \cap \{ (p, \alpha)_2 \mid p \models \Phi[\alpha] \}$. By $(\Delta_0 \models P)\Phi$-separation, $b$ is a set. I assert that $\models b = \{ x \in a \mid \Phi(x) \}$. Note first that (trivially) if $q \models_0 \alpha \in b$ then $q \models \Phi[\alpha]$. Proposition 3.13 tells us that if $q \models \alpha \in b$ then $q \models \Phi[\alpha]$, so that $\models \alpha \in b \Rightarrow \Phi[\alpha]$.

In the other direction, suppose that $p \models \alpha \in a \& \Phi[\alpha]$, then $q \leq p \exists r \leq q \exists \gamma (r \models \gamma \in a \& r \models \gamma = \alpha)$; so $\gamma \in \bigcup a \& r \models \Phi[\gamma]$; so $(r, \gamma)_2 \in b$ so $r \models \gamma \in b$; so as $r \models \gamma = \alpha$, $r \models \alpha \in b$. By density, $p \models \alpha \in b$. 

Hence \( \models (\alpha \in a \land \hat{\Phi}[\alpha]) \leftrightarrow \alpha \in b \) and \( \models b = \{ x \in a \mid x \models \hat{\Phi}(x) \} \). We have proved:

10.8. Proposition. \((\Delta_0 \models \Gamma)\)-separation implies that \(\Gamma\)-separation is forced.

Towards the Forcing Theorem

10.9. Definition. For a formula \(\Phi\), let \(\text{FT}(\Phi)\) be the principle that “what is forced is true”: namely that if \(\Phi\) is forced by some \(p \in \mathcal{G}\), then \(\Phi\) is true in \(M[\mathcal{G}]\); let \(\text{TF}(\Phi)\) be the principle that “what is true is forced”, namely that if \(\Phi\) is true in \(M[\mathcal{G}]\), then \(\Phi\) is forced by some \(p \in \mathcal{G}\); and let \(\text{TFT}(\Phi)\), the Forcing Theorem for \(\Phi\), be the conjunction of \(\text{FT}(\Phi)\) and \(\text{TF}(\Phi)\).

Let \(\text{FT}(\Gamma)\) mean that \(\text{FT}(\Phi)\) holds for each \(\Phi\) in \(\Gamma\), and similarly for \(\text{TF}(\Gamma)\) and \(\text{TFT}(\Gamma)\).

10.10. Remark. Proposition 4.5 proved \(\text{TFT}\) for atomic wffs, and Theorem 4.17 proved \(\text{TFT}(\Delta_0)\).

Propagating \(\text{FT}\) and \(\text{TF}\): the rôle of Separation

10.11. Theorem. For any \(\xi\):

\((10.11.0)\) if \(\text{TF}(\Pi_\xi)\) then \(\text{TF}(\Sigma_{\xi+1})\);
\((10.11.1)\) if \(\text{FT}(\Pi_\xi)\) and \(\mathcal{G}\) meets every \((\Sigma_1 \models \Pi_\xi)\) \(M\)-subclass of conditions, then \(\text{FT}(\Sigma_{\xi+1})\).

Proof. Let \(\Psi(\cdot, \cdot)\) be \(\Pi_\xi\). If \(M[\mathcal{G}] \models \bigvee \eta \, \Psi(\eta; \text{val}_\mathcal{G}(x))\) then \(\exists y \in M \, M[\mathcal{G}] \models \Psi[\text{val}_\mathcal{G}(y), \text{val}_\mathcal{G}(x)]\); so by \(\text{TF}(\Pi_\xi)\) some \(p \in \mathcal{G}\) forces \(\Psi[y, x]\); and then this \(p\) trivially forces \(\bigvee \eta \, \Psi(\eta; x)\). Thus (10.11.0) is proved.

