Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

Volume 80 / 2008

György Szabó Banach Center Publications 80 (2008), 197-215 MSC: Primary 91A22; Secondary 91B72. DOI: 10.4064/bc80-0-10

Abstract

We survey several mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. In these models players are located on the sites of a lattice or graph and they can follow one of the pure strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Their total income comes from Prisoner's Dilemma games with their neighbors. We discuss the consequences of different evolutionary rules determining the time-dependence of the strategy distribution and compare the results of spreading mechanisms of cooperation.

Authors

  • György SzabóResearch Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science
    POB. 49
    H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
    e-mail

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