Axiomatization of values of cooperative games using a fairness property
Volume 32 / 2005
Applicationes Mathematicae 32 (2005), 69-86 MSC: Primary 91A12. DOI: 10.4064/am32-1-6
We propose new systems of axioms which characterize four types of values of cooperative games: the Banzhaf value, the Deegan–Packel value, the least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. The common element used in these axiomatizations is a fairness property. It requires that if to a cooperative game we add another game in which two given players are symmetric, then their payoffs change by the same amount. In our analysis we will use an idea applied by R. van den Brink (2001) to obtain an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value.