If \(p_0 \in \mathcal{G}\) forces \(\bigvee \eta \, \Psi(\eta; x)\) then the class \(E = \{ p \mid \exists y \, p \models \Psi[y; x] \}\), is dense below \(p_0\); \(E\) is definable in \(M\) by a \((\Sigma_1 \models \Pi_\xi)\) formula, and therefore meets \(\mathcal{G}\). Let \(p \in E \cap \mathcal{G}\). Then for some \(y \in M\), \(p \models \Psi[y, x]\), so by \(\text{FT}(\Pi_\xi)\), \(M[\mathcal{G}] \models \Psi[\text{val}_\mathcal{G}(y), \text{val}_\mathcal{G}(x)]\), whence \(M[\mathcal{G}] \models \bigvee \eta \, \Psi(\eta; \text{val}_\mathcal{G}(x))\), proving (10.11.1). \(\blacksquare\)

10.12. Proposition. For any \(\Phi\):

\((10.12.0)\) if \(\mathcal{G}\) decides \(\Phi\), \(\text{FT}(\Phi)\) implies \(\text{TF}(\neg \Phi)\);
\((10.12.1)\) \(\text{TF}(\Phi)\) implies \(\text{FT}(\neg \Phi)\)

Proof. Suppose \(\text{FT}(\Phi)\), and that \(\neg \Phi\) is true in \(M[\mathcal{G}]\); then \(\Phi\) is not true there, so not \(\mathcal{G}\)-forced, so something in \(\mathcal{G}\) forces \(\neg \Phi\), by \(\mathcal{G}\)-completeness.

Suppose \(\text{TF}(\Phi)\), and that \(\neg \Phi\) is forced; then (by \(\mathcal{G}\)-consistency, which is automatic) nothing in \(\mathcal{G}\) forces \(\Phi\), so \(\Phi\) is not true, so \(\neg \Phi\) is true. \(\blacksquare\)
10.13. COROLLARY. For any $\xi$: 

(10.13.0) $\text{TF}(\Sigma_\xi) \implies \text{FT}(\Pi_\xi)$;
(10.13.1) if $G$ decides all $\Sigma_\xi$ statements, $\text{FT}(\Sigma_\xi) \implies \text{TF}(\Pi_\xi)$.

We get the following pattern of implications, where $\Rightarrow$ indicates that there is no extra assumption on $G$, and $\rightarrow$ indicates that there is, $G_{m\Sigma_\xi+1}$ meaning that $G$ is assumed to meet every dense $(\Sigma_1 \parallel \Pi_\xi)^M$ subclass of conditions and $G_{d\Sigma_\xi}$ meaning that $G$ is assumed to decide every $\Sigma_\xi$ statement.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{TF}(\Pi_0) & \Rightarrow \text{TF}(\Sigma_1) \Rightarrow \text{FT}(\Pi_1) \rightarrow_{gm\Sigma_2} \text{FT}(\Sigma_2) \rightarrow_{gd\Sigma_2} \text{TF}(\Pi_2) \Rightarrow \text{TF}(\Sigma_3) \ldots \\
\text{FT}(\Pi_0) & \rightarrow_{gm\Sigma_1} \text{FT}(\Sigma_1) \rightarrow_{gd\Sigma_1} \text{TF}(\Pi_1) \Rightarrow \text{FT}(\Sigma_2) \Rightarrow \text{FT}(\Pi_2) \rightarrow_{gm\Sigma_3} \text{FT}(\Sigma_3) \ldots \\
\text{TFT}(\Delta_0) & \rightarrow_{gm\Sigma_1} \text{TFT}(\Sigma_1) \rightarrow_{gd\Sigma_1} \text{TFT}(\Pi_1) \rightarrow_{gm\Sigma_2} \text{TFT}(\Sigma_2) \rightarrow_{gd\Sigma_2} \text{TFT}(\Pi_2) \rightarrow_{gm\Sigma_3} \text{TFT}(\Sigma_3) \ldots 
\end{align*}
\]

10.14. REMARK. Suppose that $G$ meets every dense member of $M$, a model of Provi. Then “$G$ meets every dense $(\Sigma_1 \parallel \Pi_\xi)$ subclass of $P$” will hold if $\Sigma_{\xi+1}$-separation holds in $M$; and $G$ will decide all $\Sigma_\xi$ statements if $\Delta_0\Sigma_\xi$-separation holds in $M$, or (when $\xi > 0$), if $\Sigma_\xi$-separation and $\Pi_{\xi-1}$-collection hold in $M$.

