JEDNOSTKA NAUKOWA KATEGORII A+

Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

Tom 71 / 2006

David M. Ramsey, Krzysztof Szajowski Banach Center Publications 71 (2006), 253-265 MSC: Primary 60C40; Secondary 90A46. DOI: 10.4064/bc71-0-21

Streszczenie

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.

Autorzy

  • David M. RamseyInstytut Matematyki Politechniki Wroc/lawskiej
    Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27
    50-370 Wroc/law
    Poland
    e-mail
  • Krzysztof SzajowskiInstytut Matematyki Politechniki Wroc/lawskiej
    Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27
    50-370 Wroc/law
    Poland
    e-mail

Przeszukaj wydawnictwa IMPAN

Zbyt krótkie zapytanie. Wpisz co najmniej 4 znaki.

Przepisz kod z obrazka

Odśwież obrazek

Odśwież obrazek