10.15. COROLLARY. Any set-generic extension of a provident set which models full separation will also be provident and model full separation; moreover the forcing theorem will hold for all formulæ.

Proof. 10.8 tells us that all instances of the separation scheme are forced. Then 10.14 with 10.11 will tell us that $\text{TFT}(\Pi_\xi)$ implies $\text{TFT}(\Sigma_{\xi+1})$, and 10.14 with 10.13 will tell us that $\text{TFT}(\Sigma_\xi)$ implies $\text{TFT}(\Pi_\xi)$. $\text{TFT}(\Pi_0)$ is $\text{TFT}(\Delta_0)$ which was Theorem 4.17, so we have $\text{TFT}$ for all formulæ of the forcing language; so that all instances of the separation scheme are true in the extension. $\blacksquare$

Persistence of the power set axiom and of provident Zermelo set theory. The persistence of the power set axiom, among others, is proved in [M4, §4]. Combining that result with those above, we get

10.16. THEOREM. Any set-generic extension of a provident set which models $\mathcal{Z}$ will also be provident and model $\mathcal{Z}$; and the forcing theorem will hold for all wffs.

Summary. Collection for $\Phi$ in the extension follows from $(\parallel \Phi)$-collection in $M$ with $\text{TF}(\Delta_0\Sigma_1\Phi)$ and $\text{FT}(\Delta_0\Phi)$.

Foundation for $\Phi$ in the extension follows from $(\Delta_0 \parallel \Phi)$-foundation in $M$ with $\text{TFT}(\Phi)$.

Separation for $\Phi$ in the extension follows from $(\Delta_0 \parallel \Phi)$-separation in $M$ with $\text{TFT}(\Phi)$. 

The persistence of KPI

10.17. Theorem. If $M$ is admissible, $\mathbb{P} \in M$ and $G$ is an $(M, \mathbb{P})$-generic filter meeting each dense open subclass of $M$ that is the union of a $\Sigma_1(M)$ and a $\Pi_1(M)$ class, then $M^\mathbb{P}[G]$ is admissible.

Proof. The system KPI, as presented in [M2], may be obtained by adding to the axioms of PROVI the schemes of $\Pi_1$-foundation and $\Delta_0$-collection. As we have proved the persistence of PROVI, it only remains to discuss those two schemes.

Let us first remark that the hypotheses imply that $\text{FT}(\Sigma_1)$ is available, since every $\langle \Sigma_1 \| \rightarrow \Delta_0 \rangle^M$ class is $\Sigma_1^M$, since $M$ is admissible.

Suppose you have $\Delta_0$-collection in the ground model. For $\Phi \Delta_0$, $\| \rightarrow \Pi_1$ is a gentle predicate, hence $\Sigma_1^{\text{PROVI}}$, and $\Sigma_1$-collection follows from $\Delta_0$-collection in PROVI. So from Proposition 10.7, we know that $\Delta_0$-collection is forced. It remains to show that it is true in the extension.

Suppose therefore that $\Psi$ is $\Delta_0$, that $a = \text{val}_G(a) \in M[G]$ and that $M[G] \models \bigwedge_{x \in \tilde{a}} \bigvee_{y \in v} \Psi(x, y)$.

Let $\Delta = \{ p \mid p \| \rightarrow \mathbb{P} \bigwedge_{x \in a} \bigvee_{y \in v} \Psi \lor \exists (q, \alpha) : p \leq q \& p \| \rightarrow \mathbb{P} \bigwedge_{\eta} \neg \Psi(\alpha, \eta) \}$. Then $\Delta$ is dense open, and is the union of a $\Sigma_1^KP$ class and a $\Pi_1^KP$ class. By hypothesis, $G \cap \Delta \neq 0$.

Hence there must be a $p \in G$ such that $p \| \rightarrow \mathbb{P} \bigwedge_{x \in a} \bigvee_{y \in v} \Psi$, the other half of the dense set being excluded by our assumption on $M[G]$. But we know from Proposition 10.7 that then $p \| \rightarrow \mathbb{P} \bigvee_{\nu} \bigwedge_{x \in a} \bigvee_{y \in v} \Psi(x, y)$; as $p \in G$, and the statement being forced is $\Sigma_1$, $\text{FT}(\Sigma_1)$ tells us that $M^\mathbb{P}[G] \models \bigvee_{\nu} \bigwedge_{x \in a} \bigvee_{y \in v} \Psi(x, y)$, as required.

Let $\Phi$ be $\Pi_1$. Suppose you have $\Pi_1$-foundation in the ground model. By (10.4.1) using $\Delta_0$-collection, that gives $(\Delta_0 \| \rightarrow \Pi_1)$-foundation there, using which we have seen how to construct a name $c$ for a member of the extension that is forced to be $\Phi$-minimal, so that $\Phi[c]$ and $\forall x \notin \Phi(x)$ are both forced by some member of $G$. To complete the proof we use $\text{FT}(\Pi_1)$, which is free, and $\text{FT}(\Delta_0 \Sigma_1)$, which is $\text{FT}(\Sigma_1)$ given $\Delta_0$-collection, and which will hold as $G$ meets every dense $\Sigma_1$ subclass of $P$. \( \blacksquare \)

10.18. Remark. We know that $\Delta_0$-separation will hold in the extension by the closure under basic separators. An alternative argument is to say that

(3) A comment on the notation: $a$ is in $M$ and is a name in the forcing for $a$; $q$ is used in the forcing language to remind us that $a$ is not being spoken of as itself but as a name for an as yet uncreated object; on the other hand, once the model $M[G]$ exists we may discuss what sentences are true in it, in terms of the usual truth predicate $\models$ and the associated language; $\tilde{a}$ is a name for $a$ in that language.
it would follow from $\Delta_1$-separation in the ground model, which fortunately
is a theorem of $\text{KP}$, together with $\text{TFT}(\Delta_0)$, which is free.

**The persistence of $\text{KPI} + \Sigma_1$-separation**

10.19. Remark. To get $\Sigma_1$-separation, we need $(\Delta_0 \models \Sigma_1)$-separation
in the ground model—fortunately $(\Delta_0 \models \Sigma_1)$ formulae are $\Sigma_1^{\text{KPI}}$—and
$\text{TFT}(\Sigma_1)$, which is available as $\text{TF}(\Sigma_1)$ is free, and $\text{FT}(\Sigma_1)$ will hold by
$\Sigma_1$-separation.

**A teasing question**

10.20. Remark. We have seen that we can reduce the amount of separation
required to hold in $M$ in proving the forcing theorem if, instead, we
require the generic $G$ to meet certain dense definable classes. On the other
hand, that device apparently cannot be used to show that separation holds
in the extension where it did not hold in the ground model; which raises the
following question:

10.21. Problem. Can a set-generic extension satisfy more separation
than held in the ground model?

Here is one case, suggested by Kai Hauser in conversation, where a negative answer holds:

10.22. Proposition. Suppose that $M$ is admissible and of the form $P^c_\theta$
for some transitive set $c$. Let $\mathbb{P} \in M$, and let $G$ be $(M, \mathbb{P})$-generic. If $\Sigma_1$
separation holds in $M[G]$, then it holds in $M$.

**Proof.** Inside $M[G]$, $M$ is a $\Sigma_1(c)$ class, and so if $a$ and $b$ are in $M$, the
class $a \cap \{x \mid x \exists y \in M \Psi(x, y, b)\}$ is a set, say, of $M[G]$. For some $\nu < \theta$,
$d \in P^c_\nu[G]$. $\forall x \in d \exists \xi (\exists y \in P^c_\xi \Psi(x, y, b))$, so by $\Sigma_1$-collection in $M[G]$, there is
a $\zeta < \theta$ such that for $z = P^c_\zeta \in M$, $d = a \cap \{x \mid x \exists y \in z \Psi(x, y, b)\} \in M$ by
$\Delta_0$-separation. $\blacksquare$

**11. Definition of generic filter and extension in the ill-founded case.** In Section 6 of [M2], forcing over an ill-founded model is used to obtain an independence result for H. Friedman’s theory of power admissibility; and pages 192–193 of [M2] contain some general remarks on such forcing.

We go over some of this ground again as [M2] was written before the development of the theory of rudimentary recursion and in any case is chiefly concerned with set theories with the power set axiom.

11.0. Suppose we have a countable ill-founded model $\mathcal{M} = \langle M, R \rangle$ of
$\text{PROVI}$, and $\mathbb{P} = (\mathbb{P}, \leq)$ in $M$ which $\mathcal{M}$ believes to be a separative poset.
Working in $\mathcal{M}$ we can, as above, define a forcing relation $\parallel \mathbb{P}$. 
The definition of an \((\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{P})\)-generic \(\mathcal{F}\) will be much as before, but let us simplify our discussion by requiring \(\mathcal{F}\) to meet every \(\mathcal{M}\)-definable subclass of \(P\).

In the case when \(M\) is transitive, we are able to define \(\text{val}_\mathcal{G}(\cdot)\) by a rudimentary recursion; but in our present context, the model \(\mathcal{M}\) is ill-founded, and so \textit{prima facie} we cannot carry out that recursive definition. Instead we treat as a definition what in the transitive case was Proposition 4.5:

11.1. **Definition.** Define for all \(a\) and \(b\) in \(\mathcal{M}\) the following equivalence relation:

\[
a \equiv_{\mathcal{F}} b \iff \exists p \in \mathcal{F} p \models a = b.
\]

Let \(Q = Q_{\mathcal{F}}\) be the set of equivalence classes. Write \([a]_{\mathcal{F}}\) for the \(\equiv_{\mathcal{F}}\)-equivalence class of \(a \in M\).

Define a relation \(\in_{\mathcal{F}}\) on \(Q\) by

\[
[a]_{\mathcal{F}} \in_{\mathcal{F}} [b]_{\mathcal{F}} \iff \exists p \in \mathcal{F} p \models a \in b.
\]

11.2. **Remark.** That that relation is independent of the chosen representatives \(a, b\) of their equivalence classes follows from Propositions 2.26 and 2.27 established within \(\mathcal{M}\).

11.3. Then \(\mathcal{Q} =_{df} (Q, \in_{\mathcal{F}})\) is a perfectly reasonable countable set with a two-place relation on it, and we can ask which of the sentences of the forcing language are true in that model when we interpret \(=\) by equality and \(\epsilon\) by \(\in_{\mathcal{F}}\).

**The Forcing Theorem in the general case.** We wish to prove, to take the case of formulæ with two free variables, that

\[
(Q, \in_{\mathcal{F}}) \models \Phi[(a)_{\mathcal{F}}, (b)_{\mathcal{F}}] \iff \exists p \in_{\mathcal{F}} (M, R) \models p \models \Phi[a, b].
\]

11.4. **Remark.** That notation hints at a conflict of language level. We have \(\Delta_0\) wffs which are sets, and over the set of which we can quantify; we are using these wffs, when their formal free variables are interpreted by constants, in two contexts; in our current universe, for which we have a truth definition \(\models^0\) and in the generic extension via the definition of forcing \(p \models \varphi\).

To resolve that conflict for \(\Delta_0\) wffs we should formulate the theorem thus:

11.5. **THE FORCING THEOREM.** For \(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{F}\) and \(\mathcal{Q}\) as above, and for every \(\Delta_0\) formula \(\varphi(\mathfrak{r}, \eta)\) and \(a, b\) in \(M\),

\[
(Q, \in_{\mathcal{F}}) \models \models^0 \varphi[(a)_{\mathcal{F}}, (b)_{\mathcal{F}}] \iff \exists p \in_{\mathcal{F}} (M, R) \models p \models \varphi[a, b].
\]

When unrestricted quantifiers are then “added by hand”, the Forcing Theorem will extend schematically with no further problem.
The proof will follow that for the transitive case, which relied entirely on the fact that $\mathcal{F}$ meets all the necessary dense classes, and made no use of the well-foundedness of the model under consideration.

Once that has been done, we may strengthen the ties between $\mathfrak{Q}$ and $\mathfrak{N}$, by showing that we may treat $\mathfrak{Q}$ as an extension of $\mathfrak{N}$ by considering the map $x \mapsto [\hat{x}]$; we may also show that $\mathcal{F}$ is in $\mathfrak{Q}$, being $[\hat{\mathcal{F}}]$. Here $\hat{x}$ is the canonical forcing name for the member $x$ of the ground model, defined recursively inside $\mathfrak{N}$, (using which we may define a predicate $\hat{V}$ of the forcing language for membership of the ground model) and $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$ is the canonical forcing name for the generic being added.

11.6. The proof given in §5 that the generic extension has no new ordinals will go through in this case. So loosely we may say that the extension $\mathfrak{Q}$ is no more ill-founded than is the starting model $\mathfrak{M}$. Further, $\mathfrak{Q}$ considers itself to be a generic extension of $\mathfrak{M}$ via $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}$; the corresponding statement about $\hat{\mathcal{P}}$ and $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$ being forced. Hence inside $\mathfrak{Q}$ the recursive definition of $\text{val}_\mathcal{F} : M \to Q$ by

$$\text{val}_\mathcal{F}(b) = \{\text{val}_\mathcal{F}(a) \mid \exists p \in \mathcal{F} (p, a) \in b\}$$

succeeds, using the predicate $\hat{V}$ identifying the members of $M$.

11.7. Proposition. $[a]_\mathcal{F} = \text{val}_\mathcal{F}(a)$.

Proof. Use recursion inside the ill-founded model $\mathfrak{Q}$ of PROVI. ■

The author is much indebted to the anonymous referee for his meticulous reading of the manuscript and his thoughtful comments, which will now be addressed, on the past and possible future of work of this kind.

11.8. Historical note. Since Cohen’s creation of forcing as a construction of extensions of models of full $\text{ZF}$, many people have examined the possibility of forcing over models of weaker systems of set theory, to say nothing of those who have transplanted Cohen’s ideas to other areas of enquiry outside set theory. Forcing over admissible sets was studied briefly by Barwise in his 1967 Stanford thesis, at greater length by Jensen in an originally unpublished treatise $[J3]$ on admissibility that contained a proof of his celebrated “sequence-of-admissibles” theorem, in Steel’s 1978 paper $[St1]$, in Sacks’ study $[Sa]$, and in numerous writings of Sy Friedman such as his papers $[F1]$ and $[F2]$, which latter expounds inter alia that result of Jensen. In this connection, the referee draws my attention to the paper of Carlson $[Ca]$ and the expositions of Ershov (the paper $[E1]$, with a correction following a critical review by Blass; and the book $[E2]$ which discusses forcing over models of KPU) and of Zarach $[Z2]$. 

Remark. Carlson [Ca] proves using constructibility and forcing arguments that for many set theories $T$ and any $\Delta_0$ formula $\Phi$, if $T + \text{AC}$ proves for all $x$ there is a unique $y$ such that $\Phi(x, y)$ then so does $T$. The results of the present paper, [MB] and [M2] show that Carlson’s theorem will also hold for $\text{PROVI}$, for $Z + \text{KP}$, and for some other theories. Whether it will hold for Zermelo set theory $Z$, for $Z + \text{PROVI}$ or for $\text{KP}^P$, the theory of “power-admissibility” discussed in Section 6 of [M2], seem delicate questions.

Remark. The paper of Hauser [Ha] and the as yet unpublished notes of Steel [St2] contain explorations of forcing over transitive sets which, whilst not required to be admissible, are nevertheless assumed to possess certain fine-structural properties.

11.9. A paper of Feferman gave an application of forcing in the context of second order arithmetic; this theme was developed in an expository article of Scott, and in lectures by Jensen at the 1967 UCLA meeting. The referee suggests that a bridge between the work of Feferman and the ideas of this paper might result if it were to be shown, as is indeed the case, that all axioms of $\text{PROVI}$ are theorems of the set-theoretic variant $\text{ATR}_0^{\text{set}}$ described in [Si2, §VII.3], of the well-known system $\text{ATR}_0$. With his permission we report that François Dorais is investigating this question and wrote as follows on January 11th, 2014:

If $\text{HC}$ denotes the statement that every set is countable then $\text{PROVI} + \text{HC}$ is bi-interpretable with $\text{ACA}_0^+$ and $\text{PROVI} + \text{HC} + \text{Mostowski Collapse}$ is bi-interpretable with $\text{ATR}_0$. The bi-interpretations are actually very strong. Here are the precise results, seen from the model-theoretic perspective:

1. If $V, W$ are two models of $\text{PROVI} + \text{HC}$ with isomorphic $(\omega, P(\omega), RWO)$, where $RWO$ is the class of wellorderings of $\omega$ that have ordinal-valued rank functions, then $V$ and $W$ are globally isomorphic.

2. If $(N, P(N))$ is a model of $\text{ACA}_0$ and $RWO$ is a subclass of the wellorderings of $N$ (as understood from within the model) which contains the usual ordering of $N$, is closed under isomorphism, initial segments, addition, and such that arithmetic transfinite recursion is possible along any element of $RWO$, then there is a model $V$ of $\text{PROVI} + \text{HC}$ whose $(\omega, P(\omega), RWO)$ from (1) is isomorphic to this $(N, P(N), RWO)$.

3. If $V$ is a model of $\text{PROVI} + \text{HC}$ and $RWO$ is the class of wellorderings of $\omega$ that have ordinal-valued rank functions, then $RWO$ contains the usual ordering of $\omega$, is closed under isomorphism, initial segments, addition, and, seen as a model of second-order arithmetic, $(\omega, P(\omega))$ satisfies arithmetic transfinite recursion along any element of $RWO$. In other words, $(\omega, P(\omega))$ with $RWO$ satisfies the hypotheses of (2).

4. A model $(N, P(N))$ of $\text{ACA}_0$ admits a class $RWO$ as described in (2) if and only if $(N, P(N))$ satisfies $\text{ACA}_0^+$, in which case we can take $RWO$ to be the smallest class of wellorderings of $N$ that contains the usual ordering of $N$ and is closed under isomorphism, initial segments and addition.
The results for $\text{ATR}_0$ follow in the same way by taking $\text{RWO}$ to be the class of all wellorderings of $N$ or $\omega$ since the Mostowski Collapse ensures that every wellordering has an ordinal-valued rank function. It follows that $\text{PROVI}$ and $\text{ACA}_0^+$ have the same proof-theoretic ordinal: the first fixed point of the epsilon function. Similarly, $\text{PROVI} + \text{Mostowski Collapse}$ and $\text{ATR}_0$ have the Feferman–Schütte ordinal $\Gamma_0$. All of these results only assume set-foundation in $\text{PROVI}$; I’m still unsure what happens with $\Pi_1$-foundation.

Something of the interplay between analysis and set theory is to be seen in a paper of Zarach and an unpublished manuscript of Gandy.

11.10. The referee also draws attention to the use of class forcing over admissible sets, which, it is hoped, might form the subject of a further paper. An early paper on class forcing in the context of Morse–Kelley theory is [Ch]. Of the papers of Zarach, [Z1] cites a preprint form of [Ch]. It discusses forcing with classes in the context of $\text{ZF}$-. [Z2] cites [Z1] and [Ch]: it discusses set forcing over admissible sets and certain cases of class forcing. [Z3] cites [Z1], [Z2] and [Z3]; it does both set and class forcing over models of $\text{ZF}$-. [Z3] cites none of the above, but it might be re-read in the light of the theory of rudimentary recursion.

A possible line of attack is this: suppose that $M$ is a transitive model of some class theory, so that $M$ has members of all ranks $\leq \lambda$, where $\lambda$ is a limit ordinal. For example, in the case of Morse–Kelley, $M$ might be $V_{\kappa+1}$ where $\kappa$ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal. Pass to the provident closure, $N$ of $M$, as defined in [M4] and [MB]. $N$ will be of height $\lambda \omega$. Now the class forcing one had in mind for $M$ will be a member of $N$, and therefore we can treat the problem as one of set forcing over the provident set $N$. The attraction of this approach is that names for members of $N$ can be explicitly laid out, since the ordinals in $N$ are all of the form $\lambda n + \zeta$ where $\zeta < \lambda$.

References